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Introduction 
This thesis was inspired by a current problem of Chinese law. The problem, in 
brief, is the inconsistency between the legislation, which criminalizes marital rape, 
and the judicial practices, which decriminalize marital rape, along with the 
controversy about whether or not marital rape should be criminalized. The problem of 
the criminalization of marital rape has been at the center of attention in Chinese 
society during the last three or four years. Unlike in the UK, where an agreement has 
been r eached o n t he criminalization o f m arital r ape i n b oth 1 egislation a nd j udicial 
practices, whether or not a husband can rape his wife is still a matter of discussion and 
debate i n C hina, and remains c ontroversial at the time o f t he writing o f t he thesis. 
While the present Chinese Criminal Code prescribes that a husband can rape his wife, 
the legislation is not followed by the judges in judicial practices and is also rejected 
by many legal scholars. The thesis thus aims firstly to explore this question, trying to 
answer problem of Chinese marital rape law with a solution based on empirical 
researches in the specific Chinese context and the comparative studies of the UK. 
As a result of addressing the practical problem of Chinese marital law, the thesis 
also tries to reflect on the theoretical problems involved, such as the methodologies of 
current comparative law and approaches to law and culture studies. The thesis will 
argue that the dilemma of current Chinese marital rape law has its roots in the law's 
status as a legal transplant. Transplanted from the West, it is not surprising that 
marital rape law is incoherent with traditional Chinese ethics and other cultural 
presuppositions. However, it is the widespread misunderstandings of the concept of 
culture, as well as the mechanism through which culture exerts influences on law, that 
has bedevilled the academic and political analysis of this issue. The 
misunderstandings concerning culture and law in turn result from insufficiencies in 
the methodology of comparative law to incorporate culture and law studies. 
Therefore, the other crucial goal of the thesis is to propose a new approach of culture 
and law studies for the solution of the Chinese marital rape law problem. 
So, in Chapter 1, before the concrete discussions of Chinese marital rape law, I 
will first give a brief review of comparative law as discipline. I will suggest that the 
present approaches a re iiiadequate b oth for t he st udies o f c ultural i mpacts o n 1 egal 
transplants as well as the prevalent understandings of the concept of culture. Then in 
the third part of Chapter 1, I will give a brief review of the writings about marital rape 
in China. 
In Chapter 2, I will give fairly thorough introduction to the background of marital 
rape in China, including the relevant legislation, judicial practices, law people's 
debates and lay people's attitudes. I demonstrate a historical evolution of rape law in 
Chinese legislation from the feudalist China to the current criminal code, which now 
covers the crime of marital rape. As readers can see from the legislative history, the 
crime of marital rape in the current Chinese code is the result not of the gradual 
evolution of native Chinese legal tradition but of the abrupt legal borrowing from the 
West. For judicial practices, I have collected all the marital rape cases available in 
China from various sources. By studying the decisions made by the courts in all the 
cases collected, I find that the marital exemption of rape is still the major principle 
followed b y C hinese j udges. I t hen introduce t he r eader t o t he major opinions and 
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debates of legal scholars and lawyers about marital rape. Readers are pointed to the 
present approaches to culture and law studies that are employed by these writers. 
Finally I introduce the attitudes of the public, the common people, towards the 
problem of marital rape. Lay attitudes are the most fundamental cultural elements 
affecting law. These attitudes are based on the empirical data collected from the 800 
questionnaires in surveys I conducted in one middle -sized city and, especially, three 
villages and one small rural town. With the surveys focusing on rural areas, the results 
should be representatives of the attitudes of the rural population, which make up the 
largest portion of Chinese population. Overall, I aim in Chapter Two to offer a pure 
descriptive picture of marital rape problem in China, which will later on work as the 
empirical foundation for my theoretical analyses in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 will analyze the empirical data obtained in Chapter Two. I will 
examine the same data with two different approaches and try to make comparison 
between them. First I will analyze them with the current culture approach. I then 
construct my alternative account based on the theory of memetics, which will be 
introduced in detail as the preparation for my theoretical construction. The core of my 
new approach is to offer a different way of understanding what culture is and to depict 
a concrete mechanism through which cultural elements exert their influence on law. 
After the new methodology is constructed, I will úse it to analyze again the empirical 
data in Chapter One. Arriving at different conclusions, I will try to show how the new 
approach can make up the insufficiencies of current approach and provide better 
solutions to the Chinese marital rape law problem. 
After addressing the problem of Chinese marital rape law, I will turn to the west 
in Chapter 4, taking the UK as an example to gather more support for the validity of 
the new approach. In this chapter, I will review the evolution of marital rape law in 
England, together with Scotland, and examine how cultural elements worked in the 
evolutionary process of law. Finding my new approach also applicable here in a 
cultural environment so different from China, the new approach may make itself 
better established. 
The final Chapter 5 is a revisit to the theoretical context of marital rape. In this 
chapter, I hope to provide, on a theoretical level, possible solutions to the problems 
found in Chapter 1. I will try to argue that the memetic approach is the remedy for the 
comparative law's methodological inefficiency concerning marital rape, and it can 
also overcome the conceptual deficiency of culture. 
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Chapter 1 Putting marital rape into 
theoretical context 
The aim of the thesis is to pursue the solution of the problems surrounding the 
current Chinese marital rape law. The core of the problem, as I will explain in detail, 
is that the legislation criminalizing marital rape is not followed in the judicial practice. 
But before I start the specific study of marital rape law in China, I will give in this 
chapter a general introduction to the theories and methodologies that are currently 
available to offer possible solutions to the problem. 
A central role is played by comparative legal research. Marital rape law in China 
is essentially a legal transplant from the West. The work of Alan Watson has 
demonstrated how comparative law can address the problems pertinent to my study, 
like how a legal transplant can survive in a foreign society. So the discipline of 
comparative law will be the first that I will offer a short account of in this chapter. 
Another important element concerns the concept of culture. As I will argue, the 
root of the problem of Chinese marital rape law lies in the conflicts between its 
western origin and its traditional Chinese cultural environment. An analysis of this 
question obviously presupposes a shared and explicit understanding of "culture ". 
Since it is far from granted that such a shared understanding exists in the literature, I 
will try to give a basic overview of the most prevalent assumptions in this field. 
Finally, I will also conduct a literature review in China of the criminalisation of 
marital rape, through which we can have a brief idea about to what extent the current 
methodology can be helpful with the marital rape problem in China, and, on the other 
hand, what inadequacies of current methodology have actually contributed to this 
problem of law. 
1.1 Review of comparative law 
1.1.1 General 
Comparative studies of law in the broadest sense have had a long history in both 
the east and the west. Throughout Chinese history, there are frequent examples of 
comparative studies between different legal systems. During the so called the "Spring 
Autumn and Warring State Period" (770 - --221 BC), China saw the emergence of a 
multitude of small kingdoms, each of which had its own legal system. While these 
small kingdoms were trying to prevail in the tough competition for survival, each of 
them felt the need to improve their legal system as the means to increase their power. 
Therefore, learning and borrowing from other legal systems became popular.' This is 
why the School of Legalists (FA JIA) flourished, and also what promoted the 
comparative studies of other legal systems at the time. An example is the first 
recorded law code in China, FA JING (The Code) compiled by Li Li (about 455 - -- 
1 Shen Zongling, Study of Comparative Law, Peking University Press, 1998, p33 -34. 
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395BC) from the Kingdom Wei. Li was said to have "collected the codes of all the 
kingdoms in order to make his six chapters of FA JING ".2 
After the reunification of China by the First Emperor in 221BC, synchronic 
comparisons of different legal systems in different countries became virtually 
impossible. This is primarily because the unified China established a tradition of 
centralized state power, which supplemented the legal systems of the small kingdoms 
with one centralized legal system. While there were occasional contacts in history 
with s orne d ifferent c ivilizations o r k ingdoms o r t ribes n eigbouring C hina, like t he 
Huns or Mongolians, or the kingdom of Japan, Chinese feelings of the superiority of 
their own legal and political system precluded study of different legal systems.3 
However, diachronic comparisons between the laws of different dynasties had 
remained an important tradition till the very last dynasty of Qing.4 
The diachronic comparative studies of the laws of previous dynasties were 
typically instigated by the lawmakérs of the new sovereign. As a rule, the sovereign of 
a new dynasty immediately tried to replace the existing law through a code of their 
own at the beginning of their reign.5 These new codes, however, never result in a total 
break with the past. On the contrary, the newly imposed law would frequently refer to 
the law of the previous dynasty or dynasties. This is almost a universal pattern 
whenever there was a change of dynasties.6 For example, even before the foundation 
of Qing dynasty, the Manchurian emperor, Huangtaiji, had decided the principle of 
"referring to the laws of Han Chinese and Jin ", (CAN HAN ZHUO JIN), for the 
establishment of the Manchurian Kingdom's own legal system. After Qing dynasty 
was founded, Emperor Shunzhi issued a decree, demanding "detailed translations of 
Ming laws into Manchurian language (XIANG Y I MING L V) " for the making of 
Qing 1 aws.8 Thus t he legislation o f e arly Q ing codes i nvolved d eep a nd sy stematic 
comparative studies of the laws of Ming and other previous dynasties.9 
The diachronic comparative studies were also carried out by the historians of each 
dynasty. It was a tradition that each Chinese dynasty would write an official history of 
its own and often the history of the previous dynasty as well, usually known as 
dynastic histories. There were also several well known non -official histories written 
by individual historians.10 Usually in each of the histories, there are special volumes 
on laws, which recorded and also made comments and comparisons of the legal 
systems of different dynasties." For example, the Law Volume in HAN SHU, the 
Dynastic History of Han, gave systematic records of the changes and developments of 
law from Zhou, Qin till the late West Han Dynasty.l2 
The diachronic c omparative studies w ere also d one b y t he traditional LV X UE 
JIA, or the traditional Chinese law scholars.13 LV XUE JIA had a wide range of 
objectives of study, covering lawmaking, legal interpretations, legal enforcement, 
2 Commentaries of Tang Codes (TANG LV SHU YI), vol. 1. 
3 Shen Zongling, p33. 
4 Shen Zongling, p34. 
5 Shen Zongling, p34. 
6 Shen Zongling, p721 
7 Wang Limin, The History of Chinese Law, China Finance and Economy Press, 2001, p381. 
8 Ibid. p382. 
9 Ibid. p382. 
1° SHI JI (The History) by SIMA QIAN, for example, covers several dynasties starting from the legendary 
emperors through Xia, Shang, Zhou, till Qin and Han Dynasty when the author lived. 
11 Shen Zongling, Study of Comparative Law, p721 
12 Ban Gu, Law volume in the Dynastic History of Han (HAN SHU XING FA ZHI), Zhonghua Book Company 
(ZHONG HUA SHU JU), 1962, p1079. 
3 LV XUE JIA, the traditional Chinese law scholars, is now a term in Chinese language to distinguish from FA 
XUE JIA, or the law scholars in the modern western sense. 
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forms of law, comparative studies of laws in different dynasties, relations of law with 
morality and LI, methodology of case study, etc. On a micro -level, they studied 
whether a crime was well defined or whether a particular word was appropriate or not 
to the precise meaning that a legal rule tried to convey. On a macro -level, they studied 
the questions like the origin of law or the social function of law.14 Xue Yunsheng 
(1820 -1901) in late Qing is an example. He compiled the 30 volumes of Co- 
compilation of Tang and Ming Codes, in which he carried out deep comparative 
studies of Tang and Ming codes. After the full Tang and Ming Codes, Xue attached at 
the end of the book also the special laws and decrees in the two dynasties. He 
compared and analyzed the concrete provisions of the two codes, finding their 
advantages a nd d isadvantages, locating t he s ources o f t he 1 aws, and a rriving a t t he 
conclusion that the Tang Code was generally better than the Ming Code. 15 
However, comparative law, as it is practiced today as a scientific and theoretical 
discipline, is totally of western origin. In ancient Greece, the large number of city - 
states offered a very 'good chance for comparative studies of different legal systems. 
Solon of Athens based his own famous legislation on comparative studies of laws in 
other city- states.16 Plato, in Laws, also provides a comparison of the laws of the city - 
states, describing them as well as testing them against the ideal constitution that he 
abstractly constructed.17 Aristotle is said to have examined the constitutions of no less 
than 153 city- states, though only his treatment of Athens has survived.18 
Rome was usually thought to have no tradition of comparative legal scholarship, 
mainly because of their feelings of the superiority of their own laws.19 However, in 5th 
century BC, when the Law of the Twelve Tables was being made, people were sent 
from Rome to study the laws in Greece.20 And according to some comparatists, the 
first work of comparative legal studies in the west was the Collatio legum4 
Mosaicarum et Romanarum in 4th century2', in which comparison was made between 
the Roman law and the law of Moses, though the author of the work is unknown.22 
In the Middle Ages, given the dominating authority of canon and Roman law, 
comparative study of law was in decline. We do find however some comparative 
studies between canon and Roman law,23 or, in England, the comparisons between the 
Common Law and Roman law, for instance, in the works of Fortescue, De Laudibus 
legumf Angliae or The Governance of England.24 
The Age of Humanism was the age of the recognition of the theoretical value of 
the methods of comparative law.25 Francis Bacon is said to be the first one to use the 
term of comparative law. In reply to the enquiry of James I about the integration of 
the 1 aws o f England and S cotland, h e suggested t hat 1 awyers from t he t wo n ations 
"should collaborate in the preparation of a digest in which the laws of the two 
countries `may be collated and compared and that the diversities may appear and be 
14Wu Jianfan, Ma Xiaohong, Interpreting Traditional Chinese Laws, Promoting Traditional Legal Merits, 
http://www.cass.net.cn/webnew/file/200302285449.html 
15 Xue Yunsheng, Co- compilation of Tang and Ming Codes(TANG MING LV HE BIAN), Law Press, 1999. 
16 Shen Zongling, p21. 
17 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3`d edtion, 1998, p49. 
18 Zweigert and Kötz, p49. 
19 Zweigert & Kötz, p49. 
20 Livy, Book III, The History of Rome. See Livy with an English translation by B. O. Foster, London: William 
Heinemann, New York: G. R. Putnam's Sons, p109. 
21 Gutteridge, Comparative Law, An Introduction to the Comparative Method & Research, Cambridge University 
Press, 1949, p. 11. 
22 K. Kagan, Three Great Systems of Jurisprudence, 1955, pp.4 -5. 
23 Shen Zongling, p22. 
24 Zweigert & Kötz, p49 -50. 
25 Zweigett & Kötz, p50. 
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discerned "'.26 He stated in his essay, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, that the 
lawyer must free himself .11e vincula of his national system before he can estimate its 
true worth: the object of judgment (the national law) cannot be the standard of 
judgment. "The perception, as valid now as ever, justifies all comparative 
researches ".27 The German philosopher G. Leibniz has also made his contribution, 
with his design of a plan for the comparative study of the laws of all peoples, places 
and times.28 Later on, Grotius, Montesquieu, and others "have expressly used the 
method of comparative law to give empirical support to the teachings of natural law29. 
Though comparative approach had been occasionally applied in the past, 
according to R. David, however, comparative law was not recognized as an 
independent discipline or a basic methodology of legal science before 19th century.3° 
The mid and late 19th century saw many important events marking the rise of 
comparative law as an independent discipline of legal studies, most importantly 
perhaps, the foundation of the International Congress for Comparative Law, launched 
by the French scholars Edouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles in Paris in 1900. This 
marks the beginning of comparative law as we know it today. 
At the Congress, comparative law was given the aim of finding the "droit commun 
legislatif , or the common law of mankind, according to Saleilles. Such a confident 
claim was in tune with the historical circumstances of the time, the "disarming belief' 
in progress or rationalism.31 Under these circumstances, rationalism was expected to 
offer a methodology with sufficient power to overcome any legal differences or 
barriers to the destination of achieving the goal set for comparative law. "At this stage 
in methodology, the principal aim and object of comparison is to create a rational 
science of law which could permit the formulation of norms appropriate to nineteenth 
century society in Continental Europe ". 32 Measured against such a belief in 
rationalism, differences of different legal systems, like cultural differences, could 
mostly be "accidental" and surely be overcome: 
"Comparative law must resolve the accidental and divisive differences in the 
laws of peoples at similar stages of cultural and economic development, and reduce 
the number of divergencies in law, attributable not to the political, moral, or social 
qualities of the different nations but to historical accident or to temporary or 
contingent circumstances ".33 
However, later development of c omparative law did not follow the r oadmap as 
drawn at the Congress. "The belief in progress, so characteristic of 1900, has died. 
World wars have weakened, if not destroyed, faith in world law". 34 Cultural 
differences, accordingly, are not as easy to handle as expected. Subsequent 
26 Gutteridge, Comparative Law, An Introduction to the Comparative Method & Research, Cambridge University 
Press, 1949, p14. 
27 Zweigert & Kötz, p50. 
28 Leibniz's Philosophical Papers and Writings, edt. by L. Loemker, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, 1969, 
p6. 
29 Zweigert & Kötz, p50. 
30 R. David, "comparative law, Study of' in Encyclopedia Britannica. 
31 Zweigert & Kötz, p2 -3. 
32 Marc Ancel, "Les grandes etaes de la recherché comparative au XXe siecle ", Studi in memoria di Andrea 
Torrente (1968) 21. Quoted from Zweigert & Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, p59. 
33 Lambert, `Conception générale et définition de la science du droit comparé', Procécsverbaux des séances et 
documents, Congrés international de droit compare I (1905) 26. Quoted from Zweigert & Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law, p3. 
34 Zweigert & Kötz, p3. 
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comparatists became rather modest and timid when talking about the aim and 
methodology of comparative law, especially in cases where radical cultural 
differences are involved. 
Zweigert and Kötz published their An Introduction to Comparative Law in 1970s, 
the work which "remains the single most important methodological exposition of 
comparative law and may serve as a representative for all comparative legal 
studies ".35 In this work, Zweigert and Kötz established their well -known functionalist 
approach. Instead of the common law of mankind, they set for comparative law much 
more modest functions and aims: an aid to the legislator, a tool of construction, a 
component of the curriculum of the universities, and a contribution to the systematic 
unification of law and the development of a private law common to the whole of 
Europe.36 To achieve the aims, Zweiget & Kötz rely on much more empirical and 
concrete methodology of functionality, referring to the concrete problems of life 
whose solutions are functions of law.37 In law, the only things that are comparable are 
those which fulfill the same function, which means those which work as the solutions 
of the same problem of life.38 Under this basic methodological principle, it is assumed 
that "the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems".39 
With this functionalist methodology, comparatists were able to efficiently conduct 
comparisons into a variety of legal problems, including obligations or property.40 
However, when faced with laws regulating highly culture specific practices, like for 
instance family law, Zweigert and Kötz seem to find their functionalist approach 
reaching the limits of its validity. By finding that there are many areas of social life 
influenced by especially strong moral and ethical feelings, particularities of religion, 
tradition, cultural development, etc, they admit "there are areas in comparative law 
where judgment must be suspended ". 41 
Apparently, the functionalist approach becomes problematic in comparative 
family law, and by implication also the marital rape problem. Kahn -Freund, however, 
while acknowledging the difficulty comparative law has with family law, takes a 
much more optimistic attitude towards such difficulty, based on his reading of 
Montesquieu. Montesquieu had thought that legal transplantation is possible only in 
most exceptional cases, where environmental factors, such as cultural, geographical, 
social and economic factors, are not operative.42 According to Kahn- Freund, the force 
of Montesquieu's environmental factors are diminishing year by year while in today's 
world political factors are playing a much more forceful role in legal transplantation 
than environmental factors like culture.43 This is also true even with family law, 
whose cultural roots are so obvious.44 He therefore concludes that, for the risk of 
rejection encountered by legal transplants, "all I have wanted to suggest is that its use 
requires a knowledge not only of the foreign ,law, but also of its social, and above all 
35 Burkhard Schafer, "Form Follows Function Fails - --as a Sociological Foundation of Comparative Law ", Social 
Epistemology, 1999, vol. 13, No. 2, 113 -128. 
36 Zweigert & Kötz, p16. 
37 Ibid. p34. 
38 Ibid. p34. 
39 Ibid. p34. 
4° Ibid. Part II, p323 -708. 
41 Ibid. p39 -40. 
42 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, New York: Legal Classics Library, 1994. See Book 14 -17 about law's relation 
with climate, Book 18 about terrain, Book 20 -21 about commerce, Book 24 -25 about religion. 
43 Kahn -Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, Modern Law Review, 1974, vol. 37, p8 -13. 
44 Ibid. part vii, p13 -17. 
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its political, context. The use of comparative law for practical purposes becomes an 
abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores this context of law. "45 
So, in contrast with the complete silence of the functionalist, Kahn -Freund tries to 
offer the option of political force as a counterweight against the cultural forces in 
family law. But in the eyes of Alan Watson, Kahn -Freund is still too conservative and 
pessimistic. In Watson's opinion, systematic knowledge of the law or political 
structure of the donor system was not necessary for legal transplantation, and 
"successful borrowing could be achieved even when nothing was known of the 
political, social or economic context of the foreign law ".46 Watson later on developed 
his notion of "law out of context" even further, claiming that "law is largely 
autonomous and not shaped by societal needs; though legal institutions will not exist 
without corresponding social institutions, law evolves from the legal tradition.i47 And, 
"the connection of a legal rule with any one environment is less intimate than may be 
supposed. It is a characteristic of a legal rule to be made for and to fit into very 
different circumstances ".48 Therefore, according to Watson, even if dramatic changes 
take place in society, politically, economically or religiously, the law can remain the 
same or change only a little.49 And law can also travel cross jurisdictions with striking 
historical or cultural differences.50 With such an approach, cultural elements or other 
factors in the social context becomes so unimportant to comparative law that they 
could often be virtually ignored. 
On the other extreme, we find Pierre Legrand. While Watson completely denies 
the connection between law and social context, Pierre Legrand completely denies the 
possibility of legal transplants, claiming that "In any meaningful sense of the term, 
`legal transplant', therefore, cannot happen ".51 And the reason given by Legrand to 
the impossibility of legal transplant is culture. Law, in Legrand's own words, "is, first 
and foremost, a cultural phenomenon ",52 and therefore, a French painting can offer as 
much understanding of the French legal mind as any article of the French civil code.53 
However, it is impossible for one to know completely the mind from another culture. 
So, it is impossible for a French lawyer to think like an English lawyer just as it is 
impossible for u s t oday to t ruly p erceive t he s ignificance o f S hakespeare's p lay o f 
`The Merchant of Venice ".54 Thus, "how to compare now " ?! What Legrand calls into 
doubt is not only the concept of legal transplant but the whole discipline of 
comparative law. Unsurprisingly, his assessment of existing comparative work is 
often scathing: "superficial ", "disappointing ", "extremely problematic, if not 
precarious ", etc.55 Contrary to Watson, Legrand thinks that cultural differences make 
comparative law virtually impossible. 
Zweigert and Kötz's functionalist approach finds its limits in the cultural factors 
influencing law. Legrand offers as an answer his "culturalist" approach, a name 
chosen by m e b ecause t he approach i s b ased o n cultural factor j ust a s Zweigert & 
45 Kahn -Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law", Modem Law Review, 1974, vol. 37, p27. 
46 Watson, "Legal Transplant and Law Reform ", Law Quarterly Review, 1976, vol.92, p79. 
47 Watson, The Evolution of Law, Oxford Blackwell, 1985, p119. 
48 Watson, Society and Legal Change, Temple University Press, 2001, chapter 9, p111. 
49 Watson, "Law Out Of Context", Edinburgh Law Review, vol4, p147. 
50 For examples, see Watosn, Legal Transplant, The University of Georgia Press, 1993, p108. 
51' Pierre Legrand, "Impossibility of Legal Transplant ", Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative law, vol. 
4, 1997, p120. 
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Kötz's functionalist approach is based on functionality. But Legrand's culturalist 
approach offers little help either because such approach actually says that once there 
are cultural elements, we should just stop the comparative studies of law. For the 
functionalist in the tradition of Zweigert and Kötz, a rational comparison between 
Chinese and western law would have to presuppose a shared understanding of the 
problem the law tries to address. However, if there were such a shared understanding, 
transplantation of Western law should have been less problematic than it turned out to 
be in practice. For the culturalist approach of Legrand on the other hand, even the 
limited success of the transplant becomes inexplicable. So, from the silence of 
Zweigert & Kötz's functionalism to the virtual impossibility of comparison of 
Legrand's culturalism, comparative law so far has failed to offer an efficient 
methodology to deal with the culture- impacted laws like the Chinese marital rape law 
at hand. - 
1.1.2 Two problems of comparative law 
The drawbacks in the methodology of comparative law inevitably cause problems 
to the academic study of foreign law, and even more to comparative law as a practical 
tool of lawmakers. Measured against its own aspirations, comparative law 
consistently fails to fulfill its core functions. 
The first is the most fundamental function of comparative law: the ability to 
compare, or the ability to produce true comparisons and to establish comparative legal 
knowledge. Comparative law "is the comparison of the different legal systems in the 
world". 56 So the ability to compare is essential for comparative law to exist. As 
Zweigert and Kötz say, "no study deserves the name of science if it limits itself to 
phenomena arising within its national boundaries ", "and comparative law offers the 
only way by which law can be international and consequently a science ".57 Also, "the 
method of comparative law can provide a much richer range of model solutions than a 
legal science devoted to a single nation ", and "it dissolves unconsidered national 
prejudices, and helps us to fathom the different societies and cultures of the world and 
to further international understanding ".58 However, these aims can be achieved only 
when comparative law can justify the epistemological truth claims that it makes. Once 
it is accepted that there are at least some categories of laws which defy comparative 
analysis, the problem becomes one of demarcation. However, as our overview of the 
methodological history of comparative law has shown, these demarcations are highly 
unstable. Once we have established why some laws defy comparison, the same 
reasons seem to apply equally to other fields of law. Once culture is accepted as 
limitation of comparative analysis, the next step, the claim that all laws are culturally 
determined, seems inevitable. 
The second function of comparative law is its use as a tool for law makers. 
"Legislators all over the world have found that on many matters good laws cannot be 
produced without the assistance of comparative law ". 59 The benefit of legal 
transplants, which "is extremely useful for law reform in developing countries "60, is 
what makes comparative law so attractive to modern day China. China is now heavily 
engaged in constructing the so- called "the modern legal system of China" through the 
s6 Zweigert & Kötz, p2. 
57Ibid. p15. 




transplantation of western models and solutions.61 Zweigert and Kötz seem quite 
happy to confirm to Chinese people this significant function of comparative law by 
claiming that "even outside Europe states which used to be `Soviet republics' are 
finding that foreign laws can be of assistance in-framing domestic legislation, as have 
the (People's) Republic of China and many of the developing nations in Africa ".62 
It is true that these two functions are performed well in many cases. But it is 
equally true that in at least as many cases, comparative law dramatically fails to live 
up to its expectations. I will give to each of the above functions an example in which 
the function of comparative law is not fulfilled. 
The first example of the limits of comparative law in fulfilling its main function, 
the production of true comparative knowledge, is given by Zweigert & Kötz 
themselves in their An Introduction to Comparative Law. After analyzing concrete 
examples with their functionalist method, Zweigert and Kötz seem to have proven the 
expected effectiveness of the approach and happily confirmed their conclusions that: 
"different legal systems give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to 
the same problems of life, despite the great differences in their historical 
development, conceptual structure, and style of operation. "63 
However, when they come to a special category of laws that are deeply affected 
by cultural elements, of which family law is a typical example, Zweigert and Kötz 
suddenly become much less confident with the above conclusion and start to hesitate: 
"Should freedom of testation be curtailed in the interests of a decedent's widow 
and family ?Under what conditions should divorce be possible? Should same -sex 
marriages be permitted or some comparable legal regime be on offer? Should 
unmarried persons be allowed to adopt ? "64 
Recognizing the difficulty in answering all the family law problems, Zweigert & 
Kötz admit: 
"It is true that there are- many areas of social life which are impressed by 
especially strong moral and ethical feelings, rooted in the particularities of the 
prevailing religion, in historical tradition, in cultural development, or in the character 
of people. These factors differ so much from one people to another that one cannot 
expect the rules which govern such areas of life to be congruent." And "So there are 
areas in comparative law where judgment must be suspended, where the student 
simply cannot say which solution is better. "65 
The s uspension o fj udgment r eveals s erious problems i n t he ability t o produce 
true comparative knowledge, which has actually taken away the most fundamental 
foundation for comparative law to exist, either as a theoretical discipline or as a 
practical tool. In fact, there has been a long - standing view that family law presents 
61 Shen Zongling, p724 -725. 
62 Zweigert and Kötz, p17. The original text of Zweigert and Kötz is "the Republic of China" while they actually 
refer to the People's Republic of China. Zweigert and Kötz made a political as well as legal mistake here. The 
official name of what is usually known as China now, with Beijing as the capital, is the People's Republic of China 
not the Republic of China. The Republic of China was used as the name of China from 1911 to 1949. However, the 
Chinese island of Taiwan, still, temporarily claims itself as the Republic of China, which, according to most 
national governments and the international law, is not an independent nation. 
63 Zweigert and Kötz, p39. 
64 Ibid. p39. 
65 Ibid. p39, p40. 
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particular difficulties for comparatists.66 But inability to compare means much more 
than difficulty but virtually the impossibility of comparative law per se. No wonder 
some people even doubt whether there can really be comparative family law.67 
Once this is acknowledged, the very discipline of comparative law is in trouble. 
According to the basic assumption of comparative law, these family laws ought to be 
comparable because they are about the same problems of life, like same -sex marriage 
laws for instance, which are regulation of two people coordinating their lives in a 
particularly intimate way. But they turn out to be incomparable. This indicates a 
tension in the methodology of comparative law. 
Meanwhile, on a more practical level, other functions of comparative law like 
international understanding and the general science of law can no longer be fulfilled 
either, at least in the field of family law. This however would be deeply worrying. 
After all, most international private law cases are concerned with family law, and here 
lawyers seem to find it unproblematic to decide whether or not foreign legal concepts 
are functionally equivalent to domestic law. Comparative law should at least be able 
to explain this ability of lawyers, many of whom are untrained in comparative legal 
analysis. 
The example of Chinese marital rape law, the main theme of the thesis, 
exemplifies the failure to fulfill the second function of comparative law, that of 
supporting legislators. As in many traditional societies, coercive sexual action by the 
husband against his wife was not recognized in law as a crime in China.68 However, 
the idea of criminalizing marital rape has entered Chinese legislation, not as a result of 
native social evolution but as a part of the governing elites' effort to learn from the 
west.69 Without excluding husband from the subject of the crime of rape, present law 
has made marital rape a crime.70 
But, in practice, in most marital rape cases so far, defendants were not convicted 
despite of the provisions of the code.71 Indeed, when commenting on one of the few 
cases in which the defendant was convicted, the Supreme Court still concluded that 
"generally speaking, husband cannot be the subject of the crime of rape against his 
wife "72, which is contrary to express statutory provision. 
Legal transplantation has brought the laws against marital rape to China, but it 
has turned out to be ineffective when confronted with social reality in China. Chinese 
marital rape law thus becomes a counterexample of Alan Watson's theory of law out 
of context, and it also fails comparative law's function, claimed by Zweigert and 
Kötz, to help the lawmakers produce "good laws ".73 
1.2 Review of theories of culture 
After the review of the discipline of comparative law, I will briefly discuss some 
common perceptions of the term "culture ". This is necessary to substantiate my 
argument that the problems identified above result from marital rape law's conflicts 
with traditional Chinese cultural elements. It is easy to say that culture influences law; 
it is easy to claim that cultural factors play a role in the problems of Chinese marital 
66 David, 'Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and Political Economy.' Oxford Comparative Law 
Forum 2 (2001). 
67 Glendon, "Irish Family Law in Comparative Perspective ", 9 Dublin University Law Journal (1987), 1. 
68 See Chapter Two for detailed discussions. 
69 See the legislative background of marital rape law in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of the thesis. 
70 Wu Xiaofang, "Consortium & Marital Rape", People's Court Daily, 15` Nov. 2000. 
71 See Chapter 2.2 of the thesis. 
72 No. 1 Criminal Division, Supreme People's Court: Reference to Criminal Trial, Vol 2, 2000, p 28. 
73 Zweigert & Kötz, p16. 
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rape law. But it is essential for us to make clear first what we exactly mean by culture 
before we talk about its role in legal problems. 
Quite often, the concept of culture functions as a catch -all expression, with too 
many different aspects covered under the same concept of "culture ". Language is 
doubtlessly an important part of a culture. So is food which typically varies from 
culture to culture. Is it the Chinese language, i which the Chinese marital rape law is 
written, that damages the law's validity? Or is the greasy and oily Chinese food that 
makes it hard for the marital rape law to keep its feet on Chinese ground? Or, as 
Legrand says, does law have close connections even with artistic works like a 
painting? Can a concept that was developed in a culture that exhibited (at the time of 
its legal acceptance) pickled sheep as art be transferred to one dominated by socialist 
realism? What really is "culture" as usually understood in its relation with law? 
Perhaps surprisingly, the very concept of culture for the Chinese people, like 
marital rape law, is something recently imported from the west. This of course does 
not mean that China was until then uncultured. Just that there was no need to have a 
single concept for the variety of cultural expressions pertinent in China. China's own 
ethics, moralities, philosophies, art, literature, etc. had had such an overwhelming 
dominance for thousands of years in the whole world known to Chinese people that 
they just took all that is now called Chinese culture as absolute and ultimate, without 
the relativistic concept of culture. Or put differently, the very concept of culture also 
implies a concept of "the other ". Such a concept came into Chinese mind only when 
they r ealized at the beginning of 20th century that different c ultures a lso existed in 
Europe a nd o ther p arts of t he w orld. F rom t hen o n, C hinese understandings o f t he 
concept are also mostly imported from the west, at least as far as academic discourse 
is concerned. 
As it is understood today in China, culture is usually taken as an ambiguous and 
uncertain concept. Professor Liang Zhiping says: "Culture, as a technical term, is a 
somewhat ambiguous and flexible concept. Definitions of it in academia should be no 
less than one hundred, but none could be accepted by all people as unchallenged 
authority ".74 He mentions some of the definitions, all of which are western. 
The first definition that he introduces is from Duncan Mitchell's A Dictionary of 
Sociology, which defines culture as a complicated social phenomenon, covering 
beliefs, literature, arts, ideologies, technologies, etc. This definition covers almost 
everything.75 
The second example is from E. Tylor, who defined the culture in its widest 
anthropological sense as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society ".76 
Professor Liang also quotes the definition by the contemporary American 
anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, according to which culture is the mode of behavior, 
the core of which is traditional values.77 
Compared to Liang Zhiping, Professor Gong Peixiang from Nanjing University 
thinks the concept of culture is even more complicated. He refers to more than two 
hundred attempted definitions.7 8 He tries to summarize them and classify these 
74 Liang zhiping, On Law: The Past, Present and Future of Chinese Law, Guizhou Renmin Press, 1992, pl. 
75 Ibid. pl. 
76 Ibid. pl. 
77 Ibid. p2. 
78 Gong Peixiang, The Historic Logic of the Oriental Legal Culture, Law Press, 2001, p2. 
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definitions into three different types. Again the examples he gives of each type are all 
western in origin. 
The first type of definitions of culture, according to Professor Gong, are those in 
anthropological sense. These see culture as the mode of behavior of people. The 
example he gives for this type is also the definition by E. Taylor as Professor Liang 
has mentioned. 79 
The second type are sociological definitions, which take culture as the life 
structure of social history and the system of value reflecting such a structure. And the 
example of this type is the definition in the Spanish World Encyclopedia that culture 
F -are all the social and material achievements and values, which constitute the 
civilization and are transmitted by she society.80 
The third type of definitions axe psychological, which interpret culture in terms of 
the reflections of common importance of people's basic psychological status in the 
society. The example for this type is Freud who defines culture on the basis of the 
mechanism of social pressure and children's psychology.81 
Let u s now take a c loser 1 ook a t studies i n the west, which exert considerable 
influences in China, and especially at the fairly recent studies from a law -related 
perspective. 
R. Cotterrell gives a defmition of culture in a broad sense, which "refers to the 
complex of belief, attitudes, cognitive ideas, values and modes of reasoning and 
perception which are typical of a particular society or social group. In this sense 
culture constitutes shared understandings, a common outlook reflected in numerous 
aspects of collective life. "82 
Lawrence M. Friedman highly values the cultural studies of law. He thinks "legal 
culture is an essential intervening variable in the process of producing legal stasis or 
change ".83 He introduces sophisticated differentiation in the concept of culture by 
distinguishing for instance general culture and legal culture. He has defined the 
concept of legal culture in a way that has become almost a classic, which, according 
to Cotterrell, is probably the most sustained effort to build an explicit concept of legal 
culture and to defend theoretically its use.84 
Friedman states that legal culture "refers to public knowledge of and attitudes and 
behavior patterns toward the legal system ". He then offers a variety of ways to deepen 
the understanding of the concept of legal culture from its relation with general culture. 
He claims that legal cultures may also be "bodies of custom organically related to the 
culture as a whole ". Also, legal culture is a part of culture generally: "those parts of 
general culture - -- customs, opinion, ways of doing and thinking -- -that bend social 
forces toward or away from the law and in particular ways ".85 
These definitions, according to Cotterrell, seem to be clusters of quite different 
things juxtaposed. He observes: "The imprecision of these formulations makes it hard 
to see what exactly the concept covers and what the relationship is between the 
various elements said to be included within its scope ".86 
79 Ibid. p2. 
8o Ibid. p2 
81 Ibid. p2. 
82 Cotterrell, "The 
83 Friedman, "The 
84 Cotterrell, "The 
85 Friedman, L.M., 
p193, p194, p15 
86 Cotterrell, "The 
Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p25. 
Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p34. 
Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p14 
The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1975, 
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But Friedman has made even further efforts to clear up the concept. He 
distinguishes between the legal culture of "those members of society who perform 
specialized legal tasks" and that of other citizens. The legal culture of legal 
professionals, which Friedman considers "specially important ", is "internal" legal 
culture. Contrasted with it is what he calls "external" legal culture.87 
Still Cotterrell is critical because the concept of culture per se is problematic for 
legal studies. He says: "Yet, in many circumstances, reliance on a general concept of 
`culture' also makes problematic the theoretical identification of a specifically legal 
culture" because the "vague concept" "serves more of an artistic than a scientific 
function ".88 So Cotterrell develops his own substitute concept for culture, suggesting 
"the concept of legal culture might best be replaced in most contexts of analysis by 
other concepts" and his recommendation for the replacement is what he calls "legal 
ideology ".89 
Legal ideology, according to Cotterrell, "can be considered to be `tied' in a 
relatively specific way to legal doctrine" and "can be regarded as made up of value 
elements and cognitive ideas presupposed in, expressed through and shaped by the 
practices of developing, interpreting and applying legal doctrine within a legal 
system." 90 Therefore, Cotterrell thinks his legal ideology is distinguished from 
Friedman's concept of legal culture as follows: 
"The concept of legal culture, at least in Friedman's formulation, seems to focus 
most directly on a diversity of elements that exert influence on the production of 
`legal acts' with legal systems and are held to explain differences in the character and 
orientation of these systems and their respsonsiveness to interests and demands. 
By contrast, analyses of legal ideology may present a more manageable theoretical 
task insofar a s they explore mechanisms by which law, usually in the sense of the 
professionalized practices of state legal systems, exerts influence on, or translates and 
thereby helps reinforce, wider structures of values, beliefs and understandings "91 
But Cotterrell's efforts are attacked by Friedman, who declares: "The two 
terms(culture and ideology) strike me as equally vague and general ".92 Even Cotterrell 
himself has admitted that: "Like legal culture in Friedman's formulation, legal 
ideology can be regarded not as a unity but rather as an overlay of currents of ideas, 
beliefs, values and attitudes embedded in, expressed through and shaped by 
practice. "93 Both "unity" and "overlay" mean a collection of ideas, beliefs, etc. As a 
result, legal ideology inherits its vagueness from the prior concept of culture. 
Neither Cotterrell nor Friedman can help us to make any substantial progress in 
making clear what the nature of culture exactly is, and the concept remains "equally 
vague and general ". There are perceptions of culture or legal culture by other scholars 
as well. For example, Grossfeld has a special chapter of "Culture and Law" in his The 
Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law. But in this chapter, he describes his 
perceptions of c ulture in very general terms: "Law is culture and culture is law ",94 
87 Friedman, L.M., The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1975, 
p194, p233. 
88 Cotterrell, "The Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, 1997, p37 
89 Ibid. p21. 
90 Ibid. p21 -22. 
91 Ibid. p23. 
92 Ibid. p38. 
93 Ibid. p21. 
94 Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p41. 
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which is even more vague and ambiguous. Professor Erhard Blankenburg from the 
Free University at Amsterdam takes "Civil litigation rates as indicators for legal 
cultures ".95 But this is not theoretic exploration into the nature of legal culture and it 
is unclear just how many other indicators we could identify. Michel de Certeau in his 
Culture in Plural makes a list of six different interpretations and uses of the term 
culture. 96 However, they don't seem either to be able to offer more help than 
Cotterrell and Friedman to obtain clearer understandings about the concept of culture. 
In all the different understandings and perceptions I can find, the concept of 
culture seems to always have two characteristics: being general and being vague. 
Being general means that culture is always understood as something general or 
collective of a society. Being vague means that the concept can cover so many things 
that eventually you don't know what it exactly refers to. 
The definitions may vary in different ways, but they all share the same view of 
taking culture as a general or collective concept. Terms like "complex" of beliefs, 
"common" outlooks, ideas "typical" of the society, "overlay" of values, etc., are all 
expressions to show the general feature of the concept of culture. The generality of the 
concept may contribute to the vagueness of it. Because it is general, many different 
things can be put under the same title, hence the vagueness of the concept. As a result, 
it is often difficult to locate precisely the law- related cultural elements and 
consequently any specific claims about the interaction of law and culture remain 
arbitrary. 
If we want to show how Chinese culture impeded the transplantation of the 
concept of marital rape we have to demand a clear and precise understanding of the 
nature of culture. Unfortunately this is not what current theories of culture can offer. 
1.3 Review of literature on marital rape in China 
Despite the methodological insufficiency and the conceptual deficiency, some 
attempts of a reflexive analysis have been made in Chinese academic literature to 
explore the problem of marital rape. 
Marital r ape i s quite a new t opic t o legal s tudies i n China, w hich w as seldom 
discussed before 1998. However, in 1997, a research paper by Professor Li Dun from 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science, Relationship Between Individual Rights and 
Holistic Interests - -- Analysis of Marital Rape in China from the Perspective of 
Sociology of Law, was published in China Social Science Quarterly in Hong Kong.97 
This was a very early and rare piece of writing on marital rape in China and was 
therefore later re- published on China's mainland in a few academic journals like 
Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law when marital rape had become a 
nationwide hot topic.98 The paper focuses on an empirical analysis based on 15 
marital rape cases that Professor Li has collected, however, many of them were not 
legal cases.99 Disputes in some of the cases were not settled in court. In some other 
95 Erhard Blankenburgh, "Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal Cultures ", Comparing Legal cultures, 
Dartmouth, p41. 
96 De Certeau, Culture in Plural, Minneapolis & London : University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p103. Detailed 
discussions about the list will be in the last chapter of the thesis. 
97 Li Dun, "Relationship Between Individual Rights and Holistic Interests - -- Analysis of Marital Rape in China 
from the Perspective of Sociology of Law", China Social Science Quarterly, 1997, voll8 -19. 
98Li Dun, "Relationship Between Individual Rights and Holistic Interests - -- Analysis of Marital Rape in China 
froin the Perspective of Sociology of Law ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law (XING SHI FA 
PAN JIE), vol.1 1999, p395 
99Ibid. 
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cases, disputes were not settled at all in any form and the victims just had to choose to 
tolerate ií.100 Descriptions of some of the cases were only six or seven sentence -long 
recounts of the stories' that happened and some did not even mention either the times 
or places or the names of the parties involved. Nevertheless, they do provide some 
valuable sociological insights, which are what Professor Li's studies pursue. 101 
The paper consists of five parts. The first part is Introduction, pointing out briefly 
that marital rape in China has different sociological meaning from that in other 
countries.102 The second part is the description of Current Conditions of marital rape 
as sociological facts, consisting mainly of the 15 cases. 103 The third part is 
Interpretation of Law, in which Professor Li argues that law can be understood only 
after it is interpreted by the dominating or mainstream culture in the society and this is 
why the current Chinese marital rape law cannot be applied in practice.104 Then, in 
part four, Background, P rofessor L i explores the dominating culture behind marital 
rape in China. As he argues, in China, holistic interests are superior to individual 
rights, which is a governing principle applicable to both the families and the nation. 
The principle has even higher status than concrete laws. So, even though Chinese 
legislation does not exclude the husband from the subject of the crime of rape, the 
principle of holistic interests has in fact counteracted the effects of legal provisions in 
practice for the sake of the unity of the family or indeed the nation.105 In the final part, 
Problems in Change, Professor Li looks into the future of marital rape law, claiming 
that feminism and other relevant ideas are changing the mainstream culture and the 
inner structure of Chinese law, which create greater awareness in the whole of society 
for women' s personal rights .1°6 
After this work was published, several marital rape cases in late 1999 and 2000 
attracted widespread attention, and marital rape became a widely and openly 
discussed topic in the whole of the country. The most important case was Wang 
Weiming Rape Case in Shanghai in 1999. This was the first marital rape case in 
Shanghai where the defendant was found guilty. The decision of the court came as a 
shock and heated discussions started on marital rape, which since then has become the 
most discussed legal problem in China's history of law.'°7 
The first result of the nationwide interest in marital rape is that the public media 
became very active in reporting marital rape cases. Once a new case takes place, 
prompt reporting in newspapers, magazines or on television and websites ensues,10,8 in 
marked difference to the attitude of the media before. Public media also began to 
revisit old cases, offering more materials for the nationwide discussions.109 As China 
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proved to be of valuable assistance in collecting empirical evidence for the study of 
the problem. 
Apart from case reports, public media also invited lawyers, judges, sociologists, 
law scholars, etc. t o give t heir comments o n the cases a s w ell a s their o pinions o f 
marital rape as a legal problem. For example, Judge Wu Xiaofang from the Supreme 
Court wrote an article in People's Court Daily on 1st January, 2001.110 Dr. Fu Liqing 
from Beijing University gave his opinions in Procuratorial Daily. 11 China Police 
Daily,112 Beijing Evening News' 13 and many other sections of the media also held 
special forums or discussions about marital rape problem. 
The nationwide interests also promoted the academic research into the legal 
problem of marital rape. At the beginning of 2000, immediately following the Wang 
Weiming Case in Shanghai, one of the principal academic journals in Chinese legal 
studies, Law Science (FA XUE), held a special seminar, inviting experts from 
judiciary and academia to discussions on marital rape and making a special issue of 
the journal on marital rape in March 2000.114 Other academic journals like Cases and 
Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law (XING SHI FA PAN JIE), 115 and Case 
Studies (PAN LI YU YAN JN)116 either set up special forum or published series of 
papers on marital rape. 
The papers or articles by lawyers or academia may be classified into three groups. 
The first group explicitly and completely rejects the criminalization of marital rape. 
Examples are "It's improper to criminalize marital rape" by Liu Xianquan, 117 
"Husbands' raping their wives are not criminal" by Shi Meitang.118 Case comments 
by the Supreme Court on Wang Weiming Rape case and Bai Junfeng Rape case 
endorsed this view.119 Writers in this group establish their argument mainly on two 
grounds: legal and cultural. On legal grounds, they argue that a duty of cohabitation is 
already contained in marriage and by voluntary marriage the wife has already given 
the consent to sex with h er husband. T herefore, s exual intercourse within marriage 
ought not to constitute the crime of rape.120 On cultural grounds, they argue that law 
has to respect social context or local resources, and, while as the criminalization of 
marital rape is against traditional Chinese culture and family ethics, it is not a suitable 
legal concept in Chinese context.121 
The second group is oft hose in support of the c riminalization of marital rape. 
Examples are "Jurisprudential research into marital rape" by Professor Cai 
Daotong,122 "On the nature marital rape - -- marital rape should be criminalized in 
China" by Li Lizhong,123 "Husbands can rape their wives" by Shen Liang,124 "Also 
on Marital Rape" by Li Kai,125 "Jurisprudential Analysis on Marital Rape" by Zhou 
.11° People's Court Daily, 1, November, 2001. 
111 Procuratorial Daily, 31, Jan. 2001. 
112 China Police Daily, 24, May, 2001. 
113 Beijing Evening News, 4, Apr. 2001. 
114 Law Science (FA XUE), Vol. 3, 2000. 
115 Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law(XING SHI FA PAN JIE) , vol.1, vol. 4, vol. 5. 
116 Case Studies, (PAN LI YU YAN JIU), vol. 2. 
117 Law Science (FA XUE), vol. 3, 2000. 
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119 Reference to Criminal Trial, vol. 3 in 1999 and vol. 2 in 2000. 
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Yongkun,126 and "On Wang Weiming Rape Case" by Zhou Qi and Hu Zhiguo.127 This 
group also establishes their arguments on two grounds: law and the values of 
women's rights. On legal grounds, they directly contradict the first group, claiming 
that marriage does not necessarily mean the duty of cohabitation or women's 
irrevocable consent to sex and modern law proclaims woman's equal status as a 
person with man. Since Chinese criminal law prescribes general subjects for the crime 
of rape, from which husbands are not excluded, the supposition that in law marriage 
necessarily entails women's consent to sexual intercourse must be wrong.128 Based on 
women's rights notion, they argue it is a fundamental value of modern human society 
to recognize and protect the innate personal rights of women, which certainly include 
their rights of sexual self -determination. Therefore, marital rape, with no substantial 
different from ordinary rape, ought to be criminalized.129 
The third group of writers tries to make a compromise solution and hope to find a 
third way. Dr. Fu Liqing could be' the representative of this group with his paper 
"Marital Rape should wait --- between to be and ought to be ".130 In this paper, Dr. Fu 
recognizes first that marital rape ought to be criminalized. However, due to the 
empirical factors in the current Chinese society, he eventually concludes that marital 
rape for the time b eing has to be decriminalized, at l east p artially.131 Among t hose 
who share the same opinions or arguments, we can also find "Research on the 
localization of marital rape law" by Zhou Huashan,132 and "On feminism and post - 
colonism - -- Rereading Chinese marital rape law" by Zhou Huashan and Zhao 
Wenzong.133 These writers first of all admit that the contemporary law in China, 
which, in essence, has the spirit of modern law, in fact, criminalizes marital rape. 
However, they also argue that traditional Chinese cultural factors like family ethics, 
which are incompatible with the criminalization of marital rape, retain their 
dominating power in current Chinese society. As a consequence, they argue that "air- 
dropped" reforms on marital rape law without caring about the present position of 
women in the patriarchal network of traditional family ethics fail to address the real 
problem.134 They therefore propose gradual change of local resource before the actual 
change o f 1 aw.135 For t he present stage, c onsequently, t hey either argue against the 
complete criminalization of marital rape or argue for the decriminalization of marital 
rape. 
'26 Law Science (FA XUE), vol. 10, 2000. 
127 Case Studies, vol. 2, 2000, p20. Or the website: chinalawinfo .com /xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1452 
(2002/2/11) 
128 Li Kai points out in "Also on Marital Rape ", People's Adjudication, vol. 12, 2000, that current criminal law of 
China has not excluded husbands from the subjects of the crime of rape. Shen Liang, in his "Husbands Can 
Commit the Crimes of Rape on Their Wives ", Law Science, vol. 3, 2000, has also arrived at his conclusions from 
analysis of current criminal law. 
129 Cai Daotong and Li Lizhong have both drawn their conclusions from premise of taking human rights as the 
universal and fundamental value for modern human beings. See "Jurisprudential Research into Marital Rape" by 
Cai Daotong in Criminal Law Review, vol.10, 2002, p499; "On the Nature of Marital Rape - -- Marital Rape Should 
Be Criminalized in China" by Li Lizhong in Journal of Chinese Criminal Law, vol. 1, 2001. See also: Awen, 
"Marital Rape, the Unprosecuted Domestic Violence" in Law and Life, vol. 12, 1999. 
130 Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law, vol. 4. Or the website: 
chinalawinfo .com /xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1504 (2002/2/11). 
131 Fu Liqing, "Marital Rape should wait - -- between to be and ought to be ", 
chinalawinfo .com/xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1504 (2002/2/11). 
132 Zhejiang Academic Journal, vol. 2, 1999. 
133 The Frontier of Law, vol. 3, 1999. 
134 Zhou Huashan, "Research on the Localization of Marital Rape Law ", Zhejiang Academic Journal, vol..2, 1999. 
135 Zhou Huashan and Zhao Wenzong "On Feminism and Post -colon ism - -- Rereading Chinese Marital Rape Law", 
The Frontier of Law, vol. 3, 1999, p52 -74. 
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1.4 Summary 
We can now observe how the comparative law methodology and the concept of 
culture are applied in the arguments in the Chinese literatures on marital rape. 
First of all, we see that cultural factors always play a significant role in the 
argument of all the writings above about marital rape law. Traditional Chinese belief 
in the principle of holistic interests is what Professor Li Dun found as the reason for 
the dilemma of marital rape law. The opponents of the criminalization of marital rape 
also base their conclusion on traditional Chinese cultural factors as essential 
arguments. The supporters, on the other hand, seem to strongly oppose the so- called 
cultural factors of traditional China as the argument for the decriminalization of 
marital rape. Instead they establish their argument for the criminalization of marital 
rape on what they tend to call the "universal and fundamental values of women's 
human r ights ". H owever, human rights n otions i s also a v alue s ystem, which is of 
course covered by the concept of culture usually defined. So the supporters of the 
criminalization of marital rape also have cultural elements as their key arguments. For 
the third group, sadly, it is the conflicts between the two groups of cultural factors that 
force them to compromise on the legal problem of marital rape. 
In the approaches employed by either the supporters or the opponents of the 
criminalization of marital rape, culture is always taken as a general concept as it 
usually is, just as we have seen in the previous review of various definitions of 
culture. In the culture approach thus employed, culture is always viewed as a positive 
and dominating entity in a society. Such an understanding of culture will easily result 
in the tendency for people to take certain category of cultural elements as arguments 
to draw their conclusions. So we find each side based on their category of cultural 
argument, opponents with Confucian ethics and supporters with women's rights 
notions, arriving at their own conclusions about marital rape. 
The s o- called M irror T heory h as a b asic s ociological a ssumption, w hich states 
that a legal system in a society is decided by the social context in which the law 
develops. 136 In this sense, cultural factors can have the ultimate and ontological 
effects on the laws of that society. When the ultimate ontology is different, the law 
accordingly must be different. Therefore, with their opposing cultural arguments, 
supporters and opponents will naturally have opposing conclusions about the 
criminalization of marital rape. 
Viewing culture as a positive and general entity also has effect on comparative 
law. As social context, which covers culture, is the ultimate ontology of laws, it is also 
the ultimate ontology for the comparison of laws in different societies. When the 
ultimate ontology is different, comparative law accordingly will lose its basic 
foundation for comparison. Eventually what the original implication of culture as 
positive and general entity leads to is the incomparability of culture- impacted laws in 
different legal systems. These problems in the methodology of current comparative 
law and the concept of culture have demonstrated themselves in the literature we've 
briefly seen, and will again in the detail introduction next about Chinese marital rape. 
136 See L. Friedman, A History of American Law, (Simon & Schuster, 1973), 595: "if by law one means an 
orgnasied system of social control, any society of any size and complexity has law. ... The law is a mirror held up 
against life. It is order: it is justice; ... it is whatever results from the scheming, plotting, and striving of people and 
groups, with and against each other ". 
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Chkoterr 2 arft 1 Rape in Ch ma 
emlArcLca1 data 
This chapter provides pure descriptive empirical data of marital rape problems in 
China, which cover legislations, judicial practices, debates of law people and attitudes 
of lay people. 
2.1 Legislations in China concerning marital rape 
The c rime o f r ape h as had a 1 ong history. It would b e impossible t o a chieve a 
proper understanding about current marital rape problem in China without the 
necessary historical knowledge of the development and evolution of the crime of rape 
in general in the Chinese legal tradition. 
2.1.1 Brief history 
Due to the stable and long -lasting continuity of Chinese civilization, attitudes 
toward sexual relations within marriage have not changed much, either legally or 
ethically, for thousands of years since the establishment of the dominance of the 
Confucianism in Han Dynasty around 60 BC to the early stage of the last dynasty of 
Qing before 1840s.137 Due to traditional Chinese ethics' incompatibility with the 
concept of marital rape, in the time prior to Qing Dynasty, including the earlier Qing, 
it was not likely for any traditional Chinese codes of any dynasties before 19t11 century 
to have the law with the possible capacity to criminalize marital rape. Here I take the 
earlier Qing Code, DA QING LV LI, which could represent other codes in feudalist 
China, as the example for the study of the attitude of traditional Chinese law towards 
marital rape. 
1 Early Qing and before 
DA QING LV LI is the last feudalist code in China. From the start of its 
compilation in 1644 to its promulgation in 1740, it took about a century to be 
completed. 138 Therefore DA QING LV LI is now thought to have taken the merits 
and achievements of the preceding two thousand years experience of legislative and 
judicial practices of China, well epitomizing the feudalist Chinese codes and 
containing a significant position in Chinese legal history and legal culture.139 
Traditionally, a feudalist Chinese code contains different branches of law, with 
rules of criminal law, civil law, administrative law, etc., coexisting in the same code. 
In DA QING LV LI, we can therefore find both the criminal and the civil provisions 
concerning marriage and rape. 
137 Wu Changzhen, Marriage Law and Me, Law Press, 2001, p3 -4. 
138 Wang Limin, The History of Chinese Law, China Finance and Economy Press, 2001, p391 -392. 
139 Foreword in DA QING LV LI, Tianjin Guji Press, 1993, pl 
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The FAN JIAN volume of the 1740 DA QING LV LI is a special category of the 
crimes of FAN JIAN, or, literally, JIAN offenses.14° This volume contains ten articles 
giving m ore detailed prescriptions o f different J IAN o ffenses.141 The Chinese w ord 
JIAN literally means the "unlawful or illicit sexual relations ", which in traditional 
Chinese context referred only to extramarital sexual relations.142 
Under the broad category of FAN JIAN, we find the flowing different JIAN 
offenses: 
DIAO JIAN: referring to the action of a man who knows of an unlawful action of 
a woman and therefore uses it as the threat or coercion to force her to have u 
sexual relation with him. 
HE JIAN: referring to the action of a man and a woman to have unlawful sexual relation 
with her consent. 
TONG JIAN: referring to the unlawful sexual relation between a man and a woman 
introduced by the third party. 
QIANG RAN: referring to the coercive action of a man to force a woman to bave 
unlawful sexual relation with him.143 
Among the JIAN offenses, QIANG JIAN is what is the equivalent in Chinese 
language to the English term "rape ". In the Chinese equivalent, QIANG means 
"coercive" while JIAN, as previously said, means "unlawful or illicit sexual 
relations ". Therefore the term QIANG JIAN literally means the "coercive and 
unlawful sexual relations ". With its "unlawful" nature, QIAN JIAN, or rape in 
traditional Chinese context, has an obvious sense of being extramarital. 
The extramarital nature of rape in DA QING LV LI can also be confirmed by the 
structure of the code concerning rape. Rape is placed under the broad category of 
FAN JIAN as one concrete form of various JIAN offenses.144 But all the offenses in 
the special FAN JIAN volume in DA QING LV LI are extramarital in nature. And 
QIANG JIAN differs from other JIAN offenses by that: 
The crime of QIANG JIAN (rape) is established only in the situation that force is 
used and the woman cannot get away from it, with other people hearing the 
screaming and shouting, or physical injuries or torn -out clothes or other proofs of 
the kind.145 
In the contrast to other JIAN offenses, rape in traditional Chinese law 
distinguished itself only with its forceful and coercive means. However, they all 
belong to the general category of JIAN, which were the unlawful extramarital sexual 
relations not legitimated by law, morality, ethics or customs. Therefore, QIANG 
JIAN, or rape, in DA QING LV LI, as one form of JIAN, referred to only the coercive 
sexual relations beyond marriage. And coercive sexual actions of the husband against 
his wife cannot be included in the crime of QIANG JIAN or rape. So, from the 
criminal law perspective, marital rape is not a concept sensible to DA QING LV LI. 
140 Yao Yuxiang, DA QING LV LI HUI TONG XIN ZUAN (Collections of Amendments and Compilation of DA 
QING LV LI), Wenhai Publishing House, Taipei, 1964, p3197 -3224. 
141 Ibid. 
142 
Li Shunzhang, "New Perspective on Marital Rape Problem ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal 
Law, vol. 5, p455. 
143 Yao Yuxiang, DA QING LV LI HUI TONG XIN ZUAN (The New Edition of DA QING LV LI), Wenhai 




From the family law perspective, husbands and wives were not equal in their 
sexual relations. All the traditional Chinese codes, including DA QING LV LI, 
explicitly allow the polygamy.146 A man could legally marry many women and a 
woman could not many many men. Those women married to one man were not 
legally equals either. One of the women enjoyed a higher status, who was known as 
QI o r w ife, while the o ther w omen w ith lower legal status w ere known as Q IE o r 
concubines. The Marriage Law volume of DA QING LV LI has in its third article the 
special provision of the punishments for the violation of the legal relationships 
between the wife and the concubines. 147 However, given that only men, not any 
women, could have more than one legitimate sexual partners, even the wife, the 
woman with higher legal status than the concubines, did not have equal rights with her 
husband in terms of their sexual relations. Therefore, under such a polygamy system, 
the right/duty of sex between husband and wife is one -sided, with the rights always on 
the husband's side and duties always on the wife's side. 
Following examples may shod to what extent the sexual inequality between 
husband and wife could go in early Qing law. In DA QING LV LI, for example, on 
the one hand, the polygamy system exempted men's duty to be sexually loyal to their 
wife or concubines by granting husbands the rights to have many sexual partners. The 
law, on the other hand, prescribed the duty of wives to preserve chastity even after the 
death of their husbands, not to remarry and not to have sex with any other men.148 
LI BU ZE LI are special regulations concerning marriage and family life, which 
prescribe the duties that women ought to follow in order to be virtuous. The law 
provides that, in case the husband died before she was thirty, a virtuous wife should 
have preserved chastity after the death of her husband from before her thirty years of 
age to fifty years of age. And if íl`e died before fifty years old, the wife should have 
preserved chastity for not less than ten years after the death of her husband in order to 
be legally virtuous.149 Later, the Collections of Amendments and Compilation of DA 
QING LV LI cited the LI BU ZE LI, providing that the sovereign would honor those 
women who had met the above requirements.15° With the honors from the sovereign 
and the citations of the formal Code, chastity preservation after the death of husbands 
had practically become the legal duty of women, making wives a complete sexual 
dependent and granting husbands complete domination over their wives in their 
sexual relations.151 
But this has not been all of it. Laws in early Qing did much more than morally 
encouraging wives' sexual dependence upon their husbands. DA QING LV LI 
actually explicitly allows husbands to mortgage their wives or concubines to other 
men. In the first years of Qing Dynasty, the law prohibited the mortgage of wives and 
concubines, prescribing eighty strokes of bamboo sticks for the offenders. 152 
However, in 1646, a note was added to the article concerned, providing that only 
those who made formal contracts for such mortgages would be punished while those 
mortgaged their wives and concubines privately would not.153 Wife mortgaging was 
146 Wu Changzhen, Marriage Law and Me, Law Press, 2001, p5. 
147 Yao Yuxiang, DA QING LV LI HUI TONG XIN ZUAN, Wenhai Publishing House, Taipei, 1964, p1025 -1026. 
148 Yao Yuxiang, DA QING LV LI HUI TONG XIN ZUAN, Wenhai Publishing House, Taipei, 1964, p1017. 
149 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
151 Zhang Jinfan, Comprehensive Studies of Civil Laws in Qing Dynasty (QING DAI MIN FA ZONG LUN), China 
Politics and Law University Press, 1998, p217. 
152 Ibid. 
153 "Those who, for the purpose of property or profit, mortgage (in formal contracts) their wives or concubines to 
other men as wives or concubines, shall receive eighty strokes of bamboo sticks. Those who rent the women shall 
receive sixty strokes of bamboo sticks. The women shall be acquitted." See: Yao Yuxiang, DA QING LV LI HUI 
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quite common among the low class people in Qing Dynasty and the provisions in DA 
QING LV LI thus actually recognized these mortgages. Under such legal 
prescriptions, the sexual rights and other personal rights of the wives are mere 
possessions o f t he husbands, which t he husbands c ould m ortgage o r dispose 1 ike a 
possession. Such prescriptions are the clear proof of the husbands' absolute and 
monopoly rights of sex over their wives. Under such circumstances, sexual 
intercourse is the absolute duty of the wife to her husband and therefore the husband's 
coercive sex with their wives was not problematic. Accordingly, the concept of 
marital rape was impossible under such a family law system. 
2 Late Qing 
It was not until the end of Qing Dynasty in late 19th century, when the Chinese 
were forced to open their door to the west after the invasion by the British, that the 
legal status of the Chinese women started to be changed under the influences of 
western legal cultures.154 The legal reforms at the turn of the century around 1900 are 
of significant importance in the Chinese legal history. It is now usually thought to be 
the starting point of the modern law in China.155 
In 1910, the Revised Qing Code, DA QING XIN XING LV (The New Criminal 
Code of the Great Qing), was promulgated. It is thought to be the first modern 
criminal code in China in which different legal branches are no longer mingled 
together. Instead, criminal law, civil law and procedural law have become separate 
and independent legal codes.156 In the Revised Code, some significant changes were 
made in the JIAN offenses. For example, the sexual relation of an unmarried woman 
with a man is no longer a crime while only the sexual relation of a married woman 
with other man is prescribed as a crime. 
CHAPTER 23 JIAN OFFENSES AND BIGAMY 
Article 283 Those who have sexual relations with married women (HE JIAN) 
shall be punished with fourth rate or lower fixed -term imprisonment or detention. 
The other party of the offense shall be subject to the same punishment. 157 
This provision decriminalized the sexual relations with unmarried women, which 
had been criminalized for thousands of years in China. Thus, this tremendous change 
was one of the first steps of Chinese law to free women from their absolute inferior 
legal status that had lasted for thousands of years, and therefore aroused radical 
controversies between the reformers and the conservatives.158 
TONG XIN ZUAN, Wenhai Publishing House, Taipei, 1964, p1 021. 
154 Li Xiandong, From DA QING LV LI to the Civil Code of the Republic of China, China People's Police 
University Press, 2003, p99. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Huai Xiaofeng, The History of Chinese Law, China Politics and Law University Press, 1998, p438. 
157 DA QING XIN XING LV (The New Criminal Code of Great Qing), printed by XIAN ZHENG BIAN CHA 
GUAN (Constitution Publishing House), 1910, p47. 
158 Under the pressure from the opponents of the decriminalization, temporary provisions were added to DA QING 
XIN XING LV when promulgated: "Article 4: If an unmarried women has committed the crime prescribed in 
Article 283, she shall be punished with fifth rate fixed-term imprisonment, or detention or fine of no more than one 
hundred yuan. The other party of the offense shall be subject to the saline punishment. There shall be no trial on the 
said offense without complaints from senior relatives of lineal kinship. There shall be no trial on the said offense 
even with complaints if the senior relatives of lineal kinship have winked \the act in advance or have reached 
private settlement for profit after the act. Note: there are no provisions id the newly promulgated codes in all other 
countries for the punishments of unlawful sexual relations with unmarried women. The prevention of such acts 
shall lie in education not criminal penalties. However, given that such modern education has not yet been well 
established in China, temporary penalties are hereby prescribed according to the traditional laws ". See page 2 of 
the attached "Temporary Provisions" of DA QING XIN XING LV, printed by XIAN ZHENG BIAN CHA GUAN 
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However radical these changes might have been, they did not make any 
difference to either the legal status of the married women or people's understanding of 
the legal concept of rape. Rape in DA QING XIN XING LV was still proscribed in 
Chapter 23 of JIAN Offenses and Bigamy together with other JIAN offenses.159 
CHAPTER 23 JIAN OFFENSES AND BIGAMY 
Article 2 79 T hose who r ender resistance impossible by threats or violence, by 
administering drugs, by inducing hypnosis, or other means so as to have carnal 
relations with female persons shall be considered to have committed rape and 
shall be punished with first or second rate fixed -term imprisonment.160 
Under such a structure arrangement of the Code, rape was still one form of the 
JIAN offenses, which as a category took the original literal meaning of the 
extramarital- nature of the character elf( JIAN) . The substantive contents of rape were 
not redefined, instead, like all the RAN offenses, the crime of rape was committed 
only in extramarital situations. So, in this Revised Qing Code, the legislative status of 
women may have seen improvements more or less, but the concept of marital rape 
was still impossible. 
For family law, DA QING MI LV CAO AN, or the Draft of the Civil Code of 
Great Qing, was made in 1911. Though it never had the chance to be promulgated due 
to the breakout of the 1911 Revolution, it well reflected the legislative thoughts at the 
time and also became the main source of Chinese civil law afterwards in the 
MINGUO period, or the Republic of China.161 Consequently, it is now regarded as the 
first modern civil code in China. There has been much study of this draft, which could 
also reveal the development of the women's legal status in Chinese legislation. 
The draft still does not, in principle, take wives as equal persons with their 
husbands. 
Article 9: A person who has reached majority and has the capacity of 
discernment has the disposing capacity, but wives are not included.162 
And the more specified prescription of wives' capacity is in article 26. 
Article 2 6: The disposing capacity of a wife i s limited in a ccordance with t he 
following four articles.163 
And the following four articles: 
Article 27: Acts that are not of daily housework need to be approved by the 
husband. 
(Constitution Publishing House), 1910. Cultural conflicts have played an obvious role here in the Revised Qing 
Code. More discussions about the controversies on DA QING XIN XING LV can be found in Chapter 3. 
159 Chapter 23 (Article 277 - 289) in DA QING XIN XING LV, printed by XIAN ZHENG BIAN CHA GUAN 
(Constitution Publishing House), 1910, p45 -47. 
160 DA QING XIN XING LV, printed by XIAN ZHENG BIAN CHA GUAN (Constitution Publishing House), 
1910, p46. 
161_ Li Xiandong, From DA QING LV LI to the Civil Code of the Republic of China, China People's Police 
University Press, 2003, p180 -186. 
162 DA QING MIN LV CAO AN. See Yang Lixin, DA QING MIN LV CAO AN HE MIN GUO MIN LV CAO AN 
(The Draft of the Civil Code of the Great Qing and the. Draft of the Civil Code of the Republic of China), Jilin 
People's Publishing House, 2002, p4. 
163 Ibid. p5. 
26 
Article 28: With the approval of the husband, wife may operate one or more 
businesses independently. ... Husband may void or limit such approval. 
Article 29: When husband is minor, he may not approve his wife's acts without 
the agreement of his guardians. 
Article 30: Husband's approval is not necessary in the following cases: 
Husband and wife have conflicting interests 
Husband deserts his wife 
Husband is an interdicted person or quasi -interdicted person 
Husband is under the execution of sentence of more than one 
year's imprisonment.164 
The above prescriptions have decided as the general principle of the draft wives' 
inferior status to their husbands. And we can go on to see more specific prescriptions 
concerning marriage and their sexual relations. 
First, we see that, in this draft, polygamy was still not abolished by law. 
Article 1403: A SISHENGZI, or illegitimate child, is the child born out of 
unlawful sexual relations or void marriage.165 
At the meantime, the draft had another article: 
Article 1387: A SHUZI is the child born by the women other than the wife.166 
By distinguishing SISHENZI and SHUZI, the draft recognized that a man could 
have, other than his wife, more women of legitimate marital relations with him. 
Obviously polygamy was still allowed here in the draft. As previously shown, the 
existence of polygamy per se means nothing but the unequal sexual relations between 
husbands and wives. And the inequality can be further confirmed by further articles in 
the draft. 
Article 1350: Husbands should make the wives cohabitate with him and wives 
have the duty to cohabitate with their husbands. 
Article 1351 Cohabitation affairs are up to the decision of the husbands.167 
Sex is a major content of the duty of cohabitation. With the dominating rights 
upon cohabitation affairs prescribed by the above two articles, husbands would have 
the rights to be in the dominant position in their sex life. Consequently, wives would 
not have the right of sexual self -determination, without which marital rape was a 
senseless concept. 
The article about reasons for divorces could be another evidence for the unequal 
sexual relations between husbands and wives: 
Article 1362 Either of the husband and wife can institute a legal proceeding for 
divorce on the following grounds: 
2. The wife conducted adultery;168 
164 Ibid. p5-6. 
165 Ibid. p179. 
166 Ibid. p177. 
167 Ibid. p 173. 
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Adultery as the ground for divorce was limited only to wife as the perpetrator and 
the draft did not make adultery conducted by husbands the ground for divorce. This 
means the one -sided legal duty of the wife to be sexually loyal to the husband and the 
husband did not have the legal duty to be sexually loyal to the wife. These provisions 
show that marital rape was still a concept incompatible with the law of family and 
marriage in the time of late Qing. With the incompatibility with criminal law as well, 
marital rape was still an impossible concept at the time. 
3 LIU FA QUAN SHU 
After the foundation of the Republic of China in 1911, a more modern legal 
system than that of the revised Qing Code was gradually established, which is now 
usually known as the LIU FA, or the Six Laws, including the constitution, the civil, 
criminal, civil procedure, criminal procedure and administrative laws.169 The criminal 
code of the Republic of China was promulgated in 1928 and the laws of marriage, 
family, maintenance were promulgated in 1929. 
The 1928 Republican criminal code provides: 
CHAPTER XVI OFFENCES AGAINST MORALS 
Article 221 A person who renders resistance impossible by threats or violence, 
by administering drugs, by inducing hypnosis, or other means and who has carnal 
relations with a female person shall be considered to have committed rape and 
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than five years.'7o 
We can easily notice two differences of the provision of rape in the Republican 
code from the previous codes. First is a structural difference. The crime of rape, or 
QIANG JIAN, is no longer put in under a category of JIAN offenses but as an 
independent crime put together with other non -sexual offenses under the category of 
offences against morals. By this structural change, rape, or QIANG JIAN, at the 
Republican time was no longer regarded as one of the JIAN offenses and therefore did 
not necessarily share the literal meaning of JIAN, which determines the extramarital 
nature of JIAN offences. It would be reluctant now even in Chinese context to insist 
that rape, QIANG JIAN, was still necessarily extramarital in nature. 
The second difference is the explicit special redefinition of rape, which eliminates 
the extramarital -nature of rape completely. Article 221 of the 1928 Code makes a 
special legal proposition to give the explicit legal definition for the concept of rape, 
with precise prescription of what rape refers to exactly. By such a special definition, 
rape, QIANG JIAN, in the Republican law not longer simply has the literal meaning 
of the word(s) in everyday language as the Qing codes did: 
However, even today, some people are still denying the concept of marital rape on 
the linguistic ground, saying that since the Chinese term for rape, QIANG JIAN, 
contains the word JIAN, which traditionally has the literal meaning of being 
extramarital, marital rape is therefore an illogical concept.171 Such an argument can be 
168 Ibid. p174. 
169 Some people insist a different version of the Six Laws, with commercial law taking the place of administrative 
law. See: Wan Limin, The History of Chinese Law, China Finance & Economy Press, 2001, p504. 
10Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p1091. 
"'See: Zhang Xianyu, "On No Rape in Marriage ", Law Science, vol. 3, 2000, p55; Liu Xianquan, "It's Improper 
to Criminalize Marital Rape ", Law Science, vol. 3, 2000, p58 -59. 
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easily refuted for its lack of understanding of Chinese language. Actually, it is 
common that the literal meaning of a Chinese character changes, and sometimes 
dramatically. For example, Chinese character for "word" is I, whose original 
meaning was "milk ", "love or to love" "to bring up or to give birth to a child ".172 The 
original meanings of ZI seem to have nothing to do with its present one, and are rarely 
known by the ordinary people today. 
Also, if strictly literal, the word JIAN, if sufficiently original, may not have had 
the unlawful or extramarital meaning either. SHUO WEN JIE ZI is the special 
dictionary into the original meanings of each Chinese character, compiled by Xu Shen 
two thousand years ago in the Han Dynasty. According to the authoritative dictionary, 
the literal meaning of the character JIAN came from the word "do" and the word 
"woman" (CONG GAN NV WEI YI).173 Such a literal meaning can refer to any 
actions to "do with a woman", which therefore is rather neutral and value free. Thus 
the above linguistic argument against the concept of marital rape is ill- grounded, and 
the traditional literal meaning of the word JIAN could no longer have preserved the 
extramarital- nature of rape in Chinese context since the special definition in the 1928 
code. 
With the special legal definition of rape, we know that, according to the provision, 
rape refers to the action of any `person who renders resistance impossible by threats 
or violence, by administering drugs, by inducing hypnosis, or other means and who 
has carnal relations with a female person ". The provision did not make marriage an 
exemption or stipulated it as special in any sense. Therefore, spoken from at least this 
provision of the Republican law, marital rape is a crime conceptually. 
However, the 1928 Code also provides: 
Article 256: Whoever, being a woman, whose husband is living, commits adultery 
with any person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not more than 
two years. r 74 
Obviously, this provision shows that the Republican law still took sex as the 
necessary duty of a married woman to her husband. But the right seemed to lie only 
on the husband's side while the wife had only the duty because we cannot find any 
article providing or implying the same duty for husbands. As a result, marriage gave 
the husband the one -sided right of sex over his wife. If the wife had sexual relations 
with anyone other than her husband, it would be a severe infringement of his right. 
Consequently the wife would be criminally punished. 
The notion contained in this provision of taking sex as the necessary part of the 
marital rights in the husband's favour was in accordance with the Republican family 
law. The Republican law of family, in contrast to the Qing Code, rejected, as a 
principle, the hierarchical relations between men and women, prescribing that as a 
"natural person ", a woman possessed the same rights and obligations as a man.175 The 
gender equality principle may have laid down the fundamental legislative base for the 
possible marital rape law. 
However, the Republican civil code stipulates that husbands and wives have a 
"mutual obligation" to live together. 
172 Xu Shen, SHUO WEN JIE ZI. See SHUO WEN JIE ZI GU LIN, Taipei, 1966, vol. 10, p6601. 
173 The character JIAN has a right/left structure. The right part is the character "women" and the left part is the 
character "do ". See: SHUO WEN 11E ZI GU LIN, Taipei, 1966, vol. 10, p5645. 
174 Guo Weixiao, Current Major Laws of The Republic of China (ZHONG HUA MIN GUO XIAN XING LIU FA 
QUAN SHU), Shanghai Translating and Editing House, 1930, p330. 
175 Chapter 2 "Persons ", Book I "General Principle ". Ibid. p2 -3. 
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Article 1001 Husband and wife are under mutual obligation to live together, 
unless for good reason they cannot live together. 
Article 1002 A wife takes the domicile of the husband as her domicile.176 
Though Art. 1001 prescribes the obligation to live together as "mutual ", Art. 
1002's prescription factually damaged the equality of the mutual obligation. 
According to Huang, these provisions have actually expanded husband's rights, even 
compared with the Qing Code: 
"Under the civil code, spouses had the mutual obligation to live together. This 
represented in theory somewhat expanded rights for husbands; in the Qing, they could 
only resort to trumped -up charges of desertion, since the law did not contain any 
stipulation against a woman's returning to her natal home for long periods. Now 
husbands could appeal to the courts "on the grounds of their wives' obligation to live 
with them ".177 
So, while, in the Qing, abused or unhappy wives still had the common resort of 
taking refuge with their natal families, husbands in the Republic had the legal tool to 
force their wives home. Despite the general principle of gender equality, concrete 
provisions of the Republican laws were still male- centric, giving the husbands the 
substantially superior status over their wives. Thus, even after the concept of rape had 
been redefined, the inconsistency inside the legal system resulted in that marital rape 
in practice couldn't be a legislative crime. 
However, legislation afterwards saw a constant process of changes and 
revisions. The legislative inconsistency was eliminated in some degree shortly after 
the promulgation of the 1928 criminal code, in 1935, with the Article 256 in the code 
revised as: 
Article 239 A married person who commits adultery with another shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than one year; the other party to the 
adultery shall be subject to the same punishment178. 
Now both the husband and the wife could commit the crime of adultery, therefore, 
it came closer to gender equality in terms of the sex rights. And this was more 
consistent with the adultery article in the 1929 -30 civil code, which made adultery on 
the part of either party acceptable grounds for divorce. 
Article 1052 Either spouse may apply to the Court for a divorce provided that 
one of the following conditions exist: 
1. Where the other spouse has committed bigamy. 
2. Where the other spouse has sexual intercourse with another person 179 
176 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p301. 
177 Philip Huang, Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China, Stanford University Press, pl 85. 
178 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p1097. 
179 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p314. 
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With the stronger emphasis on gender equality and sex as personality rights, the 
revisions and developments of the laws demonstrated a gradual process in legislation, 
whose final trend would be to make the legislative criminalization of marital rape 
more and more likely. 
2.1.2 Current legislation 
In 1949, with the military victories of the Communist Party, the Republic of China 
was succeeded by the People's Republic of China, and the established legal systems 
in the Republican period were completely abolished for political reasons. A great 
discontinuity followed soon after. But from 1970s, the Communist government picked 
up again the effort to establish the new Chinese legal system, which is the current one 
in operation on China's mainland. 
1. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China 
The current criminal law of the People's Republic of China was passed in the 
People's Congress in 1979, revised in 1997 and promulgated on March 14th, 1997. 
The Criminal Law defines rape as follows: 
Chapter IV Crimes of Infringing upon Citizen's Right of the Person and Democratic 
Rights 
Art. 236 Whoever rapes a woman by violence, coercion or any other means shall 
be sentenced to fixed -term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more 
than 10 years.180 
Compared with the 1928 Republican code, the current criminal law moves the 
crime of rape from the "Offences against morals" to the chapter of "Offences against 
personal rights ". This change is an evident proof of the change in the substantial 
connotation of the legal concept of QIANG JIAN, or rape. 
Since what rape, or QIANG JIAN, as the coercive sexual action, now violates is 
not the social morals or family ethics but the personal rights of women, therefore, any 
action against the women's personal rights of sexual self -determination can be the 
crime of rape. This, in turn, means two things: first, it confirms the substantial change 
in legislation of the connotation of the legal concept of QIANG JIAN. The current 
legal concept of rape in Chinese context, QIANG JIAN, is no longer based on the 
more fundamental category of J IAN, r eferring t o o my the unlawful se xual r elation 
outside of marriage, but based the violation of the personal rights of the women. So, 
with the substantial redefinition of rape by legislation, marriage is excluded from the 
exemption to commit the crime of rape. 
Secondly, it means more concrete application than the Republican law of the 
gender equality in terms of sexual relations. Men and women as equal persons had 
already b een laid down a s a principle by the 1928 and 1929 Republican laws. But 
what rape violated at that time were public morals not personal rights. The marriage 
exemption of rape therefore could be justified on family ethics even under the gender 
equality principle. However, by recognizing rape as offenses against personal rights, 
current criminal law has actually recognized that any coercive sexual actions against 
the women's will, whether there is a marriage or not, are not legitimated by law 
because equal persons certainly have equal rights of sexual self -determination. 
180 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, Chinese Legal System Publishing House, p203. 
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Article 1001 Husband and wife are under mutual obligation to live together, 
unless for good reason they cannot live together. 
Article 1002 A wife takes the domicile of the husband as her domicile.176 
Though Art. 1001 prescribes the obligation to live together as "mutual ", Art. 
1002's prescription factually damaged the equality of the mutual obligation. 
According to Huang, these provisions have actually expanded husband's rights, even 
compared with the Qing Code: 
"Under the civil code, spouses had the mutual obligation to live together. This 
represented in theory somewhat expanded rights for husbands; in the Qing, they could 
only resort to trumped -up charges of desertion, since the law did not contain any 
stipulation against a woman's returning to her natal home for long periods. Now 
husbands could appeal to the courts 'on the grounds of their wives' obligation to live 
with them ".177 
So, while, in the Qing, abused or unhappy wives still had the common resort of 
taking refuge with their natal families, husbands in the Republic had the legal tool to 
force their wives home. Despite the general principle of gender equality, concrete 
provisions of the Republican laws were still male- centric, giving the husbands the 
substantially superior status over their wives. Thus, even after the concept of rape had 
been redefined, the inconsistency inside the legal system resulted in that marital rape 
in practice couldn't be a legislative crime. 
However, legislation afterwards saw a constant process of changes and 
revisions. The legislative inconsistency was eliminated in some degree shortly after 
the promulgation of the 1928 criminal code, in 1935, with the Article 256 in the code 
revised as: 
Article 239 A married person who commits adultery with another shall be 
punished with imprisonment for not more than one year; the other party to the 
adultery shall be subject to the same punishment178. 
Now both the husband and the wife could commit the crime of adultery, therefore, 
it came closer to gender equality in terms of the sex rights. And this was more 
consistent with the adultery article in the 1929 -30 civil code, which made adultery on 
the part of either party acceptable grounds for divorce. 
Article 1052 Either spouse may apply to the Court for a divorce provided that 
one of the following conditions exist: 
1. Where the other spouse has committed bigamy. 
2. Where the other spouse has sexual intercourse with another person 19 
176 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p301. 
177 Philip Huang, Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China, Stanford University Press, p185. 
178 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p1097. 
179 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p314. 
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With the stronger emphasis on gender equality and sex as personality rights, the 
revisions and developments of the laws demonstrated a gradual process in legislation, 
whose final trend would be to make the legislative criminalization of marital rape 
more and more likely. 
2.1.2 Current legislation 
In 1949, with the military victories of the Communist Party, the Republic of China 
was succeeded by the People's Republic of China, and the established legal systems 
in the Republican period were completely abolished for political reasons. A great 
discontinuity followed soon after. But from 1970s, the Communist government picked 
up again the effort to establish the new Chinese legal system, which is the current one 
in operation on China's mainland. 
1. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China 
The current criminal law of the People's Republic of China was passed in the 
People's Congress in 1979, revised in 1997 and promulgated on March 14th, 1997. 
The Criminal Law defines rape as follows: 
Chapter IV Crimes of Infringing upon Citizen's Right of the Person and Democratic 
Rights 
Art. 236 Whoever rapes a woman by violence, coercion or any other means shall 
be sentenced to fxed -term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more 
than 10 years. 
Compared with the 1928 Republican code, the current criminal law moves the 
crime of rape from the "Offences against morals" to the chapter of "Offences against 
personal rights ". This change is an evident proof of the change in the substantial 
connotation of the legal concept of QIANG JIAN, or rape. 
Since what rape, or QIANG JIAN, as the coercive sexual action, now violates is 
not the social morals or family ethics but the personal rights of women, therefore, any 
action against the women's personal rights of sexual self -determination can be the 
crime of rape. This, in turn, means two things: first, it confirms the substantial change 
in legislation of the connotation of the legal concept of QIANG JIAN. The current 
legal concept of rape in Chinese context, QIANG JIAN, is no longer based on the 
more fundamental category of J IAN, r eferring t o o my the unlawful se xual r elation 
outside of marriage, but based the violation of the personal rights of the women. So, 
with the substantial redefinition of rape by legislation, marriage is excluded from the 
exemption to commit the crime of rape. 
Secondly, it means more concrete application than the Republican law of the 
gender equality in terms of sexual relations. Men and women as equal persons had 
already b een laid down a s a principle by the 1928 and 1929 Republican laws. B ut 
what rape violated at that time were public morals not personal rights. The marriage 
exemption of rape therefore could be justified on family ethics even under the gender 
equality principle. However, by recognizing rape as offenses against personal rights, 
current criminal law has actually recognized that any coercive sexual actions against 
the women's will, whether there is a marriage or not, are not legitimated by law 
because equal persons certainly have equal rights of sexual self -determination. 
180 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, Chinese Legal System Publishing House, p203. 
31 
Also from the letters of this article we know that, according to the present 
Criminal Law, rape is any forcible act to have sex against the will of the woman by 
violence, coercion or any other means. The subject of the crime is a general subject; a 
husband, who is a person with criminal capacity, can of course be the subject of the 
crime of rape. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Legislature has given any further commentary 
concerning with the strict definition of rape and its relation with marital rape. 
However, judges, lawyers and scholars have reached a general agreement about the 
definition of rape in the article. As Judge Wu Xiaofang from Supreme Court says: 
"According to the Criminal Law, rape is the act of having sex against the will of the 
woman by violence, coercion or other means. The key element to decide the 
establishment of rape is whether the act is against the will of the woman or not. The 
law does not exclude wives from the possible victims. "181 A husband can, therefore, 
commit the crime of rape on his wife. Judge Cheng Dongning, the vice president of 
Gaoyou Municipal People's Court, Jiangsu Province, said: "The crime of rape literally 
defined in the present Criminal Law in our country indicates the inviolability of 
women's rights of sexual self -determination. Any sexual act against the will of a 
woman constitutes the crime of rape. "182 
So, the current Chinese criminal code has already had the capacity to cover 
marital rape as the crime of rape. And the legislative criminalization of marital rape in 
present China would be further affirmed if we take a look at the equivalent articles in 
western codes. 
In the west, before the criminalization of marital rape, codes used to write out 
explicitly the "extramarital" character of the concept of rape. 
The 1871 German Penal Code provided: 
Article 177 Rape 
1.Anybody who by force or threat of immediate bodily harm forces a woman to 
submit to extra -marital sexual intercourse or who misuses a woman for extra- 
marital sexual intercourse ...183 
According to the English Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s.1(1): 
... a man commits rape if : 
a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the 
intercourse does not consent to it" 184 
The world "unlawful" in this English Act is usually understood as the meaning of 
being extramarital just the same as the explicit word of "extra- marital" in the German 
Code. When marital rape was criminalized, the corresponding changes in these 
western codes were to cross out the words limiting the concept of rape to only the 
181 Wu Xiaofang, "Consortium & Marital Rape ", People's Court Daily, 1st Nov. 2000. 
182 http:// www. peopledail y.co. jp/ GB/ shenghuo /76/123/20010405/433792.html. 
183 The German Penal Code of 1871, Sweet & Maxwell Limited. London, 1961, p103. 
184 `Current Law' Statutes, Sweet & Maxwell, Stevens & Sons, W. Green & Son, 1976, 82/1 . 
http: / /uk.westl aw. com/ search /defau It. wl ?Action = Search &EQ= Welcome %2F Westl awUK &Query =Tl %28 sexual +% 
2F3+ offences + %2F3+ act + %2F3 +1956 %29& Method= TNC& DB= UK %2DLIF &RP= %2Fwelcome %2FBui Iders% 
2FUKLegB u i Ider %2Ewl &RS =W LUK4.02& V R=2.0&SPa=ukedinb- 
000 &S V= Split &FN =_ top& MT= WestlawUK &Tempinfo= %7CtxtActSlNameSEXUAL +OFFENCES+ +ACT +195 
6 %7CTEMPLATEUKTMPLTUK 
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"extramarital" cases so as to expand the range of subjects of the crime to cover the 
husbands. 
For example in England, in the well -known case R. v. R., the court suggested that 
the word "unlawful" in section 1(1) of the Act of 1976 is mere surplusage and should 
be ignored.185 And, in the English Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the 
law was changed to: 
"(2) A man commits rape if- 
(a) he has sexual intercourse with a person (whether vaginal or anal) who at the 
time of the intercourse does not consent to it; ,,186 
By deleting the word "unlawful ", the criminalization of marital rape was 
established i n English Law. S imilar things t ook place i n G erman law a s w ell. T he 
German legislators just omitted the word "extramarital ", which marked out the 
extramarital character of rape in the past, making the current law, promulgated on 13 
November 1998, as: 
Section 177 Sexual Coercion; Rape 
(1) Whoever coerces another person: 
1. with force; 
2. by a threat of imminent danger to life or limb; or 
3. by exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected and at the mercy of 
the perpetrator's influence, 
to suffer the commission o f s exual a cts o f the perpetrator o r a third p erson o n 
himself or to commit them on the perpetrator or a third person, shall be punished 
with imprisonment for not less than one year.187 
This is the same effects that the language in the current Chinese criminal law has 
achieved. Due to the linguistic differences, traditional Chinese laws did not need to 
use special words to exclude marital coercive sexual actions from the crime of rape as 
the western laws did. Because of the literal meaning the Chinese character of JIAN 
originally had, without extra terms used, traditional Chinese laws had already 
achieved the same exemption of marital rape as its western counterparts did. 
But, from the 1928 code of the Republic of China, the concept of rape, QIANG 
JIAN, was specially defined in explicit words in legislation. With the special 
redefinition, what QIANG JIAN precisely means as a legal concept no longer depends 
upon the traditional literal meaning of the Chinese character of JIAN but upon the 
whole legal proposition written in the codes. 
So, with the special definition of rape and the general wording used, current 
Chinese criminal law has already achieved the same effect as the German code and 
the English acts. Under such a criminal legal system, coercive sexual actions of the 
husbands against their wives are the crimes of rape, legislatively. 
2. The Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China 
The legal marital relation stipulated in family law is the reason given by m any 
people in China today to exclude a husband's act of coercive sex against his wife from 
the crime of rape; although they also agree that the act per se, from the perspective of 
185Rv.R[1991]3WLR767. 
186 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Current Law Statutes, Sweet & Maxwell, W Green, c 33, 33/142. 
187 http: / /www.iuscomp.org /gla/statutes /StGB.htm 
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criminal provisions, constitutes the crime of rape. The reason they give is the so- 
called doctrine of "duty of cohabitation.188 According to the doctrine, legal marriage 
means the special personal and property relation between a husband and wife. 
Cohabitation and s ex life are t he b asic c ontents o f t he rights and duties b etween a 
husband and wife. The voluntary registration for marriage is the legal promise for 
cohabitation and sex life. If the promise is expressed once, it is enough to cover the 
whole period of the continued existence of the marriage. So whether the current 
Marriage Law has prescriptions expressing or implying such specialty of marriage to 
exempt a husband from raping his wife becomes the key factor of the legislative 
criminalization of marital rape in China. 
The first marriage law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated in 
1950, providing: 
Article 7: Husbands and wives are companions of their common life, enjoying the 
equal status in the family.I89 
Some people have inferred the cohabitation duty from the "common life" phrase 
in this article.190 However, this article was abolished in the 1980 marriage law. The 
current family law was promulgated in 2001 based on the revision of the 1980 family 
law, with no restoration of articles alike. Throughout the present statutes, no articles 
are found to imply the duty of cohabitation. There are neither any judicial 
interpretations nor commentaries proclaiming anything to the effect of marital consent 
to duty of sex in marriage. So, different from the Article 1001 of the 1929 -30 civil 
code in the Republic period, "actually the present Marriage Law in China does not 
prescribe the duty of cohabitation, which takes sexual life as its basic content of the 
duties. "191 
The current marriage law does not either stipulate any terms like the Article 1002 
of the 1929 -30 Republican civil code, giving different positions of rights to husband 
and wife in family domicile, property, etc., from which actual male superiority can be 
derived. 
The present Chinese marriage law prescribes the following basic principles: 
Art 2 . (The L aw) practices the system of freedom o f m arriage, monogamy and 
gender equality. 
Art 4. Husband and wife should be loyal to each other and respect each other, ... 
Art 13. The husband and the wife are equal in status in the family.192 
Obviously, the core of the principles is the equality between husband and wife. 
This essential gender equality principle was also prescribed in the 1929 -30 civil code, 
but the difference is that current family law no longer has the contradicting articles on 
concrete matters that imply the actual male superiority as the 1929 -30 civil code did. 
188 For example, Cheng Dongning, the vice president of Gaoyou Municipal People's Court, Jiangsu Province, said: 
"Since the establishment of marital relation, the duties and obligations of both parties have therefore been clearly 
defined. Saying "no" one -sidedly to marital sexual life is not only inhuman and is also not in conformity with the 
conjugal relation established and protected by law ". 
http: / /www.peopledai ly.co.jp/GB/shenghuo/76/123/20010405/433792.html. 
189 http: / /www.law999. net / law /doc /1/1950/04/13/00000321.html 
Igo Shi Meitang, "Husbands' Raping Their Wives Are Not Criminal ", Law Science (FA XUE), vol.3, 2000. 
191 Ruan Renhui: Marital Rights, Marital Rape and New Marriage Law, 
http://yuanrenhui.51.net/famarriage/concuright.htm. 
192 Su Dong, Feng Hui, Wan Qigang, Introduction of New Marriage Law, China Procuratorial Press, 2001, p114, 
p115, p116. 
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Under this gender equality principle, even the prescribed mutual loyalty and respect 
does not mean that either of the spouses has the legal right to force the other for 
sexual intercourse. If the husband/wife feels that the wife/husband does not fulfill 
her/his duty of cohabitation and sex, he /she may have the right to end the marriage, 
but s till h e /she does not have the right t o force the w ife/husband t o have s ex with 
him/her. This is determined by the most basic principle of husband -wife equality of 
present Chinese marriage law, by which the duty of cohabitation, if prescribed, would 
also be bound. Specifically, this means a married woman does not have the legal duty 
to consent to her husband's sexual requirement. Conclusively, there is no barrier in 
current marriage law to block the criminalization of marital rape. 
From either the Criminal Law or the Marriage Law, we find no justification for 
the marital exemption for rape. Therefore, the husband's coercive act to have sex with 
his wife by violence, coercion or any other means is not excluded from the crime of 
rape as long as the current Chinese legislation is concerned. 
2.2 Judicial practices in China of marital rape 
Now it is clear that under the current Chinese legislation, marital rape is already a 
crime. In this part I will look into the judicial interpretation of these provisions to see 
how the legislation operates in practice. In 1980, by abolishing the 1950 prescription 
of "common life ", which could imply the possible cohabitation duty, the 1980 family 
law has discarded with it the inconsistency with the rape law in the criminal code, and 
therefore made the criminalization of marital rape legislatively realized. Accordingly, 
my research also takes 1980 as the starting point. 
2.2.1 Marital rape cases 
A total of fifteen cases h ave been c ollected from 1980 until the present day. I t 
should be noted that it cannot be guaranteed that these are definitely all the marital 
rape cases during this period primarily because China is not a case law country and 
there are not regular case reports like those in England or other Common Law 
countries. Though the Supreme Court regularly publishes the Collection of Selected 
Cases, however, this contains only a very small portion of the cases that were actually 
decided by the courts. As a result, other resources have been consulted which might 
provide references to marital rape cases in China: academic journals with articles 
concerning the topic, bulletins or periodicals from the Supreme and local courts, as 
well as ordinary media outlets like newspapers and magazines. Indeed it was found 
that the selections of cases by the Supreme Court were actually not as helpful as the 
other sources for collecting marital rape cases. 
Luckily, since marital rape became a controversial topic all over China around the 
year 2000, most, if not all, marital rape cases are quoted or reported in academic 
articles and journals, court bulletins and even the daily newspapers and magazines. 
For example, Professor Li Dun, researcher from the Academy of Social Science of 
China, has collected 15 marital rape cases,193 which is one of the sources of my case 
collection. However, some of his cases were before 1980 and I have not referred to 
them. And some other cases of Professor Li were only marital rape stories and these 
193 There are 15 cases in Li Dun's collection but I adopt only seven of them. Two of the unquoted were 1979 and 
1976 cases and four of them had no years. But marital exemption was obvious in all the unquoted cases if settled in 
Court. 
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conflicts were actually not settled in courts. These too have been ignored. Ultimately, 
seven out of Li's 15 cases form part of this collection. 
I have also used other sources. Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal 
Law, for example, is an academic journal focusing on the current problems and topical 
areas in the judicial practices of criminal law and criminal procedure. Since the year 
2000, the journal has published series of papers on the specific topic of marital rape in 
several volumes, from which I have been able to collect some more recent cases.194 
With the other sources I have used, I can say that, although there is a chance that 
my collection may not actually include all the marital rape cases during the studied 
period, most of them should have been included. In any event, they should be 
sufficient in number to enable a statistically accurate representative analysis to follow. 
The collection is shown below in the table of cases. 
Table of cases 




at the time of 
cases 













1982 In the process of 
divorce 
proceeding 
Cheating about the age at 
registration for marriage 
Guilty of rape Null marriage 
3 
Lao 















1986 In the process of 
divorce 
proceeding 
Rape was the direct cause of 
the death of the victim who 
committed suicide 










1989 In the process of 
divorce 
proceeding 
Kidnapped the victim 
directly from the court and 
illegally detained her for 
days and raped her. 




1995 In the normal 
state of marriage 









1997 In the divorce 
proceeding 





1999 In the divorce 
proceeding 




1999 In the divorce 
proceeding 
Cheating about the age at the 
marital registration 




2001 In the divorce 
proceeding 




2001 In the divorce 
proceeding 










2001 In the divorce 
proceeding 
Kidnapped and detained the 
victim 




2003 In the divorce 
proceeding 
No Guilty of rape Marital r ape i s 
criminal 
194 Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law, vol.1, vol. 4, and vol.5. 
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2.2.2 Case Studies 
Cases in the collection can be classified into three groups. The first group are the 
cases following the explicit principle of marital exemption of rape. Cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 
9, 12 belong to this group. In these cases, the allegation of rape took place while the 
marriage subsisted and the defendants were not convicted. The reasons given by the 
courts for the decision were always the marriage exemption of rape. 
In cases 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, the husbands and wives had already started their legal 
proceedings for divorce. However, since the divorce decree had not yet come into 
effect, the marriages, therefore, were still legally valid at the time of the husbands' 
alleged a ctions o f c oercive s ex. T he legally v alid m arriages w ere, a ccording t o t he 
courts, what exempted the husbands from the crime of rape. The start of the divorce 
proceedings could not have made any differences to the marital exemption of rape. 
Actually, it was not only that the divorce proceedings couldn't make differences 
to the marital exemption of rape. Even in cases where the husbands' coercive sexual 
action has caused serious results, the' principle was still firmly adhered to. 
In Case 3, the victim, Meng, had lost her affection for the defendant, Lao, after 
marriage. For a fairly long period 9f time, she just refused to have sex with him. 
Finally, Lao asked two of his colleagues for help. They worked together to tie up 
Meng and undressed her. Then Lao had sex with her right in front of the two 
colleagues. Yet the court acquitted the defendant. 
In Case 5, the defendant, Chen, and the victim, Zou, had already reached the 
divorce agreement in the township judicial office but had not yet received the divorce 
certificate. Before the completion of the legal procedure for divorce, Chen forced Zou 
to have sex with him. And as a direct consequence of the coercive sex, Zou committed 
suicide thereafter. Also, the court found the defendant not guilty of rape. The 
decisions, due to the serious circumstances, were confirmed by the central 
procuratorial authority which has the judicial supervision power. 195 
Similar serious results occurred in case 8. In this case, the marriage per se was not 
problematic in any degree yet. It was just a typical night, the wife was feeling ill when 
the defendant asked for sex. Because of her illness, so she refused. But the defendant, 
who was s aid to be a h ot- tempered and rude man, flew into a r age because o f t he 
refusal. He had sex with his wife by force and kicked the victim in the belly, causing 
the rupture of her intestines and then her death. The defendant was convicted of 
causing death by injury but not of the crime of rape. 
Case 12 was the latest in this group of cases but it was the first marital rape case in 
Sichuan, an inland province in Southwest China. It was also one of the cases that 
activated the heated discussions about the problem of marital rape in the whole nation. 
I would like to give an introduction to it in more detail. The wife Wang and the 
husband Wu had separated because they were about to divorce. But Wu still helped 
his wife with her farm work. On June 1 1th, 2000, Wu came to Wang's residence and 
pushed her into the bedroom, asking for sex, but Wang resisted and kept screaming. In 
fear of being heard, Wu pulled Wang into another bedroom, tore down her underwear 
and had sexual intercourse with her. 
On June 14th, t he N anj fang C ounty P rocuratorate charged W u with r ape, and a 
prosecution was instituted. As there was not enough violence to constitute assault, the 
County Court held: The defendant was not guilty. Since the marital relation between 
Wang and Wu was still subsisting at the date of the alleged offence, the act of Wu did 
I95Li Dun, "Relationship Between Individual Rights and Holistic Interests - -- Analysis of Marital Rape in China 
from the Perspective of Sociology of Law ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal Law (XING SHI FA 
PAN JIE), vol.1 1999, p395. 
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not constitute the crime of rape and, therefore, the defendant was not guilty.196 In so 
doing, the Court explicitly denied the possibility of rape in marriage. However, even 
the chief judge hearing the case personally agreed that, in fact, the defendant's action 
was in every degree fit for the definition of rape in the Criminal Law of the People's 
Republic of China. 
"Wu Yaoxiong (the defendant) acted against the will of his wife, had sexual 
intercourse with her by violence. He certainly had committed the crime of rape.... 
According to the Criminal Law, as long as the sexual intercourse is by violence and 
against the will of the woman, the crime of rape is committed ", said Long Chifang, 
the chief judge of criminal division of Nanjiang County Court, Sichuan, also the chief 
judge of case 12, when giving the press his personal opinion after the case was settled. 
197 
However, the defendant was not convicted. The only reason the Court gave was 
that "the conjugal relation between the Defendant and the victim was still in the 
period of continued existence and therefore the Defendant's act did not constitute a 
crime and the charge by the Procuratorate was ill- founded ".198 It seems, then, that the 
Nanjiang Court followed the principle of "no rape in marriage ". 
The second group of cases are those following the actual principle of marital 
exemption of rape, examples of which are case 2, 6, 10, and 11. In these cases, the 
defendants were convicted, but the reasons given by the courts for the conviction were 
that the marriages were null or voidable. Therefore, despite the rape conviction, there 
was still no criminalization of marital rape. In Case 2 and 11, the marriages involved 
were nullified for the reason of the young ages at the time of registration of the 
marriages. The wife was only 17 years old in Case 2 and 19 in Case 11 when 
marriages were registered. The legal age for woman to get married is 20 according to 
the Chinese law, and the husbands in the two cases had false certificates of age for the 
registration of marriages. According to the family law about null marriages: 
Article 10 The marriage is null in the following cases: 
1. bigamy 
4. younger than the legal age. 
With the marriages nullified, the defendants were found guilty in Case 2 and 11. 
However, it was not that marital rape was criminalized. That the marriages were null 
was crucial. Similarly, in case 6, the defendant and the victim were only engaged but 
not yet married. So, as the court held, there was no legitimate marriage in the case to 
exempt the defendant from the liability of rape. In cases like these, the convictions did 
not mean that the principle of marital rape was adhered to; on the contrary, it was the 
principle that there can be no rape in marriage that was firmly adhered to. 
These cases confirm again that the start of the legal process for divorce usually did 
not make difference in the courts' decision of marital exemption of rape. Actions, 
which would otherwise amount to rape, occurred in Cases 2, 10 and 11 and all took 
place during the divorce proceeding, but it was not the ground that court delivered the 
196 Verdict of the Wu Yaoxiong Case. http: / /www. unn. com. cn/ GB/ channel2200 /2201/200110/19/116461.html. 
197 As this case was so special and disputable, Judge Long broke away from the customary rule and expressed his 
personal opinion after the case to the public so as to have the attention of the legislators and the law experts. 
http: / /www.peopledaily. co.jp /GB/ shenghuo /76/123/20010405/433792.html. 
198 Verdict of the Wu Yaoxiong Case. http: / /www. unn. com. cn/ GB/ channe12200 /2201/200110/19/116461.html 
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guilty verdicts in cases 2 and 11. But Case 10, the Shanghai case, is somewhat special. 
Since it is also the case that attracted most attention in the nationwide debate, I will 
examine it in more details. 
The husband Wang Weiming started two divorce actions in June 1996 and March 
1997. On October 8th, 1997, the Qingpu District Court, Shanghai, granted them the 
divorce decree. On October 13th, 1997, nine days before the divorce decree took 
effect, Wang came to the residence where the couple used to live. He found the wife, 
Qian, there. He wanted to have sex with her. Being refused, Wang had intercourse 
with Qian by force, causing several scratches on Qian's breast. Violence in this case 
was too slight to constitute assault.' 99 On December 24th, 1999, the Court decided: 
"Though the defendant and the victim were husband and wife, they had 
separated for more than 16 months and the Defendant had raised two divorce 
actions, they were already incompatible as husband and wife. Under the special 
circumstances that the divorce decree had been issued but not yet effective, the 
Defendant was against the will of victim by violence and therefore ought to be 
legally punished. However, whereas the case has its own peculiarities, the 
Defendant should be given a discretionary lighter punishment. "20 
The defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment 
with 3 years probation. 
This case was the first marital rape case in Shanghai and it appeared to be quite 
special compared with other cases. It was special compared with the cases which also 
occurred during the remaining existence of marriage before divorce, like Case 12 in 
Sichuan: the defendant in the Sichuan case was acquitted while in the Shanghai case 
convicted. It was also special compared with the cases in which the defendants were 
convicted, like Case 2: in Case 2 the marriage was legally null while in the Shanghai 
case the marriage was yet still legally valid. This case, with its specialty, brought to a 
climax the heated discussion in China about marital rape.201 Some commentators 
claim that, in this case, the court, on one hand, recognized that the conjugal relation 
between the defendant and the victim was in the period of continued existence, and, 
on t he o ther h and, c onvicted t he d efendant. T his w ould s uggest t hat t he C ourt h as 
moved one step forward towards the recognition of marital rape as a crime and has 
already r ejected the "no rape in marriage" principle.202 Given that Shanghai, as the 
biggest coastal cosmopolitan area in China, always takes the lead in accepting new 
ideas, it would be understandable for many people to believe that the court there 
would again take the lead in criminalizing marital rape. However, on further 
consideration, this analysis cannot be accepted. 
First, according to reasons given by the court for their decision, the defendant in 
case 10 was convicted not only for his actual act of raping but, more importantly, for 
his uncertain marital r elation with t he victim. T he v erdict gave t he r easons for t he 
conviction as the following: 
1. "Though the defendant and the victim were husband and wife, they 
had separated for more than 16 months." 
199 Verdict of Wang Weiming Case. Reference to Criminal Trial, vol. 2, 2000, p27. 
200 Verdict of Wang Weiming Case. Reference to Criminal Trial, vol. 2, 2000, p27. 
201 
Li Shunzhang, "New Perspective on Marital Rape Problem", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of Criminal 
Law, vol. 5, p450 -451. 
202 Zhou Qi, Hu Zhiguo, "On Wang Weiming Rape Case ", Case Studies, vol. 2, 2000, p20. Or the website: 
chinalawinfo .com /xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1452 (2002/2/11). 
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2. "The defendant had raised two divorce actions; they were already 
incompatible as husband and wife." 
3. "The divorce decree had been issued but not yet effective." 
4. "The Defendant's act was by force and against the will of the 
victim.i203 
Apart from the last reason given about the actual act of raping, the first three 
reasons were all on the basis that, at the time of the act of the defendant, the defendant 
and the victim did not have a normal husband -wife relation. The discussion about the 
uncertainty of the marital relation took up a much larger portion of the verdict than 
that about the violent forcible act itself. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the 
Court took the lack of normal marital relation as the key factor in making the 
defendant's act criminal, an even more important reason than the actual act of raping. 
The other reason might be a more convincing one. The case was quoted by 
Reference to Criminal Trial, a journal edited by No. 1 Criminal Trial Division of the 
Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China. In the comments by the 
Supreme Court on this case, they said: 
"We think, husband and wife, once married, have promised to live together and 
therefore have the duty of cohabitation. Though it is not seen in the clear or 
mandatory prescriptions of law, the duty is deeply rooted in the ethical ideas of 
people and therefore proclamation in the writing of law is not necessary. As long 
as the marriage is normal and continuing in existence, it is enough to keep the act 
of marital rape from the establishment of a crime. This is also why generally the 
act of marital coercive sex cannot be taken as the crime of rape in the judicial 
practice. Therefore, generally speaking, a husband cannot be the subject of the 
crime of rape of his wife." 204 
The exemption of marital rape is the principle to which the Shanghai Case 
adhered. This may take away the reasons to be optimistic about the case's progress in 
criminalizing marital rape, but this is not yet the worst. Comprehensive researches 
into the above two groups of cases will reveal the reasons to be pessimistic. 
The first reason for pessimism lies in the number of cases that refused to follow 
the legislation. The above two groups have eleven cases altogether, counting for 73% 
of all the cases I have collected. Such a high percentage shows a serious inconsistency 
between the legislation and the judicial practices, which is quite negative to an 
effective legal system. 
Secondly, judicial interpretation is not consistent either. On comparing the status 
of marriage in the Sichuan and Shanghai cases, the case facts were identical: 
1. The divorce procedures had started. 
2. The courts had issued decree of divorce. 
3. The decrees were not yet effective when the husband's alleged action 
occurred. 
4. The legal processes for divorce had not completed and therefore the marriages 
had not yet legally dissolved. 
Given the same legal status of marriages, the Sichuan court decided that the 
marriage was still legally valid and therefore gave marital exemption to the defendant 
203 Verdict of Wang Weiming Case. Reference to Criminal Trial, vol. 2, 2000, p27. 
204 No. 1 Criminal Division, Supreme People's Court: Reference for Criminal Trial, Vol 2, 2000, p 28, 
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while the Shanghai court decided that the marriage was already not sufficiently 
legally valid and therefore did not give the defendant the marital exemption. 
From this perspective, the Shanghai case demonstrated more inconsistency rather 
than progress of law. The inconsistency lies not only between the legislation and 
judicial practices, but also between the courts themselves. This inconsistency means 
that while the legislation is one thing, the judicial practice could be quite another. And 
this is why marital rape is criminal in legislation but not in practice. This 
inconsistency also means that even upon the same legal facts, different conclusions 
and decisions could be arrived at in different courts. And this is why marriage, though 
of the same legal status, played quite different roles in Sichuan and Shanghai cases. 
These inconsistencies may have prevented effective operation of the Chinese 
marital rape law, but, on the other hand, they can also be the reflections of the changes 
in current Chinese law, or the reflection of the dynamic nature of human laws that is 
caused by the constantly changing social environments in which they develop. 
Therefore, these inconsistencies of current marital rape law in China may well explain 
why, while most cases adhere to the principle of marital exemption, there are still a 
third group o f c ases i n which the criminalization o f m arital r ape was the principle 
followed, such as Case 7 in 1989, Case 13 in 2001, Case 14 in 2001, and Case 15 in 
2003. 
Defendants in all cases in the third group were found guilty but they are different 
from the Shanghai case in that the courts did not attempt to establish the lack of 
normal marital r elation for the c onviction of the defendants. Marriages in the third 
group of cases, normal or not, did not seem to play much role in the courts' guilty 
verdicts. The only factor to constitute the crime of rape, as given by the courts, was 
the actions per se of the husbands' coercive sex.205 Therefore, it is fairly obvious that 
the courts here strictly followed the legislative definition of rape in the criminal code. 
Case 13 in 2001 may deserve special attention. In the case, the husband Zhou 
attempted to rape the victim before their divorce decree took effect. However, he 
voluntarily gave up with the persuasion of relatives and friends. Still, he was accused 
of rape the next day in the court and convicted of attempted rape. Given the evidently 
lighter circumstances compared with other cases, and given that the province of 
Shaanxi, in which the case occurred, is the inland rural province where traditional 
family ethics tend to dominate, Case 13 is of particular importance. 
An additional factor of note is the different times in which the third group of cases 
occurred. Compared to the other two groups, the third group of cases mostly took 
place in the latest years. This might mean a possible trend for judicial practices to 
become consistent with the law. But, still, this optimistic view will need more cases to 
confirm, more cases that criminalize instead of exempt marital rape. 
Conclusively, marital exemption of rape is still the basic principle followed in 
judicial practice in over 70% cases. However, in some of the more recent cases, 
contrary to the traditional view, the criminalization of marital rape was the principle 
followed. But it remains to be seen whether these recent cases actually form a new 
trend or just are some more inconsistencies in judicial practices. 
205 See the verdict of Ping Zhihong Case for example. http: / /zfr.scnu.edu.cn/ court /jiaodian/hunneigiangjian.htm 
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2.3 Debates of law people 
Law people are those who play a direct or significant role in either the making or 
the practice of law. They can be legislators, judges, lawyers, law professors or other 
law -related scholars. Given their direct role in law, the inconsistency of marital rape 
law is a reflection of the disagreement of law people about marital rape, with 
legislators criminalizing it and judges decriminalizing it. In turn, the inconsistency 
between legislators and judges caused further disagreements among law professors, 
lawyers, and even scholars of sociology and other law -related fields. Readers may 
already have some idea of how polarised the debate has been from the first chapter. 
"In the Chinese legal history, there has not been yet another topic that has attracted so 
much attention and aroused such nationwide discussion as marital rape has ".206 Such a 
heated discussion seems inevitable because it is said that, "Recent discussions about 
marital rape are not only the effects of the feminism's introduction into China or of 
the wakening rights consciousness of Chinese people. Moreover, as a legal 
phenomenon, they have deep connections with China's society, history, culture as 
well as the humanist psychological structure of Chinese people. "207 
However, as April 2001 approached, when the new marriage law was about to 
come into force, people involved in the discussions started to expect the new law 
would give explicit and special provisions concerning the problem thus ending all the 
disagreements and debates.208 To their disappointment, the new law did not provide 
what people expected. The debate continues and the disagreement whether marital 
rape should be criminalized or not remains.209 The following is an introduction about 
the major arguments in the debate. 
2.3.1 The opposing opinions 
The opposing opinions of the criminalization of marital rape hold that during the 
subsistence of marital relation, husbands' actions of coercive sex against their wives 
are not the crimes of rape. Specific reasons given for the negation of marital rape are 
varied, which can be grouped into five kinds: conjugal rights, husband's exemption, 
insufficiency of the degree of danger, difficulty in proving and the literary meaning of 
QIANG JIAN. 
1. Conjugal rights 
The conjugal rights doctrine holds that conjugal rights, as the important rights of 
marriage law, refer to all the reciprocal rights between husband and wife formed on 
the basis of the status of spouse, including conjugal personal rights and conjugal 
property rights.210 Conjugal personal rights can accordingly include the rights to 
mutual support, the rights to require the spouse to cohabit, the rights to require the 
spouse's loyalty, etc. Conjugal rights in usual sense refer to the mutual obligation 
between husband and wife to cohabitate and to be loya1.211 Cohabitation is a legal 
duty, which neither the husband nor the wife, without legitimate reasons, can refuse to 
Zoe See: http: // china lawinfo.com /fzdt /qiangli.asp Quote from the organizer of a special online forum on marital 
rape hosted by The Law School in Peking University. 
207 http: / /lawnews.csdn. net .cn /news /zhuanti /jiatinbl.htm. 
208 Wang Yong, "Reflections on Marital Coercive Sex from the Perspective of Criminal Law ", Cases and Judicial 
Interpretations of Criminal Law, vol. 5, p429. 
209 Ibid. 
21° Shao Shixing, "Analysis of the Duties of Cohabitation and Loyalty between Husbands and Wives ", Law Review, 




perform. Since sex is an important part of cohabitation, the husband therefore has the 
right to demand the wife to perform the duty and the wife cannot refuse the required 
intercourse based on the duty of cohabitation. Accordingly any sexual intercourse 
between husband and wife does not constitute the crime of rape.212 
The legal meaning of the conjugal rights doctrine is the affirmation of the 
cohabitating duty based on the marriage of free will. The legality and the relative 
stability of marriage decide that the consent to cohabitate has its. generality and 
permanency in validity. And the termination of cohabitation as a legal duty c an be 
valid only through due process of law.213 Before the establishment of marriage, 
individual men and women have the absolute freedom of sexual self -determination, 
which shall not be infringed by anybody. After marriage sexual self -determination of 
both men and women becomes a kind of relative freedom, which is limited by the 
consent to marriage. The absoluteness of sexual self -determination is extramarital 
only.214 
2. Husband's exemption 
The doctrine of husband's exemption holds that the husband, with his special 
status, e njoys t he r ights t o c ohabitate w ith h is w ife. S ince t he e stablishment o f t he 
marriage, the wife has given the life -long consent to have sex with her husband, and 
the husband does not have to ask for consent each time before intercourse. Otherwise, 
there will be the inconsistency between the crime of marital rape in criminal law and 
the duty of cohabitation and loyalty in marriage law.215 On the basis of this doctrine, 
some law people argue that criminalizing marital rape is not only against the 
traditional legal culture but also against the current marriage law of China, which 
prescribes mutual loyalty. 216 Some people also argue that it would damage the 
stability of the social and family life if we criminalize marital rape because neither 
custom nor legislation in China has done so before. 217 Though such actions are 
against the will of women, they conclude, however, they are not illegal and should be 
regulated with moral rules.218 
The doctrine of the husbands' exemption shares substantial commonality with the 
conjugal rights doctrine, with only slight differences in the perspective of observation. 
The substantial commonality is that both the conjugal rights doctrine and the doctrine 
of husband exemption well conforms to the traditional Chinese moralities and ethics. 
Though the claim of the husband exemption about current marriage law's prescription 
on cohabitation duty is falsified in the debates by the supporters of the criminalization 
of marital rape,219 their arguments based on the current cultural environment about the 
instability of social life seem to be irrefutable to the supporters of marital. rape law.22° 
Traditional Chinese ethics take married women attached to their husbands and 
cohabitation is certainly the duty involved. Cohabitation and mutual loyalty between 
husband and wife are not only the reflection of physiological and ethical values of 
2121bid. 
213 Zhang Xianyu, "On No Rape in Marriage ", Law Science, vol. 3, 2000, p55. 
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marital relation but also the requirement of the essence of marital and family relations. 
People holding the two doctrines emphasize guiding function of law as the criterion of 
value judgment for the whole society.221 They think that at the present time China is 
in the middle of a transformation process where the old system of values has 
collapsed but a new system of values has not yet been established. In this 
transforming process, there are many unstable factors in the relationships of marriage 
and family.222 Higher divorce rates, extramarital sex, etc., all come as a shock to the 
stability of marriage and family relations. Many people are not happy with such 
realities. Under such circumstances, the law ought to play the stabilizing role in the 
conflicts of values to support the duty of cohabitation and mutual loyalty between 
husband and wife. This is what the majority of Chinese people expect even today after 
a long time of preaching of women's independent status and rights.223 
There are two key points in the arguments of the two doctrines to decriminalize 
marital rape. First are the most fundamental cultural arguments of traditional Chinese 
ethics and morality. It is from the' basic premise that the opponents of marital rape 
draw their conclusions. Second is the judgment about present reality in Chinese 
society. The opponents of marital rape law believe that traditional Chinese ethics are 
still dominating the current Chinese society and therefore the corresponding law of 
the decriminalization of marital rape ought to be applied in such a society. 
3. Insufficiency of social danger 
The doctrine of the inadequacy of danger holds that husband's coercive sex 
against his wife is far less dangerous than raping other women because the so- called 
marital rape has its special exclusiveness.224 The danger of marital rape is not the 
actions per se but only its means of violence and coerce. And law decides the liability 
of an action in accordance with the danger of it. With the specialty of marital rape, its 
danger can hardly constitute the criminal liability of the actor. And it would be even 
unjust to prescribe the equal liability a s the ordinary rape, which has much greater 
social danger.225 
The major criticism this doctrine has received from the supporters of marital rape 
law is how to decide social danger. According to some critics, it is quite arguable to 
say that it is a lesser danger to society for a man to rape his own wife than to rape 
another woman.226 Also some people argue, the notion of social danger per se is not 
substantively meaningful to the criminal law. 227 Actually, whether an action is 
socially dangerous or not is quite subjective, depending not only on the action itself 
but also on how people see it, which again would have a lot to do with cultural 
elements228 
4. Difficulty in proof 
People who argue the difficulty in proof suggest that sexual actions between 
husband and wife are personal privacies recognized by law. Even if coercive sex has 
happened, with wounds on the wife's body and sperms in the wife's urine, however, if 
221Ji Xiangde, 'Rational Analysis and Reflection on Marital Rape", Journal of Shandong Police, vol. 4, 2001, p32. 
222 Ibid. 
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224 Yang Deshou, "Legal Liability of Marital Coercive Sex ", Journal of Chinese Criminal Law, vol. 5, 2001, p103. 
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226 Chen Xingliang, "The Criminal Legal Culture in the Law -Ruled Country ", The People's Procuratorial, vol. 11, 
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the husband refuses to admit, it is still hard to prove either the sequence in which the 
violent actions and sexual intercourse have taken place, or that the purpose of the 
violence was to have sex. Since it is so difficult to prove non -consensual intercourse, 
even with traces of violence and injuries, then it would be even harder to prove when 
threats or other means is taken for the coercive sex. Therefore, even if marital rape is 
criminalized, such are the difficulties of proof, the law will still be practically 
unworkable.229 
This argument is found by its critics to be even weaker than the previous ones. 
Difficulties in proof are not limited to sexual offences. Therefore it cannot be the 
reason not to criminalize marital rape.23° 
The linguistic argument about the literal meaning of JIAN is that the core word in 
the Chinese term for rape, QIANG JIAN, refers only to the extramarital sex. And the 
concept of marital rape therefore cannot exist in the Chinese context.231 In my 
introduction to the Chinese legislative background in the first part of this Chapter, I 
have already shown why this argument cannot be established. 
2.3.2 The supporting opinions 
The supporting opinions of the criminalization of marital rape think that 
husbands' coercive sex with their wives constitutes the crime of rape. And the main 
reason given is that the subjects of the crime of rape are general subjects and the 
criminal law of China does not prescribe the husbands' exemption. There are two 
specific doctrines in defining the actions of marital rape. 
1. Time of the action 
One doctrine holds that if the action takes place during the period of time when 
the husband and wife are in the legal process for divorce or when they are in the long- 
term separation, it will constitute the crime of rape. The doctrine thinks that sexual 
self -determination is the basic right of every adult. Though marriage does mean 
mutual duty of cohabitation, it does not mean the irrevocable consent to sex. 
Therefore husbands do not have the right to force their wives to have sex. Especially 
when they are divorcing or have separated for a certain length of time, they are no 
longer normal husband and wife and the marriage is no longer in the legally normal 
state, the duty to submit to intercourse disappears. So, if husbands have coercive sex 
with their wives at the time of these special circumstances, they will commit the crime 
of rape.232 
There are three key points that require special attention in this regard. The first is 
that the doctrine is for the criminalization of marital rape, which is contrary to all the 
arguments of the opposing opinions. Secondly, the most fundamental basis for this 
doctrine to support the concept of marital rape is the belief that "sexual self - 
determination is the basic right of every adult ", including women. This is the opposite 
notion about women's status from that of traditional Chinese ethics, the totally 
different cultural elements from which a different legal conclusion is drawn about 
marital rape. Thirdly, this doctrine is not a thorough one in criminalizing marital rape. 
229 Yang Deshou, "Legal Liability of Marital Coercive Sex", Journal of Chinese Criminal Law, vol. 5, 2001, pl 03. 
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By claiming marital rape is criminal only when the state of marriage is no longer 
normal, it offers only its partial support to the concept of marital rape. Why it does so 
is because the doctrine recognizes the restriction upon the sexual self -determinant of 
women by the duty of marital cohabitation. 
The belief of the doctrine that "sexual self -determination is the basic right of 
every adult including woman" does not have any explicit legal prescription, but it can 
be derived from the fundamental principle of modern law about women's equal status 
to men, which, in turn, comes ultimately from non -legal values of women's rights. 
The restriction upon sexual self -determination by cohabitation duty is on the other 
hand the result of the traditional family ethics in China. Therefore, the partiality of 
this doctrine is in a degree the result from the conflicts of two opposite cultural 
elements, the notion of women's independent right of sexual self -determination v. the 
traditional ethical duties caused to women by marriage. 
2. Circumstances of actions 
The other doctrine supporting the criminalization of marital rape advocates that 
whether the crime of marital rape is committed or not should be decided by the 
specific circumstances of the action. If the husband uses light violence in the coercive 
sex with his wife, and the circumstances are rather light, the action can be identified 
as not criminal. For example, if the wife says no because she is in the period or not in 
the right mood and the husband's action of coercive sex meet only language refusal or 
other light resistance, he does not commit the crime of rape. However, if the husband 
uses serious violence or has other serious circumstances, for example, causing bodily 
harm to his wife, or raping his wife in the presence of another person(s), the action 
should constitute the crime of rape. 233 
This is also a partial supporting doctrine for the criminalization of marital rape. 
Why husbands' actions of coercive sex with light circumstances can be excluded from 
marital rape is because, according to this doctrine, though they also infringe wives' 
rights, these actions are not socially dangerous enough and it would endanger the 
stability of marriage if these light actions are also criminalized. Morality can be a 
better regulation than the criminal law for these actions. On the other hand, serious 
actions, with their greater danger, are sufficient to pierce the shield of marriage so as 
to be criminalized just as the ordinary crime of rape.234 
Just as the time doctrine, we see a compromise between two opposing cultural 
factors in the partiality of the circumstance doctrine. It is its belief of the wives' 
independent rights that makes the doctrine think that marital rape ought to be 
criminalized. However, the remaining notion of the morality -based regulation for 
conflicts within marriage prevents the doctrine from supporting the thorough 
criminalization of martial rape. 
In the debate about marital rape, it is difficult to find people so radical as to 
,preach the complete and thorough criminalization of marital rape in practice. The 
above two partially- supporting doctrines are those that have gone the furthest. Even 
those who consider marital rape ought to be criminalized completely in theory turn 
out to preach partial criminalization in 1 egal reality. This has much to do with the 
supporter's judgment about the realistic conditions of cultural elements in current 
Chinese society. Though the supporters of the criminalization of marital rape 
recognize the criminalization is the necessary result of women as independent and 
equal persons before law, however, they mostly are not confident with the social 
233 He Yifu, "Marital Rights and Marital Rape", The Application of Law, vol. 4, 2001, P54. 
234 Ibid. 
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reality, where the incompatible traditional ethics are still dominating. As a result, 
these cultural elements force them to compromise. In a word, cultural elements 
always play an important role in the debates of law people about marital rape law. 
2.3.3 Summary 
For both the opponents and the supporters of the criminalization of marital rape, 
cultural elements are always the most important and fundamental arguments. They 
both draw their conclusions, whether for or against the concept of marital rape, from 
their own cultural premise. 
Judgments about the current status of different cultural elements in the social 
reality play another important role in law people's view about whether marital rape 
should be criminalized or not in the current Chinese law. The usual judgment about 
the social reality is that current Chinese society is still dominated by the traditional 
ethics, which is in essence against the concept of marital rape. 
Such a judgment of reality well supports the opponents of the criminalization of 
marital rape. But, for those who have already accepted women's rights values, like the 
legislators, such a judgment of reality means a dilemma. According to their accepted 
women's rights notions, marital rape ought to be criminalized. But according to the 
realistic cultural environment, marital rape cannot be criminalized. This is what 
contributes to the unthoroughness of the current supporters of the criminalization of 
marital rape in China. 
The sad feelings of dilemma of the supporters can be well represented by Dr. Fu 
Liqing from Peking University. In his article "Marital rape should wait: between to 
be and ought to be ", Dr. Fu concludes: "If we look back again at the discussions 
about the problem of marital rape after all the zigzags and roundabouts, we could 
probably cool ourselves down to think deeper. I would say, under the current social 
background, decriminalizing marital rape, though not a good choice, is a rational 
choice ".235 
Up to now, we could see that the crux about whether or not marital rape should be 
criminalized in current China lies more in judgments about the realistic cultural 
environment rather than cultural elements per se. What is true map of distribution of 
the powers of different cultural elements? That is what I will discuss next. 
2.4 Attitudes f lay people 
Before the further introduction to the relevant cultural elements concerning the 
Chinese marital rape law, we might need to make clear first what are these cultural 
factors. They are, in fact, the current ideas of people about family ethics, especially 
about the husband -wife relationship, the status of wife in the family and, particularly, 
the problems concerning women's rights of sexual self -determination. That is to say, 
the decisive cultural factors for marital rape law, which law people care so much, are 
just the attitudes of the common lay people toward marital coercive sex. 
zss Fu Liqing, "Marital Rape Should Wait - -- Between To Be and Ought To Be ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations 
of Criminal Law, vol. 4, p416. Or the website: chinalawinfo .com /xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1504 
(2002/2/11). 
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2.4.1 Surveys in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 
The opponents of the criminalization of marital rape believe the traditional 
Confucian ethics are still dominating in Chinese society. And many supporters of the 
criminalization of marital rape also agree with it. But neither of them have provide 
sufficient empirical evidences to support their claims. As the cultural elements are just 
the attitudes of the lay people towards marital coercive sex, they are actually not very 
difficult to find out by means of surveys. 
During my research, I found some surveys done by a private research company 
about the attitudes of common people in China today towards marital rape. Perhaps 
interested in the nation -wide discussion, a commercial research institute Horizon - 
China Research, a leading research firm in the research industry of China, conducted a 
survey about marital rape in 2000 in the three biggest cities of China: Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. The surveys adopted the method of multi-step random 
sampling and interviewed 939 young city women, aged 18 -35, in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou, with the data weighted according to the population in each city, 
which could therefore basically show the views of the young women in the cities.236 
According to the surveys, nearly 70% of the interviewees recognize the existence 
of marital rape as a problem of life, while 14% denies its existence and 16% do not 
know.237 
Table 1 Opinions about whether marital rape exists 
It exists. 70.7% 
It does not exist. 13.5% 
I do not know. 15.8% 
Total 100 
For the attitudes towards legal solutions of marital rape problem, about 70% of 
the interviewees agree with it, with 38% strongly agree. Those who reject legal 
solutions count for 10% and the rest 20% find it hard to decide.238 
Table 2 Attitudes towards legal solutions of marital rape problem 
Strongly disagree 2.20% 
Not quite agree 8.30% 
Neutral position 13.90% 
Fairly agree 32. 10% 
Strongly agree 37.50% 
I do not know. 6% 
Total 100.00% 
When asked whether they have heard about the new marriage law, which would 
be passed in April 2001 and expected to make special prescriptions about marital 
rape, 64% of interviewees said yes while 36% said 110.239 





Table 3 Have you heard that the new marriage is expected to 




Comparatively, Shanghai always takes the lead among the three cities on every 
aspect of acceptance of the criminalization of marital rape. Shanghai has the highest 
rate of 77.5% recognizing the existence of marital rape, with 65.3% in Beijing and 
66.4% in Guangzhou.240 When asked whether you would agree with legal solutions to 
the problem of marital rape, interviewees in Shanghai again have a far higher 
percentage ( 77.2 %) than that in Beijing (65.3 %) and Guangzhou( 66.4 %) .241 
Comprehensive analyses show that attitudes towards legal solutions of marital 
rape problems have close connections with factors like marital status, age, education, 
occupation and family income. Generally, interviewees with younger ages, higher 
education and income are more likely to recognize the existence of marital rape as a 
problem of life and support legal options for the solution of the problem. In contrast, 
married people were more conservative, a much lower percentage of whom recognize 
marital rape than the unmarried. 
Table 4 Attitudes towards legal solutions of marital rape 
of people with different marital status 
Married Unmarried 
Strongly disagree 2. 1% 2.3% 
Not quite agree 5. 1% 11.5% 
Neutral position 12.8% 14.9% 
Fairly agree 29. 5% 34.7% 
Strongly agree 45.5% 29.6% 
I do not know 4.9% 7% 
100% 100% 
Table 5 Attitudes towards legal solutions of marital rape of 















disagree 2.2% 2.2% 2.5% 2.0% 
Not 






position 20.1% 14.0% 11.5% 10.8% 
Fairly 
agree 29. 9% 32. 2% 34. 5% 30. 4% 
Strongly 
agree 26. 9% 36. 2% 39. 5% 48. 6% 
I do not 
know 9. 7% 6. 6% 4. 5% 2. 7% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 6 Knowledge about new marriage law of people in 
different ages 
18 -19 20 -24 25 -29 30 -34 35 
Yes 55.60% 61.90% 67.90% 68.10% 67.60% 
No 44.40% 38.10% 32.10% 31.90% 32.40% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Finally the survey report concluded that 70% of the interviewees recognize the 
existence of marital rape as a social problem and agree to solve it with legal approach. 
What this shows, according to the survey report, is the growing awareness of the 
female in current China of their rights: women are, first of all, human, who have 
duties as wives, but, more importantly, their dignity as persons.242 
The results of the survey show an obvious agreement in the cities, which is the 
same dominating favorable idea shared by the majority of the people about marital 
rape law. Being typical and dominating, being shared by most members in the 
communities, the agreement well fits the concept of culture as defined in the previous 
chapter. So there exists something that can be called culture in terms of the problem 
of marital rape law, at least in the three cities where the surveys were conducted. 
With 70% people accepting the idea of the concept of marital rape, it is enough to 
label the three big cities as appropriate cultural environments for the criminalization 
of marital rape. The wide recognition of marital rape here shows us a favorable social 
circumstance in which modern marital rape law should operate effectively. 
Unfortunately this picture provided by the surveys does not conform to the actual 
operation of marital rape law in China. The law's legislative /judicial inconsistency as 
well a s t he i nconsistency within j udicial p ractices p rovides u s r easonable d oubt o n 
whether or not the surveys based on the three biggest cities have depicted a true and 
complete picture of the whole Chinese society. 
It is a matter of commonsense that the rural areas and the biggest cities like 
Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai have remarkable differences between them, 
economically and culturally. 243 Big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou are 
242 Ibid. 
243 Huang Ping, In Search for Survival: A Sociological Study of Rural -Urban Migration, Yunnan People's Press, 
p71. 
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known for their modern ideas and liberal attitudes towards marriage and sex life while 
the rural areas are usually thought to be much more conservative and adhere to 
traditional ethics in terms of problems like marital rape. If the above assumption is 
true, the surveys in these three cities alone are not sufficient to conclude about the 
cultural conditions in the whole nation of China. If the assumption is not true, we will 
need empirical evidences to falsify it so as to verify the surveys' validity for the whole 
nation. This means, we need separate surveys conducted in the rural areas to prove 
that they are not so different from the cities. Either way, we cannot just take for 
granted the validity of the survey in only the three biggest cities in the Chinese society 
as a whole. Only when we have empirical evidences to clear away the reasonable 
doubts about the urban/rural differences, can we use the surveys in Beijing, 
Guangzhou and Shanghai as valid data for the rest areas of China as well. 
Also, the inland rural areas are where most Chinese people live. Of the 1.3 billion 
people in China 62% live in rural area and are engaged in farming. Only 10% of 
people live in the well -developed coastal cities in the east.244 The number of people 
living in the developed cities like Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai would be even 
smaller. Given the assumed big difference between the rural and urban population in 
China, any study of the ethical ideas in Chinese society cannot let the urban be the 
representatives of the rural. On the contrary, the rural are the least to be ignored. 
Unfortunately t he above s urvey i n t he three biggest cities i n C hina i s t he o my 
empirical material available for us to see what the common ideas about marital 
coercive sex are like in the current Chinese society, which is therefore far from 
sufficient. In order to have a more reflective picture about the cultural environment of 
marital rape law in current Chinese society, more information is required, especially 
about the inland and rural areas. That's why I have to conduct my own survey for the 
information needed. 
2.4.2 Surveys in Qingdao city and the rural areas 
1. Deciding the observatory objects 
Naturally my own survey is to find out the cultural conditions in small and 
medium -sized cities and, especially, the inland rural areas, aiming to verify or falsify 
the assumed urban/rural differences in cultural elements,concerning marital rape. It is 
under this goal that I have chosen as my objects of observation, which are the city of 
Qingdao, a county town of Shenxian and a village of Pengzhuang in Shandong 
Province and two villages of Yongxing and Dachang in Shanxi Province. 
What I am most interested in is the inland rural area, which is the largest in size 
and where the largest proportion of Chinese population lives. If we talk of China as 
one society, the society would have lost its main body without the rural people. If we 
talk of China as a culture, the culture would not exist if the rural people were 
excluded. If we talk of Chinese law as a real Chinese law legitimated by its own 
people, it is essential to recognize the law as applied in rural areas. However, with the 
vast land, s trong t radition, undeveloped e conomy and less c ommunication w ith t he 
outside, the inland rural area is usually considered as a model of the most conservative 
communities in terms of marital rape law. 
I have had two observatory objects of this type. One is the inland county town, 
Shenxian, together with an inland village, Pengzhuang, of the Province of Shandong. 
Pengzhuang village is under the administration of Shenxian County and very close (4 
km) to the town, with the same dialect spoken. Though the Province is coastal, the 
244 See the Bulletin of the Fifth National Census (2000), http: // www.stats.gov.cn /tjgb /rkpcgh/. 
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county town and the village are far from the sea and, as I have known from my 
childhood, the coastal part is like another province, the dialects of which cannot be 
understood in village of Pengzhuang and the County town of Shenxian. Therefore, the 
two villages make good representatives of the largest inland rural community in 
China. 
I have surveyed another two villages, Yongxing and Dachang, in the further 
northwest province of Shanxi. The province is truly inland, with no access to the sea, 
and the economy there is underdeveloped as most inland areas of China. They live a 
traditional and tranquil life, making a perfect model of traditional Chinese 
communities in the vast rural areas. 
Qingdao, as a medium -sized city on the eastern coast of China, is chosen by me 
as the model of the right -in- the -middle between the most liberal and the most 
conservative ones. Considering that it is a quite smaller and quieter city than Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou and backed with a vast rural neighbourhood of strong 
traditional ethics, Qingdao is expected to be sort of retreat from positions of the above 
three biggest cities. But it is a coastal city after all, which might show some 
differences from the inland rural communities as well. 
So, these are the places I chose to observe as the representatives of communities 
different from those of big coastal cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
Choosing them, I expect to find out the other side of cultural environment for current 
Chinese marital rape law, which is expected to be different from or even opposite to 
the ideas about marital rape from those in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Given 
the much larger size of rural areas in China, these cultural elements, if found different, 
ought also to be more important than those in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou for 
the studies of cultural influences on marital rape law. 
My survey aims at a comparatively larger range of age and gender. Different from 
the Horizon -China survey, which observes only the young women between 18 and 35, 
I take as my objects of study all those who are above the age of 18, female and male. 
But the people above the age of 25 have turned out to be the main body of the 
interviewees in my surveys. This is good for the validity of my survey results for the 
following reasons: first people at the age of 25 or older have already had their own 
stable and mature ideas about things and therefore they are those who have more 
stable and reliable opinions about marital rape. Secondly people above 25 are mostly 
married and they therefore are the group of people to whom the problem of marital 
rape are most likely to occur, so, attitudes of these people are accordingly the cultural 
elements that are mostly likely to have factual effects on the operation of marital rape 
law. Meanwhile the 25 and above group are usually the main body of human society, 
which enjoys dominating status in any society. If culture is defined as "the complex of 
beliefs, attitudes, cognitive ideas, values and mode of reasoning and perception, which 
are typical of a particular society or social group ", those of the 25 -year -old people and 
the older ought to be what the concept of culture actually refers to. 
The empirical studies of the thesis are based on 800 questionnaires obtained from 
the surveys, with 200 from the city of Qingdao and 600 from rural areas. Among the 
600 rural questionnaires, I have had 300 from the two villages in Shanxi and another 
300 from the village and the county town in Shandong. I expect the survey of these 
600 people could represent the rural people's attitudes toward marital coercive sex. 
According to the latest census in 2001, the total Chinese population is1.276billion 
with 795.63 million in the rural area, amounting to 62.3% of the total.245 600 is an 
245 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/. 
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incredibly low number compared with 795.63 million. Whether the survey results be 
valid or not is decided by the following factors: 
First the traditional Chinese family ethics has been well established all over China 
for thousands of years. Given no external activator causing new changes, the attitudes 
of rural people towards marital coercive sex, which result from the traditional family 
ethics, would be the same in all the villages and county towns. 
Secondly, the major reason for the changes of Chinese people's attitudes towards 
marital coercive sex is the western influences.246 It is agreed as the macro social truth 
that, though also facing the challenges of western influences, rural areas all over 
China are a t a bout t he s ame p osition b efore t he w estern i ntrusion i nto t he C hinese 
family ethics, which is rather conservative and close compared with the coastal 
cities.247 
Accordingly, though the total number is large, I do not expect much difference 
among the rural people. Thus we can have an indicator of the validity of the survey 
results. Among the 600 rural questionnaires from two different provinces, if sufficient 
differences exist between them, the survey results are not valid. If no sufficient 
differences found between them, the surveys results ought to establish their reliability 
as the representative of the rural attitudes towards marital coercive sex. 
The validity can be further confirmed with the second indicator. I have had 
another 200 questionnaires from Qingdao, hoping to establish with them the sort of 
in- between model of the two extreme ends: the inland rural areas and the coastal 
cosmopolitans. So, if evident agreement is found among the rural results while at the 
mean time evident difference found between Qingdao and the rural area, the validity 
of the surveys can be better established. 
2 Design of the questionnaire 
The following principles were followed in designing the questionnaire.248 
1. The ultimate purpose of the questionnaire is to find out what the interviewees 
think about marital coercive sex, and the c ore question is whether they are 
happy with law treating it the same as the ordinary crime of rape. 
2. Several concrete questions may have been asked while they are actually 
serving the same core question from different aspects. Such a design may help 
with better precision about the information obtained. Question 3 and 4, for 
example, are concerned with the same question of whether people are willing 
to use law as alternative for the solution of the marital coercive sex problems 
in life. 
3. The questionnaire as a whole demonstrates a gradual transition from plain lay 
questions at the beginning to the more law- related questions at the end. Such a 
design is for the better understanding of the people lacking special legal 
knowledge. 
4. Assuming that the interviewees lack special legal knowledge, the easy and 
common language was used so that it was easier for the interviewees to read. 
Even so, explanations of the questions in the questionnaire were applied 
whenever the interviewees had problems of understanding. 
5. Marital status has two choices, married and unmarried. "Unmarried" means of 
course no experience of marriage while "married" originally in Chinese is JIE 
246 Fu Liqing, "Marital Rape Should Wait - -- Between To Be and Ought To Be ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of 
Criminal Law, vol. 4, p416. Or the website: chinalawinfo .com/xin /disxwpl.asp ?code= 129 &mark =1504 (2002/2/11). 
247 Suli, The Rule of Law and its Local Resources, China Politics and Law Press, 1996, p23. 
248 A sample of the questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. 
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GUO HUN, which means literally "has /had the experience of marriage" and 
therefore includes the divorced and the widowed. 
2.4.3 The results of the surveys in Qingdao city and the rural areas 
The results of the surveys in the inland and the rural areas do reveal much more 
information about current Chinese social realities in terms of people's attitudes 
towards marital coercive sex. While some results conformed to my pre -survey 
expectations, others did not. However, as a whole, the surveys do show us a picture 
quite different from that by the survey in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
The following are the results according to the different core questions concerned. 
1. Marital coercive sex as social fact 
Results from the investigated places give very affirmative answers to the actual 
occurrence of marital coercive sex in life. Questions 1 and 2 in the questionnaire are 
related to the actual existence of marital coercive sex as social facts. 
Let's start with Question 2, which is about whether marital coercive sex exists or 
not as a matter of fact. The results, are as the following: 
Table 7 Question 2 in Yongxing and Dachan 
Does marital coercive sex exist? 
Count & Percent 
It does not exist at all 26 
8.5% 
It is very common 48 
15.9% 
It occasionally happens200 
66.7% 
I do not know 27 
9.0% 
Table 8 Question 2 in Pengzhuang and Shenxian 
Does marital coercive sex exist? 
Count & Percent 
It does not exist at all 21 
7.1% 
It is very common 55 
18.4% 
It occasionally happens 184 
61.3% 
I do not know 40 
13.2% 
Table 9 Question 2 in Qingdao 
Does marital coercive sex exist? 
Count & Percent 
It does not exist at all 13 
6.5% 
It is very common 20 
10.2% 
It occasionally happens148 
74.1 % 
I do not know 19 
9.3% 
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In the two villages of Yongxing and Dachang in Shanxi, 82.6% of the 
interviewees recognize the happening of marital coercive sex, with 15.9% thinking it 
very common and 66.7% thinking it happens occasionally. And the people in the rural 
area in Shandong and Qingdao city also enjoy a high percentage, which is 79.7% and 
84.3% respectively. In contrast, people who deny the existence of marital coercive sex 
are relatively few, with only 8.5% in Yongxing and Dachang, 7.1% in Shenxian and 
Pengzhuang, and 6.5% in Qingdao city. 
Therefore, the occurrence of marital coercive sex in life is recognized as a social 
fact by the majority of the people interviewed. And in order to reduce the risk that the 
recognition might be the arbitrary subjective judgment, we can get further 
confirmation for it from the data from Question 1. 
Question 1 is about whether or not sex is a necessary duty of marriage that wives 
cannot refuse. Results are shown as the following tables: 
Table 10 Question 1 in Yongxin2 and Dachan 
Is sex the necessary marital duty? 
Sex is the necessarySex 
result of marriage 
is not the necessary 
duty, refusable 
male Count & 





female Count & 





Total Count & 





62.2% of the interviewees think sex is not the necessary duty of marriage while 
only 37.8% think it is. The high percentage of the people who think the wives can 
refuse the husbands' sexual demand is beyond my anticipation. Let's observe the 
attitudes within each gender respectively. We find that 66.7% of women and 58.9% of 
men give the negative answer to Question 1 while 33.3% of women and 41.1% of 
men give the affirmative. When a man and a woman sharing the same answer to this 
question marry to each other, marital coercive sex is less likely to happen. Neither is 
the case in which the woman thinks sex is the duty while the man thinks not. 
However, we find that while more than half of women, 66.7 %, think they can 
refuse husbands' sex demand, nearly half of men, 41.1 %, think the contrary. When a 
man and a woman from these two groups get married, there will be a high risk of 
marital coercive sex. Given that neither of the percentages with disputing ideas about 
sex as duty of marriage is low in each gender, the risk of the occurrence of marital 
coercive sex is high according to the results of Question 1. 
Results in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, . as shown in the following table, give an 
even more conservative picture, where 48.5% of men firmly believe in their rights on 
demanding sex from their wives which cannot be refused. Though a higher percentage 
of women agree with this, there are still 45.8% who disagree, causing an even higher 
risk of marital coercive sex than that shown in Yongxing and Dachang. 
Table 11 Question 1 in Pengzhuang village and Shenxian 
Is sex the necessary marital duty? 


























In Qingdao city, however, the risk seems to be lower. Only 26.8% of men still 
think their wives should not refuse their sex demands while as high as 73.2% tend to 
be more mild and agreeable husbands. This more liberal attitude compared with rural 
areas conforms to my expectation on Qingdao as a in- between model. However, when 
the 26.8% disagreeable men meet with the 57.7% of women, who are ready to refuse 
their husbands' sex demand, the risk of marital coercive sex, though lower, still exists. 
Table 12 Question 1 in Qingdao 
Is sex the necessary marital duty? 
Sex is the necessary result of 
marriage ' 
Sex is not the necessary 
duty, refusable 
Male Count & 





Female Count & 





Total Count & 





So, the data suggest an affirmative answer to the existence of marital coercive sex 
as a fact of life. 
2. Marital coercive sex as legal fact 
While most people recognize the factual existence of marital coercive sex as a 
problem of life, do they also regard it as a problem of law? How likely are the rural 
people today in China to take law as an option to solve the problem when it occurs? 
Questions 3 and 4 in the questionnaire are related to the core question. 
As is well -known, traditional Chinese family ethics regards sexual affairs as 
taboo. People are always quite reluctant to admit any external interference to this 
private problem between husband and wife. For this reason, I had expected to see in 
the survey the traditional reluctance, especially in the rural areas, to take law as an 
alternative for the solution of the marital coercive sex problem. But I was wrong, and 
the results are far beyond my expectation. 
Question 3 asks the interviewees to choose from the common options the most 
likely one they would use if the problem of marital coercive sex occurs to them. The 
results are as follows: 
Table 13 Question 3 in Yongxing and Dachang 
Options to solve the problem of marital coercive sex 
Count & 
Percent 
Its always personal privacy between husband and wife only, which needs no152 
external interference 50.8% 




Go to the court if necessary 40.2% 
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Table 14 Question 3 Shenxian and Penazhuan 
Options to solve the problem of marital coercive sex 
Count& 
Percent 
It's always personal privacy between husband and wife only, which needs no external148 
interference 49.4% 
Settle within family before senior members but not in court 39 
12.9% 
Go to the court if necessary 113 
37.6% 
Table 15 Question 3 in Qingdao 
Options to solve the problem of marital coercive sex 
Count & 
Percent 
It's always personal privacy between husband and wife only, which needs no exter59 
nal interference 29.6% 
Settle within family before senior members but not in court 17 
8.3% 
Go to the court if necessary 124 
62.0% 
In Yongxing and Dachang, about 60% of people would like to solve the marital 
coercive sex problem within family while about 40% say they will go to the court if 
necessary, which is a fairly high percentage in the supposedly conservative Chinese 
countryside. 
In Shenxian and Pengzhuang, which appears again more conservative than 
Yongxing and Dachang, there are nearly 38% of interviewees taking law as a possible 
solution. And with 2.3% of the interviewees in Shenxian and Pengzhuang who did not 
give a clear answer, the interviewees who explicitly prefer family solution are about 
the same percentage as those in Yongxing and Dachang. 
Qingdao city again demonstrates its difference from the inland rural areas, with 
the high percentage of 62% of the interviewees taking law as possible solution and 
38% otherwise. Qingdao, approximately, reverses the percentages in rural areas of the 
people saying "yes" and those saying "no" to legal solution of marital coercive sex. 
However, women as victims of marital coercive sex play the key role in the 
realistic application of legal solution. Therefore more accurate information about 
Question 3 needs us to look the answers given by different genders separately. 
Table 16 Question 3 by gender in Yongxing and Dachang 
It's always personal privacy betweenSettle 
husband and wife only, which needsbefore 
no external interference 
within familyGo 
senior membersif 
but not in court 
to the court 
necessary 
Male Count & 91 10 66 
% within 
gender 54.2% 5.6% 40.2% 
FemaleCount & 
within 
62 17 53 
gender 46.9% 13.6% 39.5% 
Total Count & 
within 
153 27 119 
gender 51.1% 9.0% 39.9% 
Table 17 Question 3 by gender in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
It's always personal privacy between Settle within familyGo to the court 
57 
husband and wife only, which needsbefore 
no external interference 
senior membersif 
but not in court 
necessary 
Male Count & 62 7 51 
% within 
gender 51.5% 6.1% 42.4% 
FemaleCount & 82 32 64 
% within 
gender 46.0% 18.0% 36.0% 
Total Count & 
within 
145 40 116 
gender 48.2% 13.3% 38.6% 
Table 18 Question 3 by gender in Qingdao 
It's always personal privacy betweenSettle 
husband and wife only, which needs 
no external interference 
within familyGo 
before senior members 
but not in court 
to the court 
if necessary 
Male Count & 34 9 58 
% within 
gender 33.9% 8.9% 57.1% 
FemaleCount & 25 8 67 
% within 
gender 25.0% 7.7% 67.3% 
Total Count & 59 17 125 
% within 
gender 29.6% 8.3% 62.0% 
Results show that separate percentages by gender do have differences from total 
percentages in terms of those who say "yes" to legal solution of marital coercive sex. 
They remain approximately the same in rural inland: in rural Shanxi, 39.5% of 
women, which is close to the average percentage of 40% of the total; in rural 
Shandong, 3 6% o f w omen, w hich i s about 2% less t han t he a verage p ercentage o f 
38% of the total. In Qingdao, however, women are more active than men, where 
67.3% of women would take legal actions for marital coercive sex, which is over 5% 
percent higher than the average percentage of both genders. This shows that in rural 
area, though the risk of marital coercive sex is higher, women, as victims, are less 
likely to choose legal remedy for the problem. 
Other than the above information, we can get more from Question 4, which asks 
the interviewees whether special legislation is necessary or not for a problem like 
marital coercive sex, which has been traditionally regulated by moral rather than legal 
norms. 
Table 19 Question 4 in Yongxing and Dachang 
Is special law needed? 





Table 20 Question 4 in Qingdao: 
Is special law needed? 




Is special law needed? 
No 26 
13.0% 
Since I did not ask this question in the survey in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, the 
two villages of Yongxing and Dachang in Shanxi can offer us an example of the rural 
inland. With the above two tables, we can see remarkable difference between rural 
inland and coastal city. While as high as 87% of people in Qingdao say "yes" to a 
marital rape law, more than half, 53 %, of people in the villages of Yongxing and 
Dachang in Shanxi say "no ". 
However, there are still 47% of people in rural Shanxi who welcome legal 
intrusion into the traditional realm of moral norms. Considering the strong 
conservative tradition in rural China, this ought to be encouraging enough for those 
who are promoting legal solutions for marital coercive sex. So the data actually 
suggests that the rural villages of Yongxing and Dachang, though more conservative 
than the city of Qingdao, are not as conservative as usually expected. 
Conclusively, in terms of the acceptance of legal solution of marital coercive sex, 
there is an obvious difference between rural areas and the cities. In the small coastal 
city of Qingdao, the percentage of women who would seek for legal protection from 
marital coercive sex is as high as 67% while in rural inland, about 36 -40% of women 
would do so. With the reluctance of most rural women to start legal actions, marital 
rape law has the risk to be ineffective in protecting victims of marital coercive sex in 
rural areas. However, viewed from t he o ther s ide, s ince 1 aw a t 1 east h as c hance i n 
nearly half of the cases in rural area to protect the victims, the percentage is already a 
fairly positive message for legal interference into marital coercive sex. 
3. The legal nature of marital coercive sex 
Most people in cities would choose legal solution of the marital coercive sex 
problem, and many in the rural areas would do the same. However, what do people 
usually think about the legal nature of such actions of the husbands? Do they take the 
actions as criminal? Do people, especially those female victims who would seek legal 
protections, take marital coercive sex same in nature as the crime of rape? Question 5 
and 6 in the questionnaire may provide the concerned information for us. 
Table 21 Question 5 in Yongxing and Dachang 
Nature of the action 
Count & Percent 
It is the crime of rape, without her consent 19 
6.4% 
It is not illegal though it is not good 145 
48.4% 
Common domestic violence, circumstances decide criminality136 
45.2% 
Table 22 Question 5 in Shenxian and Pengzhuan 
Nature of the action 
Count & Percent 
It is the crime of rape, without her consent 21 
6.9% 
It is not illegal though it is not good 173 
57.5% 
Common domestic violence, circumstances decide criminality107 
35.6% 
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Table 23 Question 5 in Qingdao 
Nature of the action 
Count & Percent 
It is the crime of rape, without her consent 28 
13.9% 
It is not illegal though it is not good 15 
7.4% 
Common domestic violence, circumstances decide criminality157 
78.7% 
As the last choice of "nothing wrong with it" was not taken by anybody, it is not 
included in the above tables, and I will not discuss this choice but focus on the other 
three only. 
On one hand, rural inland shows an obvious different picture from that in the city 
of Qingdao in the above three tables. 48.1% of the interviewees in villages of 
Yongxing and Dachang in Shanxi and 57.5% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang in 
Shandong think marital coercive sex is not at all illegal, while in Qingdao, only 7.4% 
take the choice. Such results prove my expectation of the conservative rural inland in 
contrast with the liberal model of the coastal cities like Qingdao. 
However, the rural people also share commonalities on the other hand with the 
coastal city. The percentage of the people who took the first choice are low compared 
with that of the third choice in all the three surveys, which is 6.4% to 45% in 
Yongxing and Dachang, 6.9% to 35.6% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, and 13.9% to 
78.7% in Qingdao. This shows that among those who think marital coercive sex is 
against the law, only very few people take it as rape in nature, which conceptually 
refers to intercourse with the lack of consent. In contrast, much higher percentages of 
people just took it as a form of ordinary domestic violence, and in Qingdao, the 
percentage is as high as 78.7 %. 
From this I may arrive at the conclusion that the high percentage of people 
supporting legal inference into marital coercive s ex does not necessarily means the 
high support for the criminalization of marital rape. Since it is just an ordinary form of 
domestic violence, whether it is criminal o r not i s yet uncertain, depending o n t he 
specific circumstances in each particular case.249 That's why many people support 
legal interference for marital coercive sex as domestic violence, not as the crime of 
rape. 
Question 6 confirms the conclusion arrived at from Question 5. 
Table 24 Question 6 in Yongxing and Dachang 
When it is criminal 
Count & Percent 
As long as the wife says no 30 
10.1% 
As long as the wife resists 43 
14.4% 
Only when the wife is physically hurt190 
63.3% 
It is never criminal 37 
12.2% 
249Art. 260 Whoever maltreats a member of his family, if the circumstances are flagrant, shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than two years, criminal detention or public surveillance. Criminal Law of 
the People's Republic of China, China Legal System Publishing House, p221, p223. 
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Table 25 Question 6 in Shenxian and Penazhuan 
When it is criminal 
Count & Percent 
As long as the wife says no 3 
1.1% 
As long as the wife resists 31 
10.3% 
Only when the wife is physically hurt183 
60.9% 
It is never criminal 83 
27.6% 
Table 26 Question 6 in Qingdao 
When it is criminal 
Count & Percent 
As long as the wife says no 22 
11.1% 
As long as the wife resists 31 
15.7% 
Only when the wife is physically hurt137 
68.5% 
It is never criminal 9 
4.6% 
Among all the different choices, "only when the wife is physically hurt" has 
always been the one taken by most people in all the three surveys, ranging from 60% 
to 70 %. This might explain the high percentage of people who support legal solutions 
of marital coercive sex though they do not think it is the crime of rape. These people 
are worried about the wives' bodily safety rather than the infringement of their rights 
of sexual self -determination. They take marital coercive sex, if criminal, not as an 
independent sexual offense but as a domestic violence causing bodily harm. This is 
quite different from the understanding about the action of marital coercive sex in the 
modern marital rape law. Modern marital rape law understands it as the crime of rape, 
which is sufficiently constituted with the lack of consent. But in the mind of the most 
interviewees, marital coercive sex is a crime not because of the sex without consent 
but because of the bodily harm it causes. 
4 Interactions between law people and lay people 
Many people support legal solution of marital coercive sex for the reasons that 
they take it as a possible crime of domestic violence not the grievous crime of rape. 
This is the most common state of mind of lay people. But if the courts deliver the 
verdict criminalizing marital coercive sex as rape, what reactions will lay people 
have? This is a crucial question for both the supporters and the opponents of the 
criminalization of marital rape. Both of them worry that lay people will strongly reject 
such decision of the courts and the rejection will mean more negative effects resulted 
from the real enforcement of marital rape law. Questions 8, 9, 10 in the questionnaire 
are expected to provide the information about the interactions between law people and 
lay people, which in turn will provide the answer to the most worried question about 
Chinese marital rape law. 
These three questions list out respectively three possible results of legal solution 
for marital coercive sex, which are 
Question 8: the defendant is guilty of rape and sentenced, 
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Question 9: the defendant is guilty of domestic violence and corresponding 
punishment is exerted, 
Question 10: the defendant is not guilty and the victim asks for divorce. 
' The interviewees were a sked to g ive their opinions about whether the result is 
reasonable according to their own judgments. The following three tables are results 
from Yongxing and Dachang villages in Shanxi. 
Table 27 Question 8 in Yongxing and Dachan 
Attitudes towards rape verdict 





Do not understand how the decision was made74 
24.6% 
Table 28 Question 9 in Yongxing and Dachang 
Attitudes towards domestic violence verdict 





Do not understand how the decision was made3l 
10.4% , 
Table 29 Question 10 in Yongxing and Dachang 
Attitudes towards "not guilty & divorce" 





Do not understand how the decision was made19 
6.5% 
For the "guilty of rape" decision, "unreasonable" was the choice taken by most 
people, t he p ercentage o f w hich i s a bout 4 4 %. For t he g uilty o f d omestic v iolence 
decision, "reasonable" is taken by most people, with the percentage of 65.6 %. For the 
"not guilty and divorce" decision, again "reasonable" has the percentage 71 %, which 
is the highest not only among the three choices of the question but also in all the three 
possible results of the legal solution. Such a high percentage shows a quite common 
opinion about marital coercive sex, which was repeatedly encountered during my 
survey: "Well, if she does not want to have sex with him, go and divorce. Charge him 
with rape? Imprisonment? That's too much!" 
I may get two conclusions from the above results in Yongxing and Dachang 
villages. First it is well confirmed that the high percentage of people supporting legal 
solution of marital coercive sex does not mean the high percentage of people 
supporting marital rape law. On the contrary, the high supporting rate of "not guilty 
and divorce" shows the marital exemption of rape is still deeply rooted in people's 
mind nowadays in the rural areas like Yongxing and Dachang. Secondly, other than 
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the worries about the bodily harms to the wives, divorce as a legal solution is another 
reason why so many people support the legal interference into marital coercive sex. 
However, given a closer look at the data, we may find something more, which is 
encouraging to marital rape law. In Questions 9 and 10, the distributions of the 
choices taken are quite uneven, with the majority clustering to the only one choice of 
"reasonable ". In contrast, in Question 8, interviewees are relatively more scattered 
around all the choices. The contrast between the clustered distributions to one choice 
in Questions 9 and 10 and the scattered distributions to all choices in Question 8 
shows that not all the people supporting marital exemption of rape take opposing 
positions when they are confronted with it in Question 8. Though people show their 
support to the traditional marital exemption of rape with the high percentages of 
"reasonable" choice in Questions 9 and 10, however, they do not do so by giving as 
high percentage of "unreasonable" choice in Question 8. In Question 8, the 
"unreasonable" percentage of 44% is the highest but the differences are minor 
compared to either 31.6% of "reasonable" or 24.6% of "I do not understand how ". 
This means that part of the high percentages taking "reasonable" choices in Questions 
9 and 10 move in Question 8 not to the "unreasonable" choice but to the one of "I do 
not understand how ", taking a possible "give me acceptable explanations and I may 
accept it" position. 
So a ccording t o t he d ata, t hough t hey are s till s upporting m arital e xemption o f 
rape as they have traditionally been, even the people in rural areas like Yongxing and 
Dachang villages may not firmly close the door to accepting different or even 
opposite ideas. Especially when the legal authorities like the courts show a supporting 
attitude towards the criminalization of marital rape, not every traditional mind takes a 
complete rejection attitude. Instead, some of them quickly change their mind and 
follow the authority to find criminalization of marital rape reasonable. And some of 
those who take the hesitating position may also imply a possibility of change of mind. 
Such interaction between law people and lay people leaves the chance for the 
criminalization of marital rape to be accepted in the rural inland. 
I found similar results in Pengzhuang and Shenxian as well. 
Table 30 Question 8: in Pengzhuang and Shenxian 
Attitudes towards rape verdict 





Do not understand how the decision was made67 
22.4 % 
Table 31 Question 9 in Pengzhuang and Shenxian 
Attitudes towards domestic violence verdict 





Do not understand how the decision was made26 
8.7% 
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Table 32 Question 10 in Pengzhuang and Shenxian 
Attitudes towards "not guilty & divorce" 





Do not understand how the decision was madel5 
5.0% 
But the coastal city of Qingdao always has its different performance. 
Table 33 Question 8 in Qingdao 
Attitude towards rape verdict 





Do not understand how the decision was made36 
17.8% 
Table 34 Question 9 in Qingdao 
Attitudes towards domestic violence verdict 





Do not understand how the decision was made22 
11.1% 
Table 35 Question 10 in Qingdao 
Attitudes towards "not guilty & divorce" 





Do not understand how the decision was made24 
12.0% 
The acceptance rate of rape verdict is as high as 70% in Qingdao and this well fits 
with its image of liberal coastal city, where modern ideas are always better accepted. 
In Question 9 about the attitude to the domestic violence verdict, Qingdao, compared 
with rural areas, has a relatively lower percentage of "reasonable" choice and higher 
percentage of "unreasonable" choice. This might be the exhibition of the people's 
awareness i n Q ingdao t o d istinguish m arital r ape as an i ndependent s exual o ffense 
from ordinary domestic violence, which could be the results of the heated discussions 
about marital since the beginning of the year 2000. 
However, while they accept the marital coercive sex as the crime of rape, people 
in Qingdao also accept the not guilty decision of the court with the percentage as high 
as 79.6 %, which looks quite paradoxical. The paradox might be the normal reflection 
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of common people's dilemma. Under the influence of massive media discussion about 
marital rape, city people like those in Qingdao may have some ideas about the legal 
concept of marital rape and its difference from ordinary domestic violence. That may 
be why they made a distinction between Question 8 and 9 as they know official law 
would make decisions of the kind. But traditions remain in mind and of course they 
also find the "not guilty and divorce" result in Question 10 equally acceptable, which 
consequently comes out with even slightly higher percentage than the "reasonable" 
choice for rape verdict in Question 8. 
The following conclusions at least seem reliable: in the coastal city of Qingdao, 
there are signs that rape verdict for the marital coercive sex from the court are more 
accepted than in the rural areas. But at the same time enduring old ideas also stay on 
with its remaining power in this medium -sized city. 
A comparative study between Question 5 and Question 8 may describe an even 
clearer picture of the interactions between law people and lay people. 
Table 36 Comparative study between Question 5 and Question 8 
People taking "rape" 
choice in Question 5 
People taking "reasonable" 
choice in Question 8 
Yongxing and Dachang 19 95 
6.4% 31.6% 
Shenxian and Pengzhuang 21 80 
6.9% 26.8% 
Qingdao 28 140 
13.9% 70.1% 
In Question 5, interviewees are asked plainly for their own uninterrupted personal 
opinions about the nature of marital coercive sex. Remarkably low percentages of 
interviewees regard the actions as the crime of rape. In Question 8, interviewees are 
asked for their attitudes towards the rape verdict from the court for marital coercive 
sex. This is in fact to ask the interviewees to reconsider their opinions about marital 
coercive sex under the pressure from the legal authorities. We see remarkable changes 
in all the three surveys. In Yongxing and Dachang, the difference between 6.3% and 
31.6% shows that 25.3% of the interviewees did not regard marital coercive sex as 
rape but then. changed their mind to agree with the court. In Shenxian and 
Pengzhuang, 20% interviewees changed mind under pressure while, in Qingdao, 46% 
interviewees did so. 
We may now have a clearer picture about the social consequence of the 
criminalization of marital rape. There are a large number of people who stick to the 
traditional ethics and would firmly reject marital rape law. These would be about half 
of the people in Yongxing and Dachang as well as Shenxian and Pengzhuang. 
On the other hand, in coastal cities like Qingdao, it is clear that people have been 
quite ready to accept it when the court finds the perpetrators of marital coercive sex 
guilty of rape. Even in the rural areas like Yongxing and Dachang villages, 20% or 
more people would easily accept the criminalization of marital rape if the court does 
so. And those who have not decided, 24.6 %, are also not firm opponents of but have 
the chance to accept the criminalization of marital rape. Together they would make up 
the other half of the population. So, favorable and unfavourable attitudes towards the 
operation of marital rape law, if carried out, are about half and half 
5 Social effects on the victims by legal actions 
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There is a common worry in China that victims of marital rape are reluctant to 
report the matter because of the social consequences of doing so.250 Many people 
assume that traditional family ethics are dominating current Chinese society and 
traditional Chinese ethics are strongly a gainst criminalizing husbands' coercive sex 
against the wives. Accordingly, whoever charges her own husband with marital rape 
will be ostracized by society as unreasonable or even inhuman.251 Since the victim's 
action breached, as Durkheim said, the collective conscience resulted from "the social 
solidarity",252 a sort of informal social sanction is imposed upon her. She would find 
herself under an awkward condition in her community or even been banished in some 
degree: people do not want to be associated with her; she would lose not only her 
husband but also her friend, even her relation with her own parents' family might be 
worsened.253 A woman living in such an environment is not much better than her 
rapist who lives in prison. 
If there is the potential that the victim has more to lose from a marital rape law 
than gain, one would expect this to be an important barrier to the effective operation 
of marital rape law. Question 7, asking people of their attitude towards wives who 
accuse their husbands of rape, may help to find out if there is such a barrier. 
Table 37 Question 7 in Yongxing and Dachan 
Attitude towards the wife 
Count & Percent 
Support completely 70 
23.4% 
Support her to divorce, not accuse him of rape121 
40.4% 
She is absurd and ignorant about law 53 
17.6% 




Table 38 Question 7 in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
Attitude towards the wife 
Count & Percent 
Support completely 41 
13.8% 
Support her to divorce, not accuse him of rape124 
41.4% 
She is absurd and ignorant about law 52 
17.2% 
She is inhuman and he is sympathized 83 
27.6% 
In rural areas, obviously, most people support the wives only when they apply for 
divorce but not accusing him of rape. Close percentages of this choice are found in the 
two different provinces of Shanxi and Shandong: 40.4% in Yongxing and Dachang 
villages in Shanxi and 41.4% in Shenxian in Shandong. 
250 See: Cai Dongtong, See "Jurisprudential Research into Marital Rape" Criminal Law Review, vol.10, 2002, 
p550; Zhou Huashan and Zhao Wenzong, "On Feminism and Post- colonism - -- Rereading Chinese Marital Rape. 
Law" , The Frontier of Law, vol. 3, 1999 , p52 -74. 
25! Ibid. 
252 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. by W. D. Halls, Free Press, 1984. 
253 Suli, The Rule of Law and its Local Resources, China Politics and Law Press, 1996, p23. 
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People who would possibly have unfriendly attitudes towards wives accusing 
their husbands of rape have in general the second highest percentages. People taking 
the choice of either the third or the fourth may be unfriendly to the wives, and the sum 
of the percentages of the two choices make up to 28.8% in Yongxing and Dachang 
villages in Shanxi and even 44.8% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang in Shandong. These 
people are who may increase the cost of the victims to seek legal solutions. 
Table 39 Question 7 in Qingdao 
Attitude towards the wife 
Count & Percent 
Support completely 113 
56.5% 
Support her to divorce, not accuse him of rape4l 
20.4% 
She is absurd and ignorant about law 17 
8.3% 




At this point, Qingdao again demonstrates its differences from the rural areas. 
With 56.5% people completely supporting the wives charging the husbands of rape, it 
has much higher percentage than the rural areas, either 23.4% in Yongxing and 
Dachang or 13.8% in Shenxian. And the total number of the possible unfriendly 
people make up only to 14.8 %, which is much lower than the rural inland. This shows 
that the victims' costs seeking protections from marital rape law, as mentioned above, 
are much less in cities like Qingdao. 
6. Spread of marital rape in China as a new legal concept 
So far we should have had some ideas about all the different attitudes towards 
marital coercive sex in current Chinese society. It is assumed that all the different 
opinions and disagreements show that the spread of marital rape as a modern legal 
concept is still in process in China.254 Where this modem concept has been accepted 
and the traditional Chinese ethics eroded, people would have a rather positive attitude 
towards marital rape law. And where traditional Chinese family ethics is still stuck 
with, people would have negative attitudes towards marital rape law.255 
Data have been collected in the surveys concerning how the spread of the legal 
concept of marital rape is conducted in the current Chinese society. 
Question 12: Have you heard the term "marital rape" before? 
Table 40 Question 12 in Yongxing and Dachan 
Have you heard of marital rape before 





Table 41 Question.12 in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
Have you heard of marital rape before 
254 Zhou Huashan, "Research on the Localization of Marital Rape Law ", Zhejiang Academic Journal, vol. 2, 1999. 
255 Ibid. 
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Table 42 Question 12 in Qingdao 
Have you heard of marital rape before 





In Yongxing and Dachang villages in Shanxi, 49.7% people have heard of the 
term of marital rape while 50.3% haven't. In Shenxian county and Pengzhuang village 
in Shandong, 43.7% have while 56.3% haven't. The rural data are much closer to each 
other with only sligh differences in between. There is a smaller number of people in 
Shenxian who have heard of the term than those in the two villages in Shanxi. This 
difference conforms to the slightly more conservative performance of Shenxian and 
Pengzhuang than the Shanxi villages in the surveys. 
Qingdao, as a city in coastal area, is again quite different. There are as many as 
80.6% of people who have heard of the term "marital rape ", and only less than 20% 
who haven't. This conforms to the liberal performance of Qingdao people in the 
survey. 
With the conformity between the number of people who have heard of marital 
rape and their attitudes towards marital coercive sex in all the surveys, we might 
possibly be able to conclude that the more chance people get in contact with the idea, 
the better chance they might accept it. 
Let me go on with the means by which the new legal concept spread itself. 
Question 13: What is the source from which you heard about marital rape? 
Table 43 Question 13 in Yongxing and Dachang 
Sources of information 






heard of marital 
rape before 
& % within 
have you heard of 











Table 44 Question 13 in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
Sources of information 
TelevisionNewspapers andThe People Others 
magazines Internetaround 
Have you heardYesCount 
of marital rape 
& % within30 
have you heard of 
76 0 30 4 
before marital rape before 22.6% 58.1% 0% 22.6% 3.2% 
Table 45 Question'13 in Qingdao 
Sources of information 
Television Newspapers andThe People 
magazines Internet around 
Have you heardYesCount 
of marital rape 
& % within have4l 
you heard of marital 
59 37 35 
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before rape before 25.2% 36.7% 22.9% 21.8% 
First we can see from the tables that in cities like Qingdao people have easier 
access to different sources of information than the rural people. This can be shown by 
differences between the p ercentages in the surveys. In Qingdao, the percentages of 
each choice are quite close to each other. The highest percentage is 36.7% of 
newspapers and magazines while the others are all between 21 -26 %. In rural areas, 
the percentages have much bigger differences. In Yongxing and Dachang villages in 
Shanxi, the difference is the highest percentage of 64.9% people to read newspapers 
and magazines against the lowest percentage of 1.1% people who surf the Internet. In 
Shenxian and Pengzhuang in Shandong, the difference is the highest of 58.1% versus 
the lowest of 0% or 3.2 %. 
Secondly, newspapers and magazines are the most important sources of 
information in both rural areas and cities. They are the sources of information about 
marital rape for 64.9% people in Yongxing and Dachang villages and 58.1% in 
Shenxian and Pengzhuang. Even in Qingdao, newspapers and magazines are also the 
sources for the largest group of people: 36.7 %. 
The Internet has a quite different status. As many as 22.9% of Qingdao people get 
their information about marital rape from the Internet while only 1.1% do so in 
Yongxing and Dachang villages and no one in Shenxian county and Pengzhuang 
village. S o, t he Internet functions m ainly in c ities a s t he e ffective m edia t o s pread 
information about marital rape while rural people cannot have easy access to it. 
Televisions and people around are also fairly effective sources of information 
about marital rape. Though the percentages of people using them are not as high as 
newspapers and magazines, they are quite stable in all the surveys, especially 
compared with the Internet. 
7. Determinants on successful spread of marital rape as a new legal concept 
The above data is about the particular means by which people obtain the 
information of marital rape as a new legal concept and a new thought. But awareness 
of it does not necessarily mean that people will accept it. Only after people have 
accepted a new idea or thought can we say that the spread of it is successful. In this 
section I will see what factors decide the successful spread of the new idea of marital 
rape in China. 
From all the discussions above, readers should have seen the much better 
acceptance of marital rape in cities like Qingdao than that in rural villages and county 
towns. The reason I make special comparisons between urban and rural areas is 
superficially because of the geographical differences between them. But the 
geographical differences between them actually mean the different chances for people 
to be exposed to the new ideas of marital rape coming from the foreign lands. The 
greater chance that city people have to come into contact with the information ought 
to have contributed to the better acceptance of the idea of marital rape. In contrast, 
rural people are usually closed off from such information, and are therefore less likely 
to be influenced. That is to say, pure chance of exposure to such an idea is in itself a 
determining factor on the successful spread of this idea. The greater the chance there 
is of coming into contact an idea, the greater the chance there is of the idea being 
accepted. And vice versa. The general difference between the cities and the 
countryside should be a piece of evidence proving it. 
The second determining factor can be found from the answers to Question 11 in 
the questionnaire. 
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Table 46 Question 11 in Yongxing and Dachan 
Who are the most trustworthy 
Count & Percent 
Government officials 10 
3.2% 
Senior family members32 
10.6% 








Table 47 Question 11 in Shenxian and Pengzhuan 
Who are the most trustworthy 
Count & Percent 
Scholars 29 
9.5% 




Table 48 Question 11 in Qingdao 
Who are the most trustworthy 
Count & Percent 
Government officials 6 
2.8% 
Senior family members11 
5.6% 








Without exception, in all the three tables, judges or lawyers are taken with 
remarkably high percentages as the most trustworthy people for the understanding of 
marital coercive sex. This suggests the person who is spreading the idea of marital 
rape has great influences on the chance of success of the spread of the idea. And if 
judges or lawyers are telling people that criminalizing marital rape is right and 
reasonable, there will be much greater chance for the idea to be accepted. 
Education is usually one of the most important factors that will influence an 
individual's outlook on the world. How much influence would it exert on a person's 
attitude towards marital coercive sex? Question 5 is the most direct question asking 
about people's opinion about marital coercive sex. Answers to Question 5 by different 
education levels may provide the needed information. 
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Table 49 Education * nature of the action in Yonaxina and Dachan 
It is the crime oflt 
rape, without herthough 
consent 
is not illegalCommon 




























Table 50 Education * nature of the action in Shenxian and Penazhuan 
It is ,the crime oflt 
rape, without herthough 
consent 
is not illegalCommon 



























18.8% 50.0% 31.3% 
Table 51 Education * nature of the action in Qingdao 
It is the crime oflt 
rape, without herthough 
consent 
is not illegalCommon 
























13.3% 6.7% 80.0% 
In the two rural tables, education show a sign of being influential. In the column 
of "it is the crime of rape without her consent ", "university and higher" has higher 
percentages than all the others: with 23.8% to 7.7 %, 1.8 %, 2.9% and 0% in Yongxing 
and Dachang and 18% to 6.7 %, 5.1% and 0% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang. Also, all 
the illiterate people think marital coercive sex is not illegal. However, either 23.8% or 
18% is not a large percentage within the "university and higher" people. So, from the 
rural perspective, education does make some differences but not very big ones. 
In Qingdao, the "university and higher" does not seem to be much different from 
other education levels. Instead, it is the "junior high school" that has the highest 
percentage of people who recognize the crime of marital rape. Therefore, if we 
consider comprehensively both the cities and the countryside, we cannot conclude that 
education as an independent factor exerts evident influences on people's opinion 
about marital rape. 
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Age is observed as a possible determining factor. No obvious signs are found 
about its influences on the attitudes towards marital rape. 
Table 52 Age * nature of the action Crosstabulation in Yongxing and Dachang 
It is the crime 
of rape, without 
her consent 
It is not illegal 


























17.1% 40.0% 42.9% 
Table 53 Age * nature of the action Crosstabulation in shenxian and Pengzhuang 
It is the crime 
of rape, without 
her consent 
It is not illegal 







18-25 % within 
age 
.0% 33.3% 66.7% 
26 -30 
within 












33.3% 66.7% .0% 
Table 54 Age * nature of the action Crosstabulation in Qingdao 
It is the crime 
of rape, without 
her consent 
It is not illegal 


























100.0% .0% .0% 
As the people with the experiences of marriage are who have greater influences on 
marital rape law and the young people with no experiences of marriage have slight 
influences on the legal problem, research into the different attitudes of the people with 
different marital status will not be conducted. 
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2.4.4 Conclusions 
In China, people have different ideas about marital coercive sex. Comparatively, 
people in the cities are more agreeable with the concept of marital rape than those in 
the rural areas. While the urban people are dominating economically and politically, 
the rural people are dominating in the number of population. Therefore, with the 
different or even opposing attitudes towards marital coercive sex between the two, it 
is hard to say the opinion of which is dominating in the whole Chinese society so as to 
be called as the current Chinese attitude towards marital coercive sex. 
However, though rural people have been well known for their conservative 
attitudes to marital rape, they are actually not as conservative as many scholars have 
expected. The number of people who have accepted the idea of marital rape is higher 
than usually expected. And there are also a number of people who, though presently 
having no or having negative opinion about marital rape, are ready to accept the 
explanations given by legal authorities like the judges or the lawyers. These two 
groups of people added up together surpass half of the population, and marital rape 
law therefore does not have so unfavorable social environment to operate in as 
expected. 
Survey r esults also show that there are two factors that exert great determining 
effects on people's acceptance of the idea of marital rape. The first is the chance they 
get to know about the idea and are given the reasons for it. The second is the 
authoritative sources of information. Given the common people's traditional respect 
and trust in authorities in China, the attitude of the legal authorities can play an 
important role in deciding the common people's attitude towards marital rape. 
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Chapter 3 Marital Rape in China - -- 
Analysis & Conclusions 
In this chapter, I will analyze the empirical data collected in the last chapter. I will 
first analyze them from the perspective of the current culture approach to see what it 
can bring and what it cannot bring to the legal problem of marital rape. Then, I will 
construct a new approach for culture and law studies, the memetic approach. 
Hopefully, this new approach will address the problems identified for the traditional 
analysis concerning Chinese marital rape law. Different results in handling the same 
legal problem may d emonstrate the r espective advantages and disadvantages of the 
two approaches. 
3.1 Analysis with the current culture approach 
3.1.1 Opponents and the empirical evidence 
The fundamental reason for the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape is 
the special relationship of rights and duties that marriage creates between husband and 
wife. The special relationships of rights and duties between husbands and wives also 
grant legal specialty to the marital sexual relationship, which could therefore be 
different from sex between men and women with no marital relations.256 According to 
this point of view, sex is the legal duty of marriage, the performance of which neither 
of the parties should refuse. Husbands therefore have the right to have sex with wives 
and need not to ask for consent every time before sexual intercourse. Otherwise, it 
will be a violation of the special cohabitation duty of marriage. Accordingly coercive 
sex between husbands and wives does not constitute the crime of rape and rape can 
only be of extramarital nature.257 
The special relationship of duties and rights between husbands and wives is at the 
root of the marital exemption of rape. However, such a legal specialty of marriage is 
not derived from any superior legal concepts or rules; rather it is only the reflection of 
the social reality of marriage. That is, what people perceive marriage should be like. 
These thoughts and ideas of people are what are usually known as family ethics, or to 
be exact in traditional Chinese society, the Confucian family ethics.258 Therefore the 
ultimate cause of the marital exemption of rape is the ethical ideas about family, ideas 
that are expressed in the social realities. These ethical ideas are of course what we 
usually call cultural elements. 
256 Shao Shixing, "Analysis of the Duties of Cohabitation and Loyalty between Husbands and Wives ", Law Review, 
vol. 1, 2001, p110. 
257Ibid. 
258 For example, "Three Obeys" is the basic ethical duty of a woman according to Confucian teachings, which 
means a woman should "obey her father before marriage; obey her husband after marriage; obey her son after the 
death of her husband." The "Three Obeys" principle is non -legal but lays down the fundamental basis of traditional 
Chinese marriage law concerning women's status in family. 
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Cultural elements as the ultimate root had not only started the marital exemption 
of rape in the first place in traditional Chinese society but are still used by people in 
modern China as arguments against the criminalization of marital rape in the debates 
in the year 2000. According to the comments previously quoted on the Shanghai Case 
by the Supreme People's Court of: "Though it is not seen in the clear or mandatory 
prescriptions of law, the duty is deeply rooted in the ethical ideas of people and 
therefore proclamation in the writing of law is not necessary. This is also why 
generally the act of marital coercive sex cannot be taken as the crime of rape in the 
judicial practice." 259 
So, according to the Supreme Court, the "no rape in marriage" principle stems not 
from the written law but from the "ethical ideas of people ", which are part of 
traditional Chinese culture. Why, then, does the S upreme Court follow the "ethical 
ideas of people" instead of the law? Dr. Fu Liqing may have depicted a picture that 
well explains the reason and also well reflects the common contradictory attitude of 
many people in China towards, marital rape. 
"Marital coercive sex ought to bring in a guilty verdict of rape. But this is only 
what it ought to be or only the wishes of people. Being established in the social 
realities, we will find the problem not that simple and we may eventually have a 
completely different answer for it ".260 
This is a typical state of mind presently in China about marital rape. It is widely 
agreed that it ought to be the crime of rape but unfortunately you just can't. make it be. 
And the reason given for this is always the traditional Chinese family ethics. 
"Though marital rape does indeed meet all the constitutive requirements of the 
crime of rape, however, still, should we thus explicitly criminalize it under the present 
social conditions? Though it is indeed the worldwide trend to criminalize marital rape, 
however, still, should we thus mechanically follow suit? "261 
The answer given by Dr. Fu is a definite "no ": "With thousands of years of 
feudalist tradition in our country, the ideas of male sexism have taken strong root. All 
the special conditions of China have decided that we cannot blindly and mechanically 
imitate the foreign countries when defining crimes ".262 Otherwise, we will have to 
"pay high prices" to catch up with the fashion of just being "modern ".263 
What, then, are these "high prices "? 
The first, so goes the argument, is that the law will not work.264 As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, even though the law criminalizes marital rape, it has no 
practical effects because people will not accept it. Courts may not follow the 
legislation; victims may sidestep the law for other solutions, etc. 
Secondly, the law criminalizing marital rape may take away what people see as 
legal rights and force upon them the rights that they do not see as rights, and the 
259 No. 1 Criminal Division, Supreme People's Court: Reference to Criminal Trial, Vol 2, 2000, p 28. 
260 Fu Lilting, "Marital Rape Should Wait - -- Between To Be and Ought To Be ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of 






duties that they do not see as duties. Thus, in terms of the Confucian ethics there, the 
law would be seen not as just but as unjust, not as reasonable but as unreasonable.265 
Thirdly, the law criminalizing marital rape would ruin the stable family relations 
that have been long been associated with Confucian ethics. Thus by ruining families, 
the basic cells of the society, the law, instead of protecting, would go on to damage 
the order of the whole society.266 
Therefore, "I would say, under current social background, decriminalizing marital 
rape, though not a good choice, is a rational choice ".267 
Obviously, people who object to the criminalization of marital rape believe that 
the Confucian family ethics still overwhelmingly dominate the contemporary society. 
It is upon this belief that they base their claims. However, throughout their arguments, 
the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape do not provide any empirical 
evidence to confirm their assumed cultural reality in the present society. This is what 
the previous surveys are for: to provide the indispensable evidences and to testify their 
claim with empirical works. , 
Unfortunately the empirical data does not support the claim of the people against 
the criminalization of marital rape. According to the surveys, the number of people 
who have accepted the idea of marital rape is higher than usually expected. And there 
are also a number of people who, though presently having no or having negative 
opinion about marital rape, are ready to accept the explanations given by legal 
authorities like the judges or the courts. These two groups of people added up surpass 
half of the population, and marital rape law therefore does not have so bad cultural 
environment to operate in as claimed by the opponents. 
By falsifying the basic assumptions of the opponents of the criminalization of 
marital rape, the empirical data has also revealed their methodological problems. The 
opponents ignore the live cultural elements in reality, and just simplify the live culture 
into a general notion of Confucian ethics. By doing so, they are just taking for granted 
the Confucian ethics' absolute dominating position in people's mind and they just 
suppose that people's mind are filled with nothing else but pure Confucian ethics as 
guidance to their attitudes towards marital rape. By doing so, they have in fact 
substituted the pure dogmas of Confucianism for the lively social realities. And 
therefore their argument may not be as plausible as claimed. 
3.1.2 Supporters and the empirical evidence 
How about the supporters then? Does the failure of the opponents mean the 
supporters of the criminalization of marital rape face no problems? 
As previously said, there are so far in China no supporters of complete 
criminalization of marital rape. Those who have gone the furthest support only the 
partial criminalization of it. These people argue that though it cannot be criminalized 
due to the social factors in reality, marital rape, however, ought to be criminalized. 
Why marital rape ought to be criminalized, according to the supporters, is essentially 
265 A useful example is provided by Suli in his discussions about Qiuju's puzzle. Quiju is a woman in the typical 
Chinese village, whose husband was injured on his private part in an argument with the head of the village. Qiuju 
tried her best to get the involvement of the court for what she called the `justice" of the settlement of the dispute. 
As the result of the involvement of the official law, the head of the village was detained for 15 days. But Qiuju is 
shocked and puzzled by the result because this is not the `justice" she expected. She argued with the police: "How 
can you ARREST him for a quarrel? I only want my justice not his arrest." See Suli, The Rule of Law and its 
Local Resources, China Politics and Law Press, 1996, p23. 
266 Fu Liqing, "Marital Rape Should Wait - -- Between To Be and Ought To Be ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of 
Criminal Law, vol. 4, p416. Or the website: chinalawinfo .com/xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1504 (2002/2/11). 
267Ibid 
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for the reason of the innate rights and liberties of every human being. Since they are 
inalienable, the innate rights and liberties of women as equals to men ought not to be 
lost after marriage. According to this group of people, sexual self -determination is the 
inalienable rights of every adult. And marriage does not necessarily mean that the 
wife loses her independent rights of sexual self -determination by giving herself up to 
her husband with the mutual matrimonial consent which she cannot retract. Therefore, 
with the innate rights of the wife remaining intact after marriage, the husband's 
coercive sexual actions without her consent are not different in nature from the actions 
of any male against a female who has no marital relation with him. As a result, marital 
coercive sex is equally criminal and a husband can commit the crime of rape against 
his wife. 
So, the modern idea of women's rights notion has played an essential role in the 
criminalization of marital rape in China. 268 In the past, it was the acceptance of these 
western- originated values that started the possibility of the legislative criminalization 
of marital rape. When Chinese law prescribed a woman for the first time as a "natural 
person" possessing the same rights and obligations as a man in the 1929 -30 civil code, 
it emerged as the results of the legislators' acceptance of gender equality, which came 
from the west.269 And now, these borrowed values are used by the current Chinese 
supporters of criminalization of marital rape in the recent debates as arguments 
against their opponents. 
"The criminalization of marital rape has the value that transcends the eastern and 
western parochialism. The legal proscription of marital rape firstly originated in the 
west but its origin does not make it only the "parochial knowledge" of the west. The 
protections and concerns over women's autonomous sexual self -determinant rights 
expressed in the law ought to be common to all human civilizations and ought to be 
the necessary exhibition of the notion of human rights and legality in the modern time. 
Therefore, the criminalization of marital rape should not only be western but also 
eastern, or to be exact, should be of all human beings ".27° 
So, people holding the same opinion with Professor Cai have based themselves on 
the values of innate human rights of women, including women's rights of sexual self- 
determination. In the eyes of the supporters, the criminalization of marital rape is 
demanded by the universal, absolute and capitalized truth. In Professor Cai's term, the 
values of innate human rights of women are the "capitalized truth ": "if the capitalized 
truth does exist in law, then these (protections of basic human rights like women's sex 
rights) are the indispensable contents of the capitalized rights ".271 
However, universal as it might be, the notion of human rights is an abstract 
concept. Law, as Zweigert and Kötz, functions to solve the practical problems of life. 
To derive from a pure abstract concept the conclusions about practical tool like can be 
quite problematic because pure derivation from an abstract concept could entail very 
far- reaching consequences. For instance, conceptually, any intercourse, as long as the 
268 See Li Yinhe, The Rise of Women's Power, Culture and Art Publishing House, p116, p117, p123 -124. According 
to Professor Li, as for the start of Women's Right Movement, the 17`h century Mary Astell was a representative 
pioneer in Britain(p116) while Marie Gouze with her first "Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female 
Citizen" ( "Déclaration des droits de la Femme et de la Citoyenne') in the world in 1791 made the mark in the 
European continent(p117). And the talk about China's Women's Right Movenment is impossible without 
mentioning the Western influences(p123 -124). 
269 See Chapter 3.3.2 (1. Legislators) of the thesis for detailed analysis of legislative background. 
270 Cai Dongtong, See "Jurisprudential Research into Marital Rape" Criminal Law Review, vol.10, 2002, p502. 
271 Ibid. 
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man knows that it's against the will of the woman, is rape. So, if the wife says "no" to 
the husband, which is of course an explicit expression of refusal, the intercourse 
thereafter is rape. But this is not necessarily true even in the west, where the women's 
rights notion originated. In some western jurisdictions, even now, long after marital 
rape was criminálized, "no" is not sufficient and some form of violence is required. 272 
What this tells us is that an abstract concept must be embedded in the social reality 
before it can be operational in legal practice. The women's rights -based argument 
therefore must be restricted by a broader cultural framework in the present Chinese 
society. That is, women's rights notions must stop being pure abstract and become 
live elements accepted by people into the social reality. 
But the surveys seem to have shown that such a concept is not yet embedded in 
social reality. Question 6 in my surveys asks about when the husband's action of 
coercive sex against his wife is criminal. The choice of "when the wife says no" has 
the lowest percentages in Yongxing and Dachang (10.1 %) as well as Shenxian and 
Pengzhuang(1.1 %), and the second lowest in the city of Qingdao(11.1 %). Meanwhile, 
the c hoice o f " when p hysically hurt" h as always t he h ighest p ercentages i n a 11 t he 
three surveys. The results suggest that, apart from those in the three biggest c ities, 
most Chinese people accept the criminalization of marital rape not because they have 
accepted the human rights -based arguments but because of their care about the wife's 
physical safety and their instinctive abhorrence of violence. If the criminalization of 
marital rape is to be supported, the argument will be more convincing to 
contemporary Chinese people if based on the realistic abhorrence of violence of 
people instead of the abstract notion of human rights. This is why the legislative 
criminalization of marital rape, which is derived from women's rights notions, fails to 
be effective in the current social environment. 
Empirical research thus tells us why women's rights -based criminalization of 
marital rape failed to operate. It also tells us the methodological problems of the 
women's rights -based supporters of the criminalization of marital rape. Same as the 
opponents, the supporters of the criminalization of marital rape do not provide 
sufficient empirical evidence to support their argument. Apart from the surveys in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the most of what they do is to derive from the pure 
notion of women's rights their conclusions of the criminalization of marital rape. 
They do not care about the rejections b y t hose who accept the ideas o f C onfucian 
ethics to what they take as universal and absolute and the possible ineffectiveness of 
the law caused by the rejections of these people to criminalize marital rape. Instead, 
they just ignore them and reject right back. By doing so, the supporters of the 
criminalization of marital rape have discarded the social reality and substitute their 
abstract dogmas for it. Several dogmas Of their own believed notion are solely 
sufficient for them to have their conclusions drawn about marital rape law. Here we 
see t he s ame m ethodological problems t hat t he opponents o f t he c riminalization o f 
marital rape also have. 
272 For example, on 22 "d of March 2001, at the High Court in Aberdeen, Lord Abernethy ruled that there was no 
evidence that force had been used against a young woman who had accused a fellow student of repeatedly raping 
her. In his ruling, Lord Abernethy stated that, for a charge of rape to be proved, there had to be evidence of either 
force or threat of force being used. He stated that to have sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent is 
in itself not rape, contrary to any common perception that lack of consent is enough for a charge of rape. See "The 
Legal Definition of Rape", Research Note, RN01 /46, 23 April 2001, The Scottish Parliament Information Center, 
at http: / /www.scottish. parliament .uk /S1 /whats_happening /research /pdf res_notes /rn01- 46.pdf. For more 
concerning the question of forcible violence in the definition of rape in Scots law, see also: Lord Advocates 
Reference (No 1 of 2001) 2002 SLT 466; P. W. Ferguson, "The Definition of Rape ", 2002 SLT(News), 163. 
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3.1.3 Common methodological features 
Whether for or against the criminalization of marital rape, each side starts from 
their own cultural grounds to choose their perspective on law and society, and to 
arrive at their own conclusions about laws of marital coercive sex problem. With the 
opposing cultural elements as starting points, they inevitably arrive at opposing 
conclusions. In the reasoning processes, we see on both sides the typical 
characteristics of culture approach in legal studies. 
The first characteristic is that the approach always has the concept of culture as its 
most basic foundation of reasoning. All their arguments can be traced down 
eventually to a certain culture as the basic premise. For example the opponents of 
marital rape law have the traditional Chinese family ethics while the supporters have 
the notion of women's human rights. 
Secondly, the concept used as the foundation of current culture approach is always 
a general and homogeneous one.273 Though cultural elements are just ideas, beliefs, 
etc. held in the mind of each human individual, yet, the current culture approach, once 
it has chosen certain cultural elements as arguments, does not seem to care much 
about the complexity of individual minds. Instead, it always tries to make their chosen 
cultural elements cover all of society as if their chosen cultural elements are general to 
the mind of every human individual. The opponents of marital rape law therefore 
virtually see only the dominating traditional Chinese ethics while the supporters see 
only the absolute human rights values. 
The reason why current culture approach can just ignore the individual minds, 
where the cultural elements really reside, is because of its third characteristic, i.e. it 
views culture as a reified entity. Tylor defines culture as a "complex ", which is made 
up of knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, etc.274 Cotterrell defines culture also 
as a "complex ", which is made up of refers to the complex of belief, attitudes, 
cognitive ideas, values, etc.275 By adding the concept of "complex" as part of the 
definitions of culture, the current culture approach has the inherent tendency, 
explicitly or implicitly, to take culture as an autonomous and positive entity beyond 
its substantial contents, just as the concept of forest is independent from trees. With 
culture seen as some reified entity or power, this entity or power does not rely on each 
individual human mind for its existence but seems to exist beyond and independent 
from it. This is just like arguing that if a couple of trees are cut down the forest is still 
there. 
The conclusions will be inevitably partial, rigid and biased. Supporters of marital 
rape law such as the legislators have taken the side of human rights values, thus 
arriving at the criminalization of marital rape. Opponents of marital rape law such as 
the judges, however, decide to take the side of traditional Chinese ethics, thus 
resulting in the inconsistency of Chinese marital rape law as well as all the 
disagreements and controversies surrounding the problem. In this sense, I may argue 
that the problems of Chinese marital rape problem have been caused, not by culture 
itself, but rather by the inappropriate understandings and applications of the concept 
of culture. 
273 Cotterrell, "The Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p37; Friedman, "The 
Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p34. 
274 Liang Zhiping, On Law: The past, present and future of Chinese law, Guizhou Renmin Press, 1992, pl. 
275 Cotterrell, "The Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p25. 
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3.1.4 Major features of the current culture approach 
To fully illustrate this, I need to discuss in detail the characteristics and their 
inappropriateness of current culture approach in combination with the empirical data 
from the previous chapter. 
1. Basic feature: Over -generalisation 
The most basic feature of the culture approach is its over generality and insistence 
on homogeneity in its subject of studies. When referring to the culture of a society, it 
always tends to refer only to one, sometimes two, most dominating elements. For 
example, sometimes when talking about Chinese culture, the culture approach usually 
refers to nothing but the Confucianist traditions while, in contrast, when talking about 
the traditional European culture, often refering to nothing but the Christian traditions. 
With such a mode of thinking, the culture approach inevitably alienates culture from 
social reality, the source of culture's vitality. Though culture is still claimed to be 
what is typical of and dominating in the current society, it has in fact been over 
generalized and simplified, referring to the ideas of a person or a work thousands of 
years ago. Thus, traditional Chinese culture is in some degree condensed to Confucius 
and his book of The Analects while traditional western culture is condensed to The 
Bible. 
The protagonists in marital rape law debate in China are trying to do the same 
thing. Those who oppose the criminalization of marital rape base their arguments only 
on the Confucian family ethics only while the supporters of a concept of marital rape 
on the women's rights notion. For either side, the Confucian ethics or the women's 
rights notions alone are sufficient to deny or establish their conclusions of marital rape 
law in the current Chinese society. However, this is not how cultural elements work in 
real life. 
What influence people's attitude towards marital rape is not the Confucian family 
ethics alone, nor is the human rights notion alone, nor is the interaction between these 
two categories of cultural elements alone. The facts are much more complicated 
because it is not only the prevailing cultural elements that can exert influences on law. 
As Z weigert and K ötz say, "i deas of every kind have their effect, for it is not just 
feudalism, liberalism and socialism which produce different types of law. "276 If we 
look at the everyday life, we can easily find that what guides people's behaviors are 
not just the "dominating" culture as we usually say, but the more specific composite 
forces of various cultural elements, dominant or not. 
As shown in the surveys, an individual's outlook about whether the action of 
marital coercive sex is criminal or not is not decided only by either Confucian ethics 
or human rights notions. For example, a very important factor that influenced people's 
view is whether husbands cause physical harm to wives. When asked when the 
actions of marital coercive sex could be criminal (Question 6 in the Questionnaire), 
there was always more than 60% of people, in either Qingdao city, or Shenxian 
County and Pengzhuang village, or Yongxing and Dachang villages, who took the 
choice of "when the wife is physically hurt". 
In contrast, according to Confucian family ethics, wives have the irrevocable duty 
of sex to their husbands. If wives refuse the husbands' sex demand, they are actually 
refusing to perform their legal and ethical duties. Accordingly, marital coercive sex as 
a sexual offence could never be criminal as rape is. However, the choice of "it never 
276 Zweigert and Kötz, p36. 
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is" is taken by 4.6% in Qingdao, 27.6% in Shenxian County and Pengzhuang village 
and 12.2% in Yongxing and Dachang villages, which are remarkably lower. 
Conversely, according to the conceptual reasoning of modern marital rape law, 
which conforms to the women's rights notion, the core constitutive requirement of the 
crime of rape is the sexual intercourse without consent. Therefore, conceptually, 
marital coercive sex ought to be criminal as long as the wife expresses her lack of 
consent b y saying "no ". However, such a choice was taken b y 1 1.1% i n Qingdao, 
1.1% in Shenxian County and Pengzhuang village and 10.1% in Yongxing and 
Dachang villages, which are even lower. 
If culture is, as by R. Cotterrell describes it, "the shared understanding and 
common outlook typical of a particular society or social group ", then "marital 
coercive sex is criminal when the wife is physically hurt" fits in with the definition 
much better than either a Confucian outlook or the ideas derived from the notion of 
women's rights. As data shows, "marital coercive sex is criminal when the wife is 
physically hurt" is shared by, relatively the largest majority of people and therefore 
can be seen as more common and typical in the current Chinese society. Confucius is 
somebody from thousands of years ago while human rights notions are transplanted 
from thousands of miles away, neither of which, as the survey indicates, could be as 
much shared, or as typical, or as common in the current Chinese society as the notion 
of "criminal when physically hurt". Conceptually, if either the supporters or the 
opponents of marital rape law really want to use some "dominating" or "common" 
cultural factors as t heir a rguments, it is " marital c oercive se x is c riminal w hen t he 
wife is physically hurt" that should be used, instead of either Confucian ethics. or the 
women's rights notions. 
Moreover, "criminal when physically hurt" is not the only one that fits in better 
with the Confucian or the women's 
rights notion. Another choice in the questionnaire, "it is criminal when wife resists ", 
is also taken by more people than either the choice of "the wife says no" and the 
choice of "it never is ". In Yongxing and Dachang, "wife resists" choice was taken by 
14.3% of interviewees, higher than 10.1% of "wife says no" and 12.2% of "it never 
is ". hi Qingdao, the contrast is 15.7% of "wife resists" to 11.1% of "wife says no" and 
4.6% of "it never is ". Only in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, 10.3% of interviewees took 
the "wife resists ", which is less than 27.6% of "it never is" but still higher than 1.1% 
of "wife says no ". So, even the notion that "marital coercive sex is criminal when wife 
resists" is better accepted by people and fits better with the concèpt of culture than the 
standard notions derived from either Confucian ethics or women's rights values. 
In fact, the key point here is that there are just too many cultural elements that 
need to be considered. If we consider only those perceived to be predominant high 
culture, we are quite likely to be fallaciously over -generalizing and over -simplifying. 
Bodley claims that culture is "collective" 277and Cotterrell says that culture is the 
"shared understandings ", "common outlook" "typical of a particular society or social 
group ". 278 However, if over -generalized and over -simplified, either Bodley's 
"collective" or Cotterrell's "typical" and "common outlook" ensure not the 
comprehensiveness of current cultural approach to legal studies, but rather its inherent 
one -sidedness. "Law is the whole life ", said a great philosopher. But a copy of a 
religious scripture or a person from thousands of years ago is certainly not "the whole 
life ". A general and abstract social theory or notion like that of women's rights cannot 
be truly lively cultural elements in real life either. 
277 Bodley, Cultural Anthropology: Tribes, States, and the Global System, Mountain View California, 1994. 
278 Cotterrell, "The Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p25. 
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Therefore, if one is concerned only about Confucianism, or Buddhism and 
Taoism at most, when studying cultural influences on law in China, and only 
Christianity and the rationalist tradition when Europe, then one is inherently biased 
and one -sided. When a true human individual behaves, he is not always following the 
dominating religious teachings or rationalist law of nature. There are an infinite 
variety of factors acting in his mind. And this is the key point where the usual concept 
of culture and the lively cultural elements in the real life differ in terms of law and 
culture studies. Over -generality or homogeneousness ignores the liveliness and 
complexity of the different cultural elements in concrete social realities. 
Consequently, the whole society is generalized and simplified into some dogmas of 
one theory or notion, which alone work as the determining factor for the conclusions 
about marital rape law. 
2. Ignorance of the reality 
As a result of over generalisation, culture approach seems to have an intuitive 
tendency of focusing only on the so- called high cultures and typically ignoring the 
perhaps infinite individual ideas in reality. 
By focusing on high cultures, the cultural elements in real life are often 
misinterpreted simply as a person, a book or a theory. But high cultures contained in 
books or elites' theoretical systems are not necessarily the live cultural elements in 
real life. People against the criminalization of marital rape establish their arguments 
on the ground of Confucian ethics. But the surveys have shown that the ideas of the 
great sage are not so well accepted as expected in the current Chinese society to direct 
people's attitude t owards m arital c oercive s ex. S upporters o f t he c riminalization o f 
marital rape establish their arguments on the ground of the human rights notion. 
Taking their notion a priori, they do not even care whether it has really been accepted 
in the minds of people i n current Chinese society.279 Therefore, though they might 
both claim so, neither party establishes their cultural arguments on the truly existing 
live cultural elements in the social realities, but on a person or a theory that are far 
removed from real attitudes and opinions. 
Being satisfied with ideas of famous figures and high theories as arguments, the 
culture approach is easy to ignore the reality. Before the promulgation of the new 
marriage law in 2001, serious considerations had been given to the possibility of an 
explicit special provision on the marital rape problem. 280 , The crucial problem 
standing in the way of the legislation was the concern about whether the 
criminalization of marital rape could be accepted or not by the people under such a 
long tradition of Confucian ethics. 281 The core of the problem, therefore, concerns the 
status of cultural elements in current social realities. However, even under such 
circumstances, when the current status of cultural elements is already the decisive 
factor for the legislation, no official institution has ever conducted any survey to find 
out what these factors really are. 
279 Since they take human rights values as universal and absolute, supporters of marital rape law usually do not 
think they are also using a cultural argument. They might even claim their approach as `human rights approach" to 
distinguish themselves from culture approach. However, human right values, same in nature as Confucian ethics, 
are just another group of ordinary cultural elements. Any cultural elements would be absolutized by their followers 
or believers. Similarly, believers of Confucian ethics can also have the same attitude towards human rights values 
just as believers of human rights values do to Confucian ethics. Detailed discussions about the nature of human 
rights values as ordinary cultural elements will be in the last chapter of the thesis. 
280 http: // law. beelink . com.cn /zhti /zt01042802.htm 
28' http: // law. beelink .com.cn /zhti /zt01042802.htm 
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Finally a private research company, Horizon -China Research, conducted some 
surveys. However, the surveys conducted by Horizon -China Research are only limited 
to the three biggest cities in China, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which could 
only represent the most westernized group of Chinese people but not those in the vast 
rural areas inland. Even these limited survey results have not drawn much attention 
from the legislators, who decided not to do anything in the 2001 Marriage Law, 
neither to make a special provision for the criminalization of marital rape as the 
supporters expected, nor to explicitly decriminalize it as the conservatives suggested. 
In terms of judicial practices, the Supreme Court has given comments, on both the 
Wang Weiming Case in Shanghai and Bai Junfeng case in Liaoning, explicitly 
prescribing the marital exemption of rape. The reason given is the traditional family 
ethics that are deeply rooted in the society.283 But they do not have surveys or any 
empirical data either to support their claims, and it is, therefore, quite doubtful how 
they can be sure such ethics are still deeply rooted in the current society. The common 
people's ideas, which can be easily found out by means of surveys, are the cultural 
elements pursued. But with the general culture approach, they would rather derive 
their conclusions from the dogmas of their believed Confucian ethics than to directly 
and empirically find them out with surveys. 
Empirical evidences are more important for the opponents of marital rape law than 
for the supporters. What the supporters of the criminalization of marital rape want to 
do is to change the traditional Chinese cultural elements of Confucian ethics and to 
replace them with their own notion of the women's rights as individuals equal to men. 
Therefore, it would be understandable if supporters deliberately ignore the traditional 
cultural elements. But the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape cannot do 
that because they are using the traditional cultural elements as their fundamental 
arguments, their basic premises. Therefore the opponents must ascertain that the 
traditional cultural elements are still there for their arguments to gain validity. 
Surprisingly they have done even less empirical research than the supporters. Resulted 
from the basic characteristic of over generality, such ignorance of the reality is fatal 
for the arguments of the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape. 
3. Presupposition failure: 
Both supporters and the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape claim that 
their arguments are based on actual cultural elements in society. While supporters of 
the criminalization can at least rely on only the surveys in the three biggest cities of 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, what supports opponents' claim is only their 
arduous belief that traditional Confucian ethics are still ruling over the mind of most 
people in China. 
Surveys in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou do show an encouraging picture for 
the supporters of the criminalization of marital rape. Shanghai has the highest rate of 
77.5% people recognizing marital rape, with 65.3% in Beijing and 66.4% in 
Guangzhou. The survey results should have shown that the necessary cultural 
elements for the criminalization of marital rape are indeed in the dominating position 
in the three cities. And the traditional family ethics as opposing power no longer have 
much weight. 
282 http: / /law.beelink .com.cn /zhti /zt01042802.htm 
283Reference to Criminal Trial, vol. 3 in 1999 and vol. 2 in 2000. 
83 
But the population of the three cities together is about 35.84 million, counting for 
only 3% of the total Chinese population.284 So, cultural elements dominating in the 
three cities are not necessarily dominating in the nation as a whole. Indeed, my 
surveys in the inland and rural areas have shown a quite different picture. 
Among the choices for Question 5, which concerns the nature of the action of 
marital coercive sex, only 6.4% in Y ongxing and Dachang villages think it is rape 
while the percentage is 6.9% in Pengzhuang village and Shenxian County. Qingdao as 
a small coastal city has only 13.9% people recognizing marital coercive sex as rape. 
This question is asking the interviewees to make their own subjective value judgments 
about the problem of marital coercive sex. The values leading to the answers given by 
the interviewees are the respective cultural elements of family ethics. So, answers to 
this question can best reflect the status of the existing ethical ideas in people's minds. 
Here, the low percentages of people who classify marital coercive sex as rape show 
that, in those areas, the cultural elements supporting the criminalization of marital 
rape are not in the dominating position. 
In Question 8, where the court has already delievered the guilty verdict of rape, 
the interviewees are asked to make a rather passive judgment of the decision of the 
authority. Higher percentages appear to accept the verdict than those who voluntarily 
take the marital coercive sex as rape in Question 5. In Qingdao city, 70.1% think the 
verdict is reasonable, which is quite close to the percentages of who recognize marital 
rape in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. 31.6% in Yongxing and Dachang villages 
and 26.8% in Pengzhuang village and Shenxian county also judge the decision as 
"reasonable ". The higher percentages here in Question 8 than those in Question 5 may 
show that people would like to accept the legal authority and change their own ideas. 
But the rural percentages of 31.6% and 26.8% are still minorities, which again 
conform that cultural elements supporting the criminalization of marital rape are not 
dominating in rural areas. 
Given the size and population of inland rural areas, cultural elements that are not 
dominating in the inland and rural areas are surely not dominating in the Chinese 
society as a whole, even though they may be dominating in some cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai or Guangzhou. 
On the other hand, the o pponents of the criminalization of marital rape believe 
that their cultural elements of Confucian family ethics are still in a dominating 
position, especially in the inland and rural areas. But the survey results do not seem to 
support the claim. 
In Question 5, 48.4% in Yongxing and Dachang choose "it is not illegal though it 
is not good ", and the percentage is 57.5% in Pengzhuang and Shenxian. The 
percentages are indeed much higher than those of "it is rape without consent" (6.4% 
and 6.9% respectively). But these mean that only about half of the people in these 
rural communities still fairly agree with the Confucianist viewpoint on marital 
coercive sex. Some of the remainders are already holding the modern liberal point of 
view to support the criminalization of marital rape, and others are at least undecided 
and could possibly be converted to either the traditional Confucianist view or the 
modern liberal view by their peers. Under such circumstances, it is a bit unwarranted 
to say that traditional ethics, which are accepted by only half of the people, are still 
dominating the rural society in terms of the marital rape problem. 
In Question 8, when the court delivers the guilty verdict of rape, 43.9% in 
Yongxing and Dachang villages think the verdict is unreasonable while the percentage 
284 See the Bulletin of the Fifth National Census (2000), http: / /www.stats.gov.cn /tjgb /rkpcgb /. 
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in Shenxian and Pengzhuang is 50.8 %. These are still the high percentages compared 
with other choices in the same question. But if we compare the two percentages with 
the corresponding ones in Question 5 of the "it is not illegal though it is not good" 
choice, 48.4% and 57.5% respectively, we can see that under the pressure of modern 
legal authority, Confucian loyalists have reduced in number. 
Also if we sum up the percentage of the first choice and the third choice in 
Question 8, it makes up to 56.2% in Yongxing and Dachang, and 49.2% in Shenxian 
and Pengzhuang. So, under the pressure of legal authorities, in Shenxian and 
Pengzhuang, people with firm traditional attitude are about the same in number as the 
people who hold or could possibly hold the opposite attitude towards marital rape. In 
Yongxing and Dachang, as a result of the court's guilty verdict, people with the 
liberal attitude have even surpassed the conservative people in number. 
With the results, it would not be right even in the rural areas for people to claim 
that the traditional Confucian family ethics are still "deeply rooted in" 285 or 
"dominating'-'286 the current Chinese society in terms of marital rape. And in the cities, 
as data have shown, traditional Confucian ethics are even farther from dominating. 
So, in current Chinese society as a whole, traditional Confucian ethics are no longer 
exerting a dominant influence at least as far as marital rape is concerned. 
Confucian family ethics and human rights notion are used as the fundamental 
cultural arguments for the discussion the criminalization of marital rape, by opponents 
or supporters. But now we know neither of them is enjoying the dominating position 
in the current Chinese society. If we again refer to Cotterrell's definition of culture, 
i.e. of "shared understandings ", of a "common outlook" or as being "typical of a 
particular society or social group "287, we find neither of the above fit in with the 
definition. This is to say, in terms of marital rape, people's understanding and outlook 
are currently in a dynamic process of changing, and there is nothing typical and 
general yet that can be called "culture" so defined. 
However, the culture approach in legal studies needs the concept of culture as its 
starting point or logical premise. Since the current transformation of Chinese society 
has caused the fragmentation of culture as a general concept in terms of the marital 
rape problem, the very foundation of the law and culture approach becomes tenuous. 
As a result, for the current Chinese marital rape law problem, the culture approach is 
violating one of its own presuppositions for analysis and therefore has an inherent 
logical inability - -- the lack of valid premise. 
4. Inability to interpret the mechanism of how culture exerts influences on 
law 
Apart from the problem of the missing presupposition, the culture approach also 
has drawbacks in its methodology that results in its inability to explain how culture 
exerts its influences on law. 
The culture approach, as applied in the discussions about current Chinese marital 
rape law, tends to arrive at its legal conclusions directly from cultural arguments. The 
methodology they adopt seems to be a sort of deductive argument. From wives' duty 
to their husbands in the Confucian ethics, the opponents derive their legal conclusions 
against the criminalization of marital rape. From women's independent rights, the 
supporters derive their necessary legal conclusions for the criminalization of marital 
285 Reference to Criminal Trial, vol. 2, 2000, p28. 
286 Fu Liqing, "Marital Rape Should Wait - -- Between To Be and Ought To Be ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of 
Criminal Law, vol. 4, p416. Or the website: china lawinfo.com /xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1504 (2002/2/11). 
287 Cotterrell, "The Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p25. 
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rape. In the reasoning processes, while cultural elements work as the premises, legal 
conclusions seem to come intrinsically from it. What lies in between to link up 
cultural elements and legal conclusions is obscure or totally omitted. 
Such a type of reasoning process can easily obscure or even eliminate the 
boundaries between law and the non -legal realms. If the law is just the direct and 
intrinsic outcome of the corresponding ethics, people's outlooks or other cultural 
elements, then there must be various laws for the same problem of life in one society, 
which are different from, contradictory to or even opposing each other, because 
people often have different understandings or outlooks about the same problem, 
which could be taken as different cultural elements. Thus, this direct and intrinsic 
reasoning between culture and law is obviously fallacious. 
The problem here is the insufficient understanding of the mediating links between 
culture and law, which in fact is the inability to interpret the concrete mechanism of 
how cultural elements exert their influences on law. Laws are positive social norms, 
or, in Zweigert and Kötz's words, the solutions to problems of life.288 They are not 
just another form of ethical teachings, religious beliefs or theoretical illustrations. So, 
we cannot simply arrive from one specific ethical notion to the conclusions about the 
specific legislation on a specific problem of life. Only after we have fully understood 
the concrete and detailed mechanism or process of how cultural elements exert their 
influences on law, can we realize how the law distinguishes itself from ethical notions 
or other cultural elements while at the same time is closely connected with them. 
However, with its general and crude nature, the current culture approach seems 
too coarse to analyze in detail the delicate influence -exerting mechanism between 
culture and law. Problems caused by such an inability are obvious in current Chinese 
marital rape law. 
The supporters of the criminalization of marital rape base their arguments on the 
transmitted western cultural elements: the notion of women's innate rights of sexual 
self -determination. They are happy with the current Chinese legislation on rape, 
which, read abstractly and out of context, has the capacity to criminalize marital rape. 
But, with no further knowledge of the influence -exerting mechanism between culture 
and law, the supporters of criminalization of marital rape tend to ignore the current 
Chinese social realities, and therefore fail to understand the problems of effectively 
implementing this legislation in practice and giving it effect. 
Thus the legislation criminalizing marital rape become the reflection of only the 
dogmas of some foreign notions not the reflection of the realities of current Chinese 
society. As a result we see severe inconsistency between the legislation and the 
judicial practice: while the current legislation has already criminalized marital rape, 
the principle of marital exemption of rape is still firmly adhered to in judicial practice. 
This inconsistency, as I will show later, is the evidence that women's rights notions 
has not exert its influences through the proper channels, and is therefore also the 
evidence of the importance of the understanding of the influence -exerting mechanism 
between culture and law.289 
5. Discrepancies in conclusions about the social environment 
With all the fallacies in basic premises and reasoning methodologies, naturally, 
the culture approach reaches wrong conclusions about marital rape. 
The first fallacious conclusion is about the status of cultural elements concerning 
marital rape in the current Chinese social environment. This fallacy is more evident in 
288 Zweigert and Kötz, p34. 
289 See Chapter 3.2.2 for detailed discussions about the influence- exerting mechanism between culture and law. 
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the opposing side of the criminalization of marital rape than in the supporting side. 
The supporters, as previously said, intend to change the traditional cultural elements 
that they know exist in current Chinese society and may therefore not care that much 
as the opponents do about conclusions about these cultural elements. 
The opponents, however, establish themselves basically on the claim that 
traditional Confucian family ethics are still dominating present Chinese society. Such 
a conclusion about the current cultural elements in social environment is significant to 
any further argument of the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape. 
But this conclusion is drawn not from the empirical research into the social 
environment but from the deduction from premise of traditional ethics per se. 
Opponents argue that Confucian ethics is native Chinese and has lasted for so long in 
Chinese history.290 They admit that some changes have taken place under the strong 
influences of western cultures but they a ssume traditional family ethics should still 
dominate, especially in the countryside.291 
The surveys in the rural areas have empirically demonstrated that, though not as 
liberal as cities, rural minds are no longer so dominated by Confucian family ethics as 
the opponents expect in terms of the marital rape problem. All the data in last chapter 
and the precious analyses in this chapter have offered considerable evidences of 
this.292 And the marital rape law actually has much better social environment to 
operate in than claimed by the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape. 
6. Unsatisfactory proposals 
The second problematic conclusion by the culture approach about Chinese marital 
rape is its implication for the legislation or judicial practice. 
Idealistic supporters of the criminalization of marital rape base their argument 
only on women's rights notions. These are what legislators are, who have brought the 
complete conceptual criminalization of marital rape to the legislation. But, the 
empirical data has shown that, such legislation is simply not followed by judges in 
judicial practices and the strict concept of marital rape is not accepted either by the 
majority of people in current Chinese society. So the proposal of complete 
criminalization of marital rape has turned out to be a failure. 
In law people's debates about marital rape, there are only supporters of partial 
criminalization of marital rape. These people base their support on the human rights 
notion, claiming marital rape ought to be criminalized. But the judgment of realistic 
cultural e nvironment m akes t hem r etreat from t heir o riginal p osition. C onsequently 
they suggest that marital rape be criminalized only under circumstances where 
abnormal marital status or violence is present. This proposal is what is followed in 
some of the cases today. However, the proposal has inherent contradiction in it as it is 
an unwilling compromise between to be and ought to be. So the proposal is not 
satisfactory even to the people who make it. 
The opponents of the criminalization of marital rape base themselves on the 
assumption that current Chinese society is dominated with traditional Confucian 
ethics, to which marital rape is an unacceptable concept. But the previous empirical 
data have shown that the concept of marital rape is not completely unacceptable now, 
even i n t he conservative rural areas. And given that most m arital r ape c ases o ccur 
during separating or divorcing period, the concept already sounds sensible to many 
290 See: Liu Xianquan, "It's Improper to Criminalize Marital Rape "; Shi Meitang, "Husbands' Raping Their Wives 
Are Not Criminal" , Law Science (FA XUE), vol. 3, 2000. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Answers to Question 3 and 6 can be good examples. 
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people, even in the rural areas. Therefore, the cultural arguments against the concept 
of marital rape are untenable. Beside, the rejection of marital rape is against the 
legislation, causing the inconsistency within the legal system. For the reasons above, 
the rejection of marital rape is not appropriate either. 
3.2 Constructions of the Memetic Approach 
After the problems of the culture approach, this part is the construction of the 
memetic approach, a new approach with which I will try to provide better solutions to 
the problem of Chinese marital rape law. 
3.2.1 Subindividual approach and memetic theory 
1 Subindividual approach & the discipline of memetics 
As we have seen, the underlying reason for the failures of current culture approach 
is the generality and vagueness of the fundamental concept of culture. The reason that 
the concept is so general and vague is because culture, as normally used, is a supra - 
individual entity, which can contain various different things. 
Such a view of culture is shared by many theories that either assert or assume that 
individuals are socially and culturally constructed. These theories have tended to 
submerge the individual into the larger forces of society and culture and take a 
relatively unitary view of the cultural elements in a society.293 Thus the problem of 
conceptual generality and vagueness easily arises. 
To overcome the drawbacks that result from a supra -individual methodology, the 
remedy is, naturally, its antithesis, methodological individualism, the view that all 
social phenomena can be explained in terms of individuals: their actions and their 
mental states. Opposing theories always have symmetric strengths and w eaknesses, 
each explaining best what the other downplays or disregards. Echoing the problems of 
social construction theories, methodological individualism may also be incomplete, 
for the individual is not the only unit of social explanation. However, for the sake of 
overcoming the generality and vagueness of the concept of culture, individualism is 
required. 
The culture approach is too general because it is based on the general concept of 
culture. If human individuals were substituted for culture as the foundation of the 
methodology, it would be more individualistic than the general culture approach. 
Actually, the methodology I will propose is even more individualistic than this. 
Instead of human individuals, I take as the methodological foundation the most basic 
cultural elements that every human individual bears in his mind, which is therefore 
sub -individual and I call as sub -individualism. By sub -individualism, I want to make 
an antithesis of supra -individualism. Supra- individualist concept like culture is 
superior to human individuals. The sub -individualist conception of culture, on the 
other hand, referring to the most basic units of cultural elements, is subter -human 
individual. It is with this sub -individualistic methodology that I hope to achieve the 
goals of both supra- individualistic and the ordinary individual methodologies. That is, 
I hope to account for not only the uniqueness of each individual being but also how 
the social and cultural forces shape us and produce our individuality. 
As an sub -individualist, I will do without supra -individual entities. Being supra - 
individualistic, the general culture approach has been looking in the wrong place. 
293 
J. M. Balkin, Culture Software, A theory of Ideology, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1998, px. 
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Instead of looking above or beyond individuals, it should look deeper inside them and 
look directly at the most basic cultural elements themselves, or the sub -individual 
entities: the units of cultural transmission that help form individuals as well as create 
the overall culture in the whole society. These sub -individual entities, as the most 
basic cultural units, are what produce the effects that social theorists in the past saw 
from outside the individuals explaining as cultural phenomena.294 
The sub -individual approach provides a new perspective to view human 
individuals and society, basic cultural elements and culture in general. Since the sub - 
individual entities forming both social culture and individuals, conflict between 
individualism and social constructionism no longer exists but is merged into one and 
the same question: how do these basic sub -individual elements form both the 
individuals and the overall culture in the society. 
One typical representative of this sub -individualistic approach is what is called the 
theory of memetics. Memetics is the name of a relatively modem field of research 
that deals with the analysis pf cultural transfer and evolution by studying the basic 
cultural elements viewed as "living" organisms, capable of reproduction and evolution 
in an "ideosphere" (similar to the biosphere), the collective of human minds. Thus the 
study o f c ultural p henomena and t he e volution of c ulture w ould t um o ut to be t he 
study of the replication and evolution of these bacteria -like "living" organisms. 
At least since the early seventies, or perhaps late sixties, some authors have tried 
to adopt the Darwinian theory of evolution by selection to understand the continuous 
change in cultural behaviours.295 However, it was a book by Richard Dawkins, The 
Selfish Gene, first published in 1976, 296 that greatly popularized the memetic 
approach. In this book, Dawkins coined the term 'meme'(rhyrines with cream), this is a 
shortening of mimeme (from Greek mimé-ma), as analogous to the biological unit of 
inheritance, gene gene refers to the most 
biological units of information, meme refers to the basic cultural units. The rather 
simple distinction between genetic replicators as 'genes' on the one hand and all non- 
genetic replicators as ' memes' on the other has been firmly imprinted in the 
evolutionary thinking about cultural information. Since then the coining of the term of 
meme has greatly promoted the development of the new discipline, and it is also how 
the new discipline gets its name. 
Memetics has since influenced a wide variety of fields of study. Richard Dawkins 
works with it in the field of evolutionary biology;298 Daniel Dennet applies it to his 
research on the philosophy of mind;299 Hull has tried memetic theory in evolutionary 
epistemology and the development of science;30° Rogan Jacobson thinks it may work 
294Ibid. 
295 Among the writings resulted from the early explorations, we might find: Campbell DT, "Variation and Selective 
Retention in Socio- cultural Evolution ", Social Change in Developing Areas, A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary 
Theory, (Barringer HR, Blanksten GI and Mack RW (eds)) Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965. Cavalli- Sforza L. 
and Feldman M., "Cultural versus Biological Inheritance: Phenotypic Transmission from Parents to Children", 
Human Genetics, 1973, vol.25, p618 -637. Campbell DT "Evolutionary Epistemology ", The Library of Living 
Philosophers, Vol. XIV: The Philosophy of Karl Popper (Schlipp PA (ed)), LaSalle: Open Court, 1974. Boyd R. 
and Richerson PJ., Culture and the Evolutionary Process, University of Chicago Press. 1985. etc. 
296 Dawkins R., The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, 1976 
297 Ibid. p192. 
298 See: Dawkins R., "Organisms, Groups and Mentes: Replicators or Vehicles ? ", The Extended Phenotype, 
Oxford University Press, 1982, p97 -117; Dawkins R. "Viruses of the Mind", Dennett and His Critics, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993, p13 -27. 
299 See: Dennett D. "Meures and the exploitation of imagination", J Aesthetics Art Criticism 48: 127 -135, 1990; 
Dennett D., "Darwins Dangerous Idea", The Sciences 35: 34 -40, 1996.; Dennett D., Consciousness Explained, 
Penguin Books, 1991. 
300 Hull DL., "The Naked Meme ",Learning Development and Culture, Essays in Evolutionary Epistemology 
(Plotkin HC (ed)), John Wiley and Sons,1982.; Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and 
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in historical studies;301 Coombs and his colleagues have found the meme concept 
useful even in company strategies. 302 Other fields like artificial intelligence, 
psychology, sociology, etc. have also found the application of memetics. 
With its wide applications, the term 'meme' has been used for very different ideas 
in different contexts of various disciplines. For example, Dennett sees the human 
mind as being built from memes comparable to the programming of a computer.303 
Hull defines the meme as replicator, and adds interaction to account for evolution by 
natural or artificial selection, describing selection processes in science and biology 
with exactly similar definitions. 304 Most popularly, memes are described as 'viruses of 
the m ind', j ust 1 ike t hose b iological o r computer v irus v arieties, w ho would k ill o r 
damage others for the sake of their own survival. 305 
Meme, in this thesis, literally, is the most basic unit of cultural information. This 
understanding of meme serves the present purpose of the thesis best, which is to apply 
the theory of memetics to the study of the cultural elements in marital rape law. As far 
as I am aware, memetics has, not yet been used extensively in the study of law. J. M. 
Balkin has made his efforts in his book of Cultural Software to apply memetic theory 
in legal studies. 306 In his b ook, Balkin tries to constitute his theory o f ideology by 
combining m emetic theory and 1 egal theories. This t hesis t ries t o, with t he h elp o f 
memetics, to solve the problems of culture- impacted marital rape law by giving better 
interpretations of how culture exerts effects on law. But before the attempt to apply 
memetic theory to Chinese marital rape law, a few more comments about the theory 
of memetics are necessary. 
2 Introduction of the basic theory of memetics 
The new discipline of memetics is derived from the science of biology. In 
biology, the principle of evolution by selection from the natural selection theory 
developed by Darwin is well known and widely accepted to explain evolution of 
biological organisms.307. Dennett calls this natural selection principle a universal acid: 
"it is such a powerful concept that it bites through everything ". 308 This implies the 
possibility for the principle to be applied in non -biological fields. 
According to Balkin, this evolution by natural selection requires the following 
five conditions: 1) entities that replicate; 2) a source or mechanism of variation that 
continuously provides differences among entities; 3) a means by which variations can 
be passed on to future replicants; 4) an environment in which the entities replicate; 5) 
different degrees of survival for different entities within the environment. Once these 
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five conditions are met, there will be a process of natural selection, which will 
produce highly complex and differentiated entities over time.309 In this sense, Darwin 
described only a special case of selection when he was dealing with biological 
evolution. Nothing in this formulation requires the replicating entities to be organic in 
nature.31° 
Evolutionary theories can therefore be applied to a wide variety of disciplines. In 
computer sciences, genetic programming and genetic algorithms are descendants of 
this evolutionary view. 311 Evolutionary theory also is employed in the field of 
economy, combined with the development of technology312; or with the evolution of 
institutions313 Campbell combines evolutionary theory with human learning theories, 
applied to individuals, groups and society.314 Besides, we can find the theory's 
philosophical value in the works of Popper315 and Kuhn316 With the great potential of 
evolutionary thought in all fields of human sciences, it would not be surprising if the 
Darwinian mechanism also works in culture sphere. 
With the memetic concepts well used to describe the different kind of 
evolutionary processes of culture,317 the evolutionary approach, although originating 
in biology, no longer confined only to plants and animals.318 The founders of the 
memetics s et up the theory not a s an analogous fiction o r m ere m etaphor but a s a 
serious science. 
Dawkins defines a meme as "a unit of culture transmission, or a unit of imitation" 
that can replicate itself.319 There are as many different kinds of memes as there are 
things that can be transmitted culturally. Dawkins gives examples of memes like 
"tunes, ideas, catch -phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building 
arches ".320 We can have as many more examples as we like, such as how to sing a 
particular song; how to make a particular kind of food; how to order a meal in a 
restaurant; a p olitical slogan; the b elief i n God, etc., etc. M emes c an b e s kills and 
abilities and they can also be beliefs about the world and the ethics of family. Actually 
memes "encompass all the forms of cultural know -how that can be passed to others 
through the various forms of imitation and communication ".321 
It might be because memetics as a new discipline is still in its infancy that the 
concept of the meme is currently experiencing a controversial process of debate. Now 
a meme can be found variously described as: "a unit of information residing in a 
309 Balkin, p42. 
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brain "(Dawkins),322 "a unit of imitation "(Dawkins),323 "roughly equivalent to ideas or 
representations "(Plotkin) 324 "culturally transmitted instructions "(Dennett), 325 etc. 
However, despite all the differences, these definitions share the following 
commonalities: 
1. The meme is the most basic cultural unit. 
2. A piece of information is essential to the cultural unit of meme. 
3. The piece of information exists one way or the other as a mental object in the 
mind of individual humans. 
With the three features, the meme as a basic unit of information in an individual's 
mind is obviously a sub -individual entity and any individual can have more than one 
memes. So the memetic approach to culture study, different from the general culture 
approach, is based on a sub -individual instead of supra -individual concept. 
In a nutshell, the understanding of a meme in cultural studies is of similar 
importance to the understanding of DNA and RNA in molecular biology. Memès to 
cultural constructs are as genes to biological organisms. Thus, memes can be taken as 
the most basic culture units or culture -genes. And the study of culture can become the 
study of these basic cultural units of memes while the study of culture transmission 
and evolution can become the study of how memes spread and replicate themselves 
among people and how memes change in the process of their spread and reproduction. 
The concept of meme is of crucial importance to culture study. 
How will this sub -individualistic meme e ventually form the human individuals 
and, further down the line, form the general cultures of a ,society? Like biological 
genes, it is through the replication. The explanatory strength of genes lies in their 
function as replicators.326 However, g enetic e volution is only o ne of many possible 
kinds of evolution. Once conditions are met for a new kind of replicator - either 
genetic or memetic or whatever - to make copies of itself, the new replicator will start 
a new kind of evolution. Once this new evolution begins, it will not necessarily be 
subservient to the old. "Once self -copying memes had arisen, their own, much faster, 
kind of evolution took off'.327 
How do memes replicate themselves? The question leads us to the concept of 
imitation. As Dawkins puts it: "just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by 
leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the 
meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can 
be called imitation ".328 Imitation, as defined by the psychologist, Thorndike, is 
"learning to do an act from seeing it done ".329 Susan Blackmore, elaborating on this 
idea, thinks that "the skill of generalized imitation means that humans can produce 
behaviors of almost unlimited kinds and pass them on to each other by a kind of 
copying ".33° Thus, once we define memes as something transmitted by imitation, 
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whatever is passed on by this copying process is a meme. Based on this definition, 
memes meet the three following conditions to be replicators: 
1. Heredity (the form and details of the memes are copied), 
2. Variation (they are copied with errors, embellishments or other variations), 
3. Selection (only some memes are successfully copied).331 
Through the memes' replication by imitation, culture comes into existence and 
evolves. 
With replication occurring, memes start a true evolution process. And memes, 
like genes, become units of inheritance, the cultural inheritance. However, while we 
inherit our genes from our parents, we can inherit our memes from anyone we learn 
from, imitate, or communicate with. We pass our genes on to our children only, but 
we can pass on our memes to anyone who learns from us, imitates us, or 
communicates with us.332 
For the sake of successful replication, memes sometimes need to co -exist to form 
meme -complexes in the same way as co- adapted gene -complexes. Meme -complexes 
are important for several reasons. First, in some cases, a meme need to depend on the 
existence of some other memes to survive t he e volution process. For example, the 
meme of marital rape needs at least two other meme to exist: "rape" and 
"marriage ".333 Secondly, one meme greatly promotes the chance of survival of other 
memes in the complex, a good example of which are the religious memes. A member 
of the religious meme complex is called faith, which means, according to Dawkins, 
"blind trust, in the absence of evidence, even in the teeth of evidence ". 334 And it is 
this meme for blind faith secures the perpetuation of god meme by the simple 
unconscious expedient of discouraging rational inquiry.335 
So the existence of meme- complex is for the benefits of memes themselves. 
Anything that memes do are for their own benefit, and this is why Dawkins calls 
memes "selfish" and "ruthless ".336 Memetics holds that, "in the domain of memes, the 
ultimate beneficiary, the beneficiary in terms of which the final cost -benefit 
calculations must apply i s: the meme itself, not its carriers ".337 Indeed, the carriers, 
instead of being benefited, are often harmed by the memes they carry just as the 
carriers of virus are harmed by the diseases caused by the virus. Religious memes for 
example have turned many people to martyrs. To a degree we can say that the martyrs 
are killed by the memes they carry, but their death is beneficial to the memes of 
religion.338 
However, we do not always have to be so negative about memes and meme- 
complexes. The collection of memes and meme -complexes, according to memetists, 
will construct the mechanisms or tools of human understanding. As Dennett says, 
"Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes. "339 And some memetists 
vividly liken the tools of understanding to computer software, which processes data. J. 
M. Balkin, for example, says that our tools of understanding are constructed from and 
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with skills and abilities that memes collectively provide while memes are the building 
blocks of the cultural software that forms our apparatus of understanding.34° These 
tools or software, according to Balkin, are what we use to understand the world and 
articulate our values: "They are tools used to make other tools. This has always 
seemed to me the deeper meaning of the Talmudic story; for when God created 
human beings on the sixth day of creation, one of His final acts was to bequeath to 
them a toolmaking tool, which is human culture ". 341 This means that these memes are 
tools to spread memes as well as produce new memes. 
With these tools or software, both the unique individuals and their shared culture 
are constituted. As Balkin puts it, a person is a human being inhabited by memes, a 
complicated symbiosis of organism and cultural skills: "The different beliefs and 
worldviews that human beings possess are the product of the evolution of cultural 
information that is instantiated in human beings and helps to makes them the unique 
individuals they are ".342 
On the other hand, cultures are populations of individuals with relatively similar 
kinds of memes. Any person is constituted by a particular kind of memes that exist at 
his particular point in time. When these people gather together, the memes they have 
will show a certain kind of general similarities, or the people will appear to have the 
shared w ays o f understanding.343 This i s h ow unique individuals form t he common 
culture in a society. 
3 Conceptual clarification: the materialized v. the unmaterialized memes 
Evolutionary biologists distinguish between the genetic information coded in 
genes (the genotype) and the physical or behavioral effects of this coding on an 
organism in its environment (the phenotype). Corresponding distinctions are also 
made in memetics between the information coded in memes (the memotype) and the 
cognitive and behavioral effects that the meme produces in a person (the memetic 
phenotype). 344 As human cognitive apparatus cannot directly cognize abstract 
memotype and its power is limited only to the phenotype effects, the memetic 
phenotype is therefore of essential importance to the spread of memes from one mind 
to another. 
But such a distinction w as not made at the very beginning of the discipline of 
memetics. When Dawkins created the concept of memes on the analogy of genes, he 
recognised the limitations of his construction. For example, with the analogy, it is 
difficult to recognize anything like a memetic allele or memetic chromosomes. For 
this theoretical inadequacy, Dawkins suggested that the meme is still "drifting 
clumsily about in its primeval soup "345 like early replicating molecules, and might 
have a very different mechanism for competition such as memory space in the brain. 
Thus Dawkins avoided the need for the definition of a vehicle of culture or memetic 
phenotype. 
However, more memetists feel the need to distinguish the genotype /phenotype in 
memes as biologists do to genes. Otherwise, with Dawkins' lack of clarity, much 
confusion would be generated, an example of which might be Dennett's famous 
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maxim: "A scholar is just a library's way of making another library. "346 By this, 
Dennett is actually suggesting that we should not take a library as memes themselves 
but should distinguish the information housed within a library, the memes, as a 
replicator from the library as a phenotype or a meme vehicle. So, we can see more 
clearly that libraries, as vehicles for the memes, serve to promote the replication of 
those memes among scholars. 
Some theories have been constructed to meet the need for the distinction, though 
many are found to be unsatisfactory. Dan Sperber, for example, distinguishes two 
basic types of representations. Mental representations are beliefs, intentions and 
preferences. Public representations are signals, utterances, texts, and pictures; they 
include what other writers have called symbolic forms. 347 But Dan Sperber's 
distinction is found to be incomplete by J. M. Balkin because it does not take into 
account cognitive mechanisms like associations.348 
F. T. Cloak's approach seems more helpful. He calls the set of cultural 
instructions people carry in their nervous systems, "I- culture ". The material structures, 
relationships among material structures, and changes in these relationships which are 
actually brought about or maintained by behaviors of these cultural instructions, he 
calls, "M- culture ".349 Features of M- culture thus include features of their behavior, 
their technology, their social organization, ideologies, etc. 
The I- culture/M -culture interaction as summarized by Cloak makes clear the link 
to Dawkins' subsequent formulation of memes and their phenotypes.35° "An I- culture 
builds and operates M- culture features whose ultimate function is to provide for the 
maintenance and propagation of the I- culture in a certain environment. And the M- 
culture features, in turn, environmentally affect the composition of the I- culture so as 
to maintain or increase their own capabilities for performing that function. As a result, 
each M- culture feature is shaped for its particular functions in that environment. "351 
Under such a categorization, Cloak's 'M- culture' covers Dawkins' examples of 
memes, such as, pots, arches and fashions for clothes, 352 while only the cultural 
instructions inside the brain which produced these artefacts would be considered the 
replicator whose 'purposes' are being served by these things.353 Dawkins later also 
adopted the I- culture -M- culture distinction: "I was insufficiently clear about the 
distinction between the meme itself, as replicator, on the one hand, and its 'phenotypes 
effects' or 'meme products' on the other. A meme should be regarded as a unit of 
information residing in a brain (Cloak's 'I- culture'). "354 
However, I would like to personalize Cloak's genotype /phenotype distinction in 
my own terms. I would name what is usually called I- culture by Cloak as 
unmaterialized memes and name Cloak's M- culture as materialized memes. I change 
the names of the concepts for two reasons. First, as I am taking a pure memetic view 
on what is called cultural elements by common people, I would not like to use still the 
concept of culture as the foundations of my memetic approach. It is for this reason 
that I rename Cloak's terms unmaterialized and materialized memes. Change of the 
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terms from culture to meme here actually means the switch of substantial perspective 
of view or fundamental conceptual transmission. Secondly, I abandon terms like 
memotype and memetic phenotype because they look too technical and uncommon to 
ordinary readers, who may have no much special knowledge of memetics or biology. 
In contrast, terms like materialized and unmaterialized memes can express the equally 
clear and rigorous meanings, and be more easily understood by the people specialized 
mainly in the field of law. 
The two concepts of materialized and unmaterialized memes can be further 
refined. If a meme has in the physical and tangible world its physical object(s) and/or 
other tangible beings that is /are originated from the meme, then we define the 
physical and tangible objects as the meme materialized, or m -meme; and we define as 
unmaterialized meme, or u -meme, the meme from which the physical and tangible 
objects originated or the meme from which no physical and tangible objects 
originated. And I define the process involved from u -meme to m -meme as the process 
of materialization. 
As a meme is "information residing in the brain ", it is a mental being in the 
internal realm of human mind. When a meme first comes into being, it is always the 
internal mental being, or an unmaterialized meme. However, many of memes will 
later exhibit themselves physically in some knowable forms to the cognitive apparatus 
of people, then they become materialized. 
Materialized memes have many concrete forms that people are usually very 
familiar with, among which physical objects might be the most common group, like a 
painting as the m -memes of a painter, a book as that of a writer, etc. For example, 
religious memes themselves are unmaterialized memes but, they can also have their 
corresponding materialized counterparts, like churches. ass The belief in Jesus' 
existence is an unmaterialized meme but a painting or a statue of Jesus is a 
materialized meme of Jesus. 
Besides, other knowable beings like actions, attitudes, which can also be 
perceived by the people around, are also m -memes when they are activated by an 
internal u -meme. The actions of rape, expressions of disgust at a rapist are examples 
of these kinds. 
According to the definitions, materialized memes and unmaterialized memes do 
not enjoy e qual status. T he u -meme is the thing -in- itself, w hile the m -meme is the 
external form of the u -meme. Therefore, u -meme has the absolute decisive effects 
upon m -meme while m -meme does not have the decisive effects on u -meme. So u- 
meme can exist independently from m -meme while no m -meme can exist 
independently from its u -meme source. 
That's why we can easily find u -memes without any materialized form, like a 
little secret one wants to keep only to him/herself. Any individual can suddenly have a 
meme come into his mind and he keeps it to himself, and the meme is unmaterialized. 
Later the individual writes or speaks it out to other individuals, then the meme is 
materialized because it is now tangible when spoken or written down. So, though u- 
memes do not necessarily turn out to be physical and tangible, all m -memes must be 
originated from u- memes. For example, any special food must be from a special 
meme of certain person or certain group of people. 
Another point that need to be paid special attention to is what is called the 
contingency of materialization, which means that even the same unmaterialized meme 
may have different materialized forms while the same materialized forms may be 
sss Of course, a church is usually a comprehension of different memes materialized: religious, architectural, 
technical, etc. 
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from essentially different unmaterialized memes. A person may do many deeds out of 
the belief in Jesus: he prays regularly, he often reads the Bible, he would like to tell 
other people about Jesus, etc. But all these are the materializations of the same belief. 
Because of the changeability of the materialized forms of memes, we may not be able 
to t ell w hat u nmaterialized m eme lies under a materialized form. F or e xample, w e 
cannot decide that a young man is a Christian just from seeing him wear a cross. In 
China, for instance, this could actually be the underlying meme to catch fashions. Or 
we cannot either decide a person believes in Jesus for the reason that he says so as 
here might underlie the meme to lie. 
Though m -memes do not have any decisive effects on u- memes. They do be able 
to have some influences on u- memes. The most important function of m -memes is as 
the vehicle to spread the u -meme because human cognitive apparatus cannot yet 
directly read other people's mind But the most important function of the distinction 
in this thesis is the reconceptualization of the general concept of culture with the 
individualistic concept of meme, which I will discuss later in the final chapter. 
3.2.2 Memetic methodologies for Chinese marital rape problem 
1 Basic features of the memetic methodology 
Having introduced the basic theory of memetics, I will now construct with it the 
concrete methodologies for Chinese marital rape problem. Memetics can have many 
applications in the study of culture and law, however, the biggest value it can be of in 
my thesis is its sub -individual perspective on cultural elements, or memes. Therefore, 
adverse to the generality of current culture approach, the basic feature of my proposed 
memetic approach to cultural studies in law is its individuality. 
Current culture approach must first assume the existence in the society of a 
general entity called culture before anything else could be done. The memetic 
approach however does not assume the existence of culture; actually, it does not make 
any a priori assumptions at all. As a result of its individualistic nature, to apply 
memetic approach in cultural studies requires more empirical research of individual 
cultural elements, or memes, so as to find out whether or not there are enough memes 
to form the general culture. 
In the current discussions about marital rape in China from culture perspective, 
the opponents of the criminalization of marital rape assume the existence of 
Confucian family ethics as the general culture in current Chinese society w hile the 
supporters rely on the notion of women's rights.356 On the other hand, the memetic 
approach involves no assumptions but surveys. 
Another reflection of the generality -individuality distinction between the current 
culture approach and the memetic approach lies in their different objects of study. 
Individual cultural elements, or memes, are always the objects of study for the 
memetic approach. The memetic approach does not study general entities, although 
the memetic approach sometimes also needs to determine some general or collective 
features of individual memes, like the general distribution of memes, etc.357 But these 
general and collective features are just the external forms or patterns of the memes not 
the substantial entities of memes per se. The substantial entities as objects of study are 
always the individual memes. 
356 See Chapter3.1 of the thesis. 
357 Meme -complex, for example, is a rather general concept in memetics, which is substantially equivalent to what 
is usually called as culture. But conceptually speaking, the two are essentially different. 
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Both Confucian ethics and women's rights notion are independent entities that do 
not need to rely on the ideas of any women's individuals in current Chinese society to 
exist. So, with current culture approach, both the opponents and the supporters of the 
criminalization of marital rape have generalized the concerned cultures into specific 
materialized systems of theories or notions. In contrast, with memetic approach, what 
is studied as culture is quite different. It's neither the Confucian family ethics nor the 
women's rights values; rather, it is all the personal ideas of human individuals in 
current Chinese society that are related to the marital rape problem. To memetics, 
these individual ideas or memes are what culture essentially is. To put it in the terms 
of the usual concept of culture, these individual ideas are just the microscopic cultural 
elements. When one group of similar ideas has gained the general and common 
acceptance of the people in the society, these microscopic elements will make the 
usual concept of culture. So, memetic approach also does cultural studies in Chinese 
marital rape law but with quite different objects of study from those of general culture 
approach. 
The third indicator of the generality /individuality distinction is the different 
sources for collecting data about culture. The source of information about culture can 
be single for current culture approach which, for example, can be only Confucius. The 
memetics sources of information on culture, on the other hand, are multiple. In order 
to study the cultural factors in Chinese marital rape law, theoretically, one ought to 
ascertain the ideas of each Chinese person about the problem. This is obviously 
impossible. Therefore it is necessary to ensure that the methods used for sampling and 
obtaining statistical results are scientifically reliable, which can therefore give as 
precise a reflection as possible of the individual ideas of each person. The difference 
in the sources of information is, in some degree, the transformation of the difference 
of what is taken as culture by current culture approach and the memetic approach. 
With the fundamental difference in methodology, the memetic approach also 
relies on an essentially different logical premise from that of the current culture 
approach. When studying the cultural factors in Chinese marital rape law, the culture 
approach relies on only one or two theories as the premises for all the further 
reasoning and conclusions. But the memetic approach cannot do that. It must rely only 
on social reality. It is for this reason that empirical research is necessary before 
anything can be said about the concerned cultural elements of Chinese marital rape 
law. In the eyes of memetics, only the living memes in current society are the true and 
live culture. A well known notion or theory, words of a famous book or person, in 
contrast, c annot guarantee a t rue r eflection o f so cial r eality. T he C hristian B ible i s 
well known nowadays in China but you cannot say the present Chinese culture is a 
Christian culture. Confucianism is also to known to many westerners, but it is hard to 
talk about the living cultural elements of Confucianism in the current western 
societies. So, to the memetic approach, culture can only be found in the lively social 
reality. Whatever the social reality is, whatever theoretical foundation it has. As long 
as the social reality is there, the memetic approach will not worry about the lack of its 
theoretical foundation. It therefore does not have use the often illusionary theoretical 
foundations as the general culture approach does. Consequently the memetic approach 
will not be in the embarrassing dilemma of the discrepancy between the derivational 
conclusions of culture from the assumed theoretical foundation and the empirical 
conclusions of culture from the social realities. 
Upon different foundations, different reasoning processes are adopted by current 
culture approach and the memetic approach. The current culture approach adopts a 
type of deductive reasoning As previously discussed, with a general ethic, say 
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Confucianism or women's rights notions, the current culture approach derives from 
the general ethical dogmas the special legal conclusions about the concrete problem of 
marital rape. 
Memetic approach, in contrast, does not draw conclusions by a deductive 
derivation. Instead, it stays close to social realities: not only to ascertain culture itself 
as the living ideas of people but also to explore the empirical mechanisms by which 
culture elements exert their influences on law. In doing this, the memetic approach is 
not interested in metaphysical or pure ethical derivations but always tries to be 
positivistic and empirical. 
2 Normative meaning & Meme: memetic approach for analysis of cultural environment 
Any social event or action must be both descriptive and normative. By 
descriptive, I mean that any social event or action must contain as the core a physical 
event or action, like the physical event of an explosion or some bodily movements of 
a human being. So far, these events or actions are only the objective parts of the 
physical world, and we can only talk of them in pure descriptive terms because they 
are not "social" yet. 
In order to qualify as a social event or action in a society, the event or action must 
have certain special meaning or judgment of values attached to it by the people in the 
society. Once this meaning or judgment of value is attached to the event or action, we 
can talk about it not only in pure descriptive terms but also in normative terms. This is 
what I mean by being normative. Only after this normative meaning is attached, can 
an event or action be social. So not every kind of contact between human beings has a 
social character; this is rather confined to cases where the actor's behavior is 
meaningfully oriented to that of others. We can see the following example for 
illustrations: 
"For example, a mere collision of two cyclists may be compared to a natural 
event. On the other hand, their attempts to avoid hitting each other, or whatever 
insults, blows, or friendly discussion might follow the collision, would constitute 
social `action "'.358 
The natural event of collision is descriptive while the subjective attempts, insults, 
ect. are the normative meanings attached to the collision that make it social. Thus, the 
concept of meaning is one of the most fundamental concepts in the understanding of 
social action. With this concept, we know that the natural e vent alone cannot be a 
social problem because it is meaningless. Only after subjective meaning is attached, 
can people have an attitude towards a natural conduct and then can the conduct be 
social. Therefore, what social problems the collision would cause, or what different 
reactions to the collision would occur between the two cyclists - be it insults, blows, 
or friendly discussion - depends on the different meanings attached to the collision. 
Legal problems are social problems. Whether the natural conduct of a person 
constitutes a legal problem or not, accordingly, also depends upon the subjective 
meaning attached to the conduct. Adultery and rape are very good examples of this. 
The conduct of sexual intercourse, or even coercive sexual intercourse, does not, per 
se, necessarily constitute crimes. Apart from the natural existence of such conduct, it 
358 Max Weber, Economy and Society, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, p113. Italicized by the author of the 
thesis. 
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is the subjective meaning granted to the conduct that plays the key role in, deciding 
whether the conduct is criminal or not. If an appropriate meaning is attached, even the 
coercive sex without the consent of the woman will not be criminal, of which marital 
coercive sex under the traditional Chinese law is an example. The subjective meaning 
granted by Confucian ethics to coercive sex between husband and wife determines the 
legitimacy of it. If the subjective meaning attached to a conduct has changed, the 
same conduct which used to be legal can be criminalized. And this is the case of the 
current legislative criminalization of marital rape in China. 
On the other hand, if an appropriate meaning is attached, even sex with the 
consent of the woman can also be criminal. Adultery under the traditional Chinese 
law makes the example. Adultery refers to the voluntary sexual intercourse between a 
married person and a partner other than the lawful spouse. Though the natural act of 
sex p er se is t he e xactly t he same a s any v oluntary s ex b etween m en and w omen, 
however, a special subjective meaning is attached to adulterous sex by the 
combination of the traditional Confucian ethics and the marital factors of the involved 
party, leading to the criminalization of such acts. Now adultery is no longer a crime 
according to the current Chinese law in the People's Republic in China.359 Adultery is 
decriminalized because people have now a different understanding about the acts, or, 
in other words, they are attaching a different meaning to the hitherto "adulterous" 
conduct. This is to say that the decriminalization of adultery results from the change 
of the subjective meaning attached. 
The contrast in Chinese laws between the criminalization of marital rape and the 
decriminalization of adultery evidences the decisive effects of the subjective meaning 
upon the changes in the legal treatment of these actions. We can see the significant 
concept of meaning in understanding general sociological problems remains its 
significance in the legal problems. Actually in terms of the importance of subjective 
meaning in the understandings of the problems of law, we can get more support from 
Geoffrey Samuel. 
Geoffrey Samuel has raised similar theory about the constructions of social facts, 
claiming that legal systems not only have different solutions for but also different 
descriptions of the problems. According to Samuel, law as a science (intellectus) does 
not operate directly on the facts (res). And what lawyers do is to construct a model of 
the social world and it is this model that acts as the bridge between the social and 
legal worlds. The model is both the res and the intellectus.36° And the constructed 
model of facts might well be an active step in the process of reaching a solution in a 
case36t Therefore this fact construction can be seen as a kind of precategorisation: that 
is to say, it is a preliminary categorisation before the facts are formally assigned to an 
established legal category.362 And thus the construction - -- and reconstruction - -- of 
facts is as important as any search for, or an application of, a rule.363 
As for how the construction of the facts goes, Samuel describes as follows: "It is 
a matter of how facts are viewed, of how particular aspects are emphasised; thus it 
may be a matter of emphasising a w hole as opposed to its parts, or vice versa. "364 
359 But in Taiwan it still is. "Art. 239 A married person who commits adultery with another shall be punished with 
imprisonment for not more than one year; the other party to the adultery shall be subject o the same punishment." 
See Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See, Major Laws of The Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p1097. 
369 
G. Samuel, Epistemology and Mehtod in Law, Ashgate, p2. 
361 Ibid. pl 
362 Ibid, pl. 
363 Ibid. pl 
364 Ibid, pl. 
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Interestingly, he also gives a car crash example for illustrations of what the 
constructivism exactly means: 
"The direct object of legal analysis is not a car crash involving this and that 
particular type of vehicle, nor is it the actual transaction involving a delivery of a 
cargo of rotten oranges. Nor, again, is it the particular type of spikes built, or holes 
dug, on a specific individual's land so as to interrupt a neighbour's ballooning 
activities or his water supply. Facts are abstracted version of these events in which a 
car is interchangeable with a van and oranges with bananas, just as spikes can be 
replaced by holes. "365 
So, a natural event alone is not sufficient to constitute the problem of life or law. 
How people understand it, which is the meaning attached to it, plays an essential part 
as well. As meaning is found to be so important by many theorists, what is meaning 
anyway? What decides the meaning of social contact between individuals? Or, to be 
specific, what is the relationship between the subjective meaning and cultural 
elements, or memes, in Chinese marital rape law? 
There is in fact an equivalent relation between the two. To memetists, as we have 
known, the collection of memes and meme -complexes constructs the mechanisms or 
tools of human understanding. So, whatever subjective meaning attached to a natural 
event depends on the memes in the mind of people. In this sense, memes decide the 
normative meaning. Moreover, the subjective meaning itself, once generated, is just 
another meme. Since memes can refer to any units of information or entities, 
therefore, in the memetic eyes, the subjective meaning, as a unit of information or a 
human mental entity, is of course also a meme or memes. People's attitudes towards 
marital rape are reflections of certain cultural elements, Confucian ethics or women's 
rights values, and we know such attitudes can also be interpreted as subjective 
meanings. Thus we can see an equivalent relation between these two conceptual 
systems. Meanings are memes; memes are meanings. Or, to be specific, in terms of 
marital rape, people's attitudes or ideas, either criminalization or decriminalization, 
which is decided by the normative meanings, can also be said to be decided by 
memes, the equivalent of the normative meaning. 
The equivalent relation between the concepts of meme and meaning is significant 
for the construction of the memetic approach. As previously said, a natural action 
alone, like the collision of two cyclists, cannot by itself constitute a social problem. It 
is the normative meaning that decides what social problem it will constitute: if the 
cyclist thinks that the collision is tolerable, a friendly discussion may follow; if he 
takes it as irritating and unbearable, there might be a fight. 
Similarly, the natural actions of sex are just the neutral and objective events in 
the physical world, without subjective meaning, or memes, involved yet. Only after 
the subjective meanings are attached, or the memes mixed in, can they be certain 
social problems in human society. Thus the problems of marital rape or adultery can 
be divided into two parts: the pre -cultural natural actions and the subjective memes of 
the meanings attached. 
However, some memetists may not agree to such a division. They will argue that 
even the natural actions must be known to the human mind before they work to 
constitute a social problem. And once the natural actions are known to the human 
mind, they are no longer a pure objective and natural beings but have also turned into 
the memes in human mind. Thus the dichotomy of the objective and subjective 
constituents o f t he problem o f m arital r ape o r adultery a re actually b oth subjective 
365 Ibid, p2. 
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memes. A s m emes are the b asic units o f c ulture, t here exist n o p re- cultural b eings 
here. 
To answer this question, it is necessary to introduce the distinction recently made 
in philosophy of science between "epistemic values" and non -epistemic values. As a 
very successful tool for modern people to know and change the world, science is 
usually a solely epistemic apparatus and scientific cognitions are therefore epistemic 
memes. Recently a philosopher, L. Laudan makes a distinction between epistemic 
values and non -epistemic values.366 According to him, epistemic values are related to 
a special type of question "what should we accept as knowledge (or a fact) ?" Logical 
consistency, empirical adequacy, simplicity etc. are the criteria to answer such a 
question, and they are called epistemic values. Knowledge of modern science, usually, 
goes to this category. 
On the other hand, other values are supposed to be used to answer the broader 
question "what should we do ?" These are non -epistemic values. So, the so- called non- 
epistemic values are the memes that decide what reactions the people should make to 
an event, to another person or the world around him/her. Thus, non -epistemic values 
are rather a sociological than a scientific concept. From this definition, we can tell the 
non -epistemic values are in fact what I refer to as normative meanings.367 
In the general sense, the epistemic values are of course a part of culture. But 
when we talk about the legal problem of marital rape and its relationship with culture, 
the concept of "culture" here does not refer to the epistemic values, which deal only 
with the cognition of the natural actions of marital coercive sex. Instead, the "culture" 
here refers to non -epistemic values that attach some meanings to the epistemic values 
to make the actions "social ". Thus, in the problem of marital rape, though the 
epistemic memes to cognize the natural actions of marital coercive sex and the non- 
epistemic memes to attach the normative meanings are both memes, there are still 
essential differences between these two groups of memes. The epistemic memes of a 
natural action are more likely to stay the same in different times and different 
societies but the non -epistemic memes to attach special social meanings to the action 
are more easily changeable. For example, the recognition of the existence of actions 
of the marital coercive sex is the same for both the supporters and the opponents of 
the criminalization of marital rape, but they attach to the same epistemic memes 
opposite non -epistemic memes, which exhibit as opposite meanings of criminalizing 
and decriminalizing marital rape. 
So, in the memetic eyes, even if we discard the concept of the natural actions and 
adopt the concept of epistemic memes, we can still have an essential distinction 
between the two constituents of the problems of life. With this distinction, we can still 
have strict definition of the cultural elements related to the marital rape law. I define 
culture only as the non -epistemic memes that work as the special normative meanings 
attached. The reason I do this is that only these non -epistemic memes cause the 
differences in the ethical and legal status of marital coercive sex in different cultures 
and societies. The epistemic memes that only cognize the natural action of coercive 
sex between husband and wife is therefore defined as the pre -cultural memes.368 
Thus, in terms of the particular problem of marital rape, I can transform the 
distinction between the epistemic memes and the non -epistemic memes into the 
366 See Laudan , Larry, Science and Values, University of California Press, 1984, pxi, xii. 
367 The sociologists who pursue to make sociology a science preach the so- called "value- free" principle. With this 
distinction between epistemic and non -epistemic values, we know that the "value" in this "value free" sociology 
refers to non -epistemic value. By "value free ", the sociologists' actually claims for epistemic values to be free from 
non -epistemic values in sociology. 
368 This is only in terms of the specific problem of marital rape. 
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distinction between the pre -cultural memes and the cultural memes. That I call 
epistemic memes "pre- cultural" is not to deny their nature as basic cultural units. 
Rather, in the context of marital rape, the epistemic memes are the same in all the 
different cultures while only the non -epistemic memes are different. As a result, it is 
the non -epistemic memes that are responsible for all the differences in marital rape 
laws. With this essential difference between the cultural and the pre -cultural memes, I 
can therefore keep on using the usual terms of the objective actions /facts v. the 
subjective meaning /memes to mark the differentiation. 
3 Zweigert and Kötz's problem of life: memetic approach to influence- exerting 
mechanism of culture on law 
Laws are memes, individual memes. This is obvious. In the codified law systems, 
laws are made by the legislators. When the legislators have the memes in mind, they 
write them out and maké statutory laws. So, statutory laws are memes, the 
materialized memes of the individuals called legislators. In the case law systems, 
when deciding a case, the judge will use his own reason to try to find out the law in 
the precedents. The memes he or she has collected from the precedent lay down a new 
rule, and that is the judge -made law. So judge -made laws are also memes, and they 
are the individual memes of the judges. In a word, laws are memes and they are the 
individual memes of the lawmakers. 
Since the individual memes of lawmakers are the direct source of law, therefore, 
any memes, if they want to play a role in law, must first become the individual memes 
of the lawmakers. Memes as basic units of culture are usually widely spread in the 
society, so it is not that difficult for them to spread to the mind of the lawmakers and 
become their own individual memes. Actually the question might be the other way 
round. There are so manÿ memes going around in the society, giving the lawmakers 
too many memes in their mind. It is hard to be certain which meme in the lawmaker's 
mind will make itself the law. So, theoretically, any meme, once getting into the 
lawmaker's mind, has the chance to become law. 
For example, if a lawmaker one day occasionally has a meme in his mind that he 
would go to movie with his girlfriend that night, theoretically, this meme has the 
chance to become law. Vincent van Gogh's paintings are surely some brilliant memes, 
which could easily attract a lawmaker and get into his mind. Then, these memes of 
van Gogh, from which his paintings are materialized, get their chance to play a role in 
the law made by the infected lawmaker. Similarly, Confucian family ethics, when 
taking over the lawmakers, can also make itself law. This has already happened. 
Though China is not a case law country, many Chinese judges, with their mind 
occupied by the memes of Confucian ethics, decriminalized marital rape in practice, 
despite its inconsistency with the legislation. On the other hand, if the notions of 
innate women's rights and gender equality dominate the mind of the lawmakers, they 
have their chance to become law just as any other memes. As laws are individual 
memes of the lawmakers, this could happen even when the general social environment 
is not yet ready for it. This is actually what has already happened to the legislators in 
the People's Republic of China who made the law criminalize marital rape. 
The battle in the lawmakers' mind between different memes for a role in law 
highly resembles the competition between thousands of sperms around the egg for 
insemination. For each there is a chance of victory. For each there is a risk of failure. 
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Eventually all the chances and risks for memes result in contingency of man -made 
law and its risk of inconsistency with what we expect it to do. 
It is not every arbitrary or random meme that occurs to the lawmakers that ought 
to become law, no matter how beautiful, brilliant or interesting it might be. Legal 
memes ought to be different from the non -legal memes. The differences should lie not 
only on a formal level as the memes of the special individuals of the lawmakers; the 
differences should also lie in the essential level inherently in the memes per se. This is 
because the law has its own special function as solutions of problems of life. 
For example, t he function o f t aw i s n of t o entertainment o r art. S o, m ovies o r 
famous paintings of van Gogh cannot directly become legal memes even if they have 
already spread into the lawmakers' mind. Law is also not to function as the sheer 
textbook or preacher of certain ethics, so, ethical teachings of Confucius, values of 
innate human rights and gender equality or any other ethical memes cannot 
necessarily be made legal memes either even though they have taken over the 
personal minds of the lawmakers. Not every non -legal meme can surely turn into a 
legal meme. Any cultural element, or meme, must meet some prerequisites, go 
through some proper channels, or resort to certain mechanisms to play a role in law. 
What, then, lies between the law and the non -legal memes? What bridge does a 
cultural element, or a non -legal meme, have to cross in order have its impact on law? 
To explore this influence -exerting mechanism of memes on law, it would be helpful 
to take a functionalist view to recheck Zweigert and Kötz's "problem of life ". 
According to Zweigert and Kötz's functionalist methodology of comparative law, 
"The basic methodological principle of a 11 comparative law is that of functionality. 
From t his b asic p rinciple s tern a 11 t he r ules which d etermine t he choice o f 1 aws t o 
compare ", and "in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the 
same function ".369 
The functionality here refers to laws as the solutions for problems of life. As 
Zweigert and Kötz say: "different legal systems give the same or very similar 
solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite the great differences 
in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of operation ", 370 and 
why comparative law is possible is fundamentally because "the legal system of every 
society faces essentially the same problems ".371 
One can infer from Zweigert and Kötz's approach that they think problems of life 
are why laws need to exist because the law functions as the solutions to the problems. 
The thesis agrees with the problem of life's crucial role to law, but we need to check 
the conclusion that "the legal system of every society faces essentially the same 
problems "372 
Zweigert and Kötz's problem of life refers actually to the realistic problem 
existing in complicated social relations, which is rather a sociological than a legal 
concept. "(T)he problem must be stated without any reference to the concepts of one's 
own legal system ", it "must be posed in purely functional terms". 373 With the 
functionalist character, the concept of the problem of life, if more rigorously defined, 
is not a legal but purely a sociological one, which exists as the part of the concept of 
social relation defined in rather general sociological sense. So Zweigert and Kötz's 
problem of life must share essentially the same constituents as general sociological 
369 Zweigert & Kötz, p34. 
37o Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
371 Zweigert & Kötz, p34 
372 Zweigert & Kötz, p34 
373 Ibid. 
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problems: the objective fact and the subjective meme. Therefore if we say two 
problems of life are the same, we must be sure that both their constituents, the 
objective and the subjective, are the same. 
Marital rape is a good example. When the functionalist compares marital rape 
laws in different societies, he presupposes the societies face essentially the same 
problem of life of marital rape. However, when deciding whether the same problem of 
life of marital rape exists in different societies, we must consider both of its two 
constituent parts: the objective fact, which is the action of coercive sexual intercourse 
between husband and wife, and the subjective meme of the action, which is the 
judgment of to what extent the action ought to be condemned. Only when both the 
constituents are the same, can we say the same problem of marital rape exists in the 
societies under comparison: 
Suppose the objective fact of coercive sexual intercourse between husband and 
wife exists in every society. There is the other factor left for us to consider, the 
subjective meme about the action, to decide whether marital rape exists as a problem 
of life. Only when the subjective meme dictates that the action of marital coercive sex 
is bad enough to be condemned as a crime, can marital rape exist as a problem of life. 
In order to be more explicit, I will carry out my analysis in five different situations: 
1. If a husband and wife agree that the action of coercive sexual intercourse 
between them is nothing more than a minor unpleasant quarrel between 
lovers, or at most is immoral but still a private matter for them, which is still 
far away from or totally irrelevant to the crime of rape, then there is no 
problem of martial rape to them. If all or sufficient majority of husbands and 
wives in the society share the meme, then the problem of life of marital rape 
does not exist to the majority people or to the society as a whole. 
2. If a husband and wife agree that the action of coercive sexual intercourse 
between them, same as that between a man and a woman who have no marital 
relations, amounts to the crime of rape, then the problem of marital rape exists 
to them. If all or sufficient majority of husbands and wives in the society 
share the meme, then marital rape exists as a problem of life to the majority or 
to the whole society. 
3. If the wife thinks her husband's action of coercive sexual intercourse with her 
amounts the c rime o f r ape while h e does not, t hen m arital r ape exists as a 
problem of life to her but not to him. If all other or sufficient majority of 
people in the society share her meme, then marital rape exists as problem of 
life to the majority or all people in the whole society; if all other, or a 
sufficient majority of, people in the society share his meme, then marital rape 
does not exist as problem of life to the majority or the whole society. 
4. Given the disagreement between the wife and the husband in case 3, if some 
people share her meme while the others share his with neither gaining the 
prevailing position, then there is a dispute about the existence of the problem 
of m arital r ape. If t he s mall g roup o f t egislators s hare h er m eme w hile t he 
mass share his, statutes criminalizing marital rape may possibly be made but 
may not be efficiently workable in operation. 
5. Given the disagreement between the wife and the husband in case 3, if all or 
sufficient majority of people in society A share her meme while all or 
sufficient majority of people in society B share his, then marital rape exists as 
problem of life in society A but not in B. Thus the two societies do not share 
the same problem of life of marital rape even if the same objective fact of 
coercive sexual intercourse exists in both societies. 
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The above analysis tells us two things. First, subjective meaning is the inalienable 
part of a problem of life. Objective facts alone, either a human conduct or an event, 
which are neutral and free from any subjective judgment of values, cannot constitute 
the problems of life in the society. It must combine with some subjective memes to 
constitute concrete problems of life. 374 
Secondly, as the law functions as solutions to the problem of life, the problem of 
life is the only factor that directly affects law. Cultural factors, values, beliefs, or other 
memes, can affect law only after they become the constituent of the problem of life. 
Attitudes toward the act of marital coercive sex are the subjective memes that are 
usually referred to as cultural elements concerning marital rape law. To play its role in 
law, these memes first become the subjective constituents of the problem of life called 
marital rape. Once the problem of life contains these cultural elements, they will 
inevitably influence its solution called marital rape law. With this knowledge, one can 
have a better understanding about the current dilemma of Chinese marital rape law. 
The legislation that criminalizes marital rape is only the individual memes of 
legislators. But if the memes are not shared by most people in the society, especially 
those who are involved in the actions of marital coercive sex, then no problems of life 
are actually constituted even though the natural actions exist. Without the existence of 
the problems, the solutions are of course unnecessary and useless. Naturally, current 
marital rape law, even though it is legislated, does not have the chance to operate in 
practice. 
In short, why marital rape law is not working is because marital rape as a problem 
of life exists to the legislators but not to the judges nor to the majority of the society. 
Three conclusions can be arrived from the above analysis: 
First, it is the two constituents together that decide whether valid or not to assume 
that "the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems ".375 Only 
when both of the constituents are the same, can the basic functionalist assumption be 
valid. Otherwise, the assumption is invalid. In chapter 5 I will go on to disclose the 
fallacies that the unreliable assumption has caused to the functionalist methodology of 
comparative law. 
The second conclusion is more important, which is the about the concrete 
mechanism of how memes exert effects on law. Problems of life are the practical 
instruments of memes to affect law. If a meme is to affect law, it must first merge into 
the problem of life to be the subjective constituent of it, which will consequently 
cause the corresponding effects on law as the solution of the problem. With the meme 
as the part of the problem, law as the solution will inevitably be affected by the meme. 
The third conclusion is about the relation between the problem of life and the 
problem of law. Laws are solutions to the problems of life, therefore, when a problem 
of life needs law for its solution, it becomes a problem of law. However, not every 
problem of life needs law for its solution. For example, I have a toothache, and I 
attach to this natural event the subjective meaning of being problematic for my life, so 
it is a problem of life. But it is not necessarily a problem of law because it is more 
likely that I will go to a dentist than a court for the solution. So, problems of law are 
374 Of course, both the two constituents are indispensable for a problem of life. The subjective meme alone, 
without its corresponding objective being, cannot constitute social problems either. For example, if human beings 
had no gender, there would be no existence of sex and there would be no marriage law, divorce law etc. Under 
such circumstances, pure concept of dissolution of marriage alone would also be too abstract to constitute any real 
problems of life, it must combine with certain physical reality to make itself real, to make the combination 
materialized as concrete problems of life, which then trigger the making of the law concerned. 
sus Zweigert and Kotz, p34. 
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definitely problems of life but not all problems of life are problems of law. Only some 
problems of life are problems of law. 
I can describe as the following the difference between the problem of life and the 
problem of law from the perspective of their constituents: 
As long as a natural event is attached a subjective meaning of being problematic 
in any sense of life, they constitute a problem of life. Only if a natural event is 
attached a subjective meaning of being legally p roblematic, can they c onstitute the 
problem of law. However, the same problem of life can possibly be different problems 
of law if understood from different legal perspectives. 
For example in China if a tourist who joins a package tour of a tour agency is 
injured in a traffic accident, he can starts the legal action against the tour agency on 
two different legal grounds, either for tort or for breach of contract. And often he will 
get very different results in compensation. In this case, we have the same problem of 
life, which is the physical injury of the tourist plus the subjective meaning of thinking 
the physical injury is problematic and ought to be compensated. But the more 
specified subjective legal meaning of being problematic can be either because of tort 
or because of breach of contract. And the two different understandings will 
accordingly result in two different problems of law. 
3.3 Analysis with the memetic approach 
3.3.1 Analysis of current cultural environment of Chinese marital 
rape law 
Now I have transformed the concept of general culture into the concept of meme 
and I have also given an even more strict definition of what culture exactly means in 
terms of the marital rape law problem. The key point I have been trying to make is the 
separation of the cultural elements, the non -epistemic memes, from the epistemic 
memes about the natural actions of marital coercive sex. With the separation, I can 
start the concrete analyses of the cultural elements in current Chinese society 
concerning the marital rape problem. 
1. Marital coercive sex as social and legal facts 
Marital coercive sex as epistemic fact is well recognized. People who think such 
acts "do not exist at all" always have the low percentages of less than 10% in all the 
surveys. As it is still pre -cultural, we can see that such an epistemic meme is shared 
by both the opponents and the supporters of the criminalization of marital rape with 
high percentages, with data shown in the table below. 
Percentages of People Who Think Marital Coercive Sex Does not Exist 
Qingdao Shenxian & Pengzhuang Yongxing & Dachang 
6.5% 7.1% 8.5% 
The epistemic cognition of the natural fact alone cannot make it a social problem 
because it is only the neutral and value -free human cognition of the natural world with 
no non -epistemic elements involved to attach meaning to such fact. Though it is 
neutral and pre -cultural, however, as it is common and dominating in the current 
Chinese society, the well recognition of the existence of the fact of marital coercive 
sex lays down the material foundation of a social problem. As long as we locate the 
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non -epistemic memes of the meaning attached to the epistemic memes, we would find 
out its social status: whether the natural actions constitute a problem or not, and, if 
yes, what problem they constitute, ethical, legal or else. 
Question 5 in the Questionnaire is one of the questions that give clear indicators 
of the corresponding meaning -attaching memes. The question has the following four 
choices about the personal opinions of marital coercive sex: 
(1). Now that it is against the wife's will, the action is essentially the crime 
of rape. 
(2). Though it is bad, the action is not illegal because of their legal marriage. 
(3). The action is a kind of domestic violence and whether it is criminal or 
not depends on the specific circumstances or the seriousness of the case. 
(4) Nothing wrong with it 
Among all the four choices, virtually 0% of people take the final choice of 
"nothing wrong with it" while practically all the interviewees think the actions 
problematic one way or another. Therefore, the physical actions of marital coercive 
sex, with subjective meaning attached, become social problems, either ethical, or 
moral or legal. 
Meanwhile, as shown by the results from Question 3 about the means to settle the 
social problems of marital coercive sex, there are quite a number of people who stand 
for legal involvement in the solution. The percentages were 40.2% in Yongxing and 
Dachang villages, 37.6% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, 62% in Qingdao. The memes 
of these groups of people, obviously, attach the meaning to the actions of marital 
coercive sex as legal problems. 
We can, therefore, draw tentative conclusions about the natural actions of 
coercive sex between husband and wife as social actions. As far as shown by the 
memes p resently existing i n C hinese s ociety, t here are t he cultural e lements i n t he 
current Chinese society that tend to make such actions legal problems. But there are 
two points that I need to stress about the conclusion. 
First this conclusion is not based on any dogmas or notions of either the 
traditional Confucian ethics or innate human rights. Instead, this conclusion is based 
entirely on empirical data of individual memes collected in the surveys. Secondly, the 
conclusion makes a clear distinction between the pure epistemic memes and the 
meaning- attaching memes, which, as will be shown in later discussion, is of great 
significance for the memetic approach to culture and law. 
2. The legal nature of marital coercive sex 
As previously shown, there indeed exist the necessary memes to form the 
possible cultural environment for the legal solution of the problem of marital coercive 
sex, especially in the cities like Qingdao where the cultural environment is more 
favourable. However, the data seems to have shown that people who stand for a legal 
solution do not necessarily see marital coercive sex as the crime of rape. 
As the data shows, when people view marital coercive sex as a possible crime, 
they mostly see it as common domestic violence rather than the crime of rape. When 
asked in Question 6 when marital coercive sex should be criminal, 63.3% people in 
Yongxing and Dachang chose "when the wife is physically hurt", and the percentages 
are 60.9% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, 68.5% in Qingdao. In contrast, only 10.1% of 
people in Yongxing and Dachang chose "as long as the wife says no ", and the 
percentages are 11.1% in Qingdao, and as low as 1.1% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang. 
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In relation to marital coercive sex, what current Chinese people most care about is 
the bodily harm caused, not the lack of women's consent to sex, which is essential to 
the concept of rape in modern sense. This is to say, with sufficient memes, there is a 
favourable cultural environment in current China for criminal legal solution of marital 
coercive sex as domestic violence or assault. But there might be no sufficient memes 
to form an favourable cultural environment to criminalize marital coercive sex as 
rape. 
This is confirmed by the answers given to Question 5. Among the four choices, 
apart from the "nothing wrong" one, which was taken by nobody, percentages of 
people taking the first choice of "rape" are particularly low compared with those of 
the choice of "domestic violence ", which are respectively 6.4% in Yongxing and 
Dachang, 6.9% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, and 13.9% in Qingdao. Therefore, 
generally speaking, the existing cultural environment in China is not the one to suit 
the criminalization of marital rape. 
Though memes are not yet sufficient for an favourable cultural environment in 
present China to criminalize marital rape, one of a meme's essential attributes is to 
replicate and spread in the society. I f they find appropriate carriers, memes can be 
very powerful and efficient in permeating a society. Data seems to have shown that, 
though not well spread, memes suitable for the criminalization of marital rape have a 
very good chance of being widely spread in current Chinese society. 
In the surveys, when the interviewees were first asked in Question 5 about their 
own attitudes towards marital coercive sex, few were easily and readily to equate it to 
the crime of rape (see the results previously given). However, when they were later 
confronted with the court's guilty verdict of rape in Question 8, there were prompt 
increases in the percentages of the people who would accept the idea of criminalizing 
marital rape. 
In Yongxing and Dachang, 31.6% of people found the verdict of rape reasonable, 
which is an increase of 25.2% over 6.4% of those who voluntarily took the "rape" 
choice in Question 5. In Shenxian and Pengzhuang, the increase is about20% from 
6.9% to26.8 %. Qingdao even shows a striking increase of almost 56% from 13.9% to 
70.1 %. 
The data show that though most people do not currently have the memes in mind 
adapted to the criminalization of marital rape. However, once they get the information 
from the legal authorities like the courts, many would quickly accept it. This sudden 
change of mind demonstrates the great potential of the relevant memes to quickly 
spread themselves with the appropriate carriers. This is very helpful to form an 
environment suitable for the criminalization of marital rape. 
The above increases take into account only those who took the "reasonable" 
choice in Question 8. There are also a small number of people in Question 8 who took 
not first choice of "reasonable" but the third one, "do not understand the reasons of 
the court but believe they have the reasons there ". Obviously at least some of these 
people would accept the memes of marital rape once they get the explanations from 
appropriate authorities like the courts or other sources they trust in Question 11. 
The existing cultural elements are mostly not so appropriate for the 
criminalization of marital rape. But the cultural environment is presently in the 
process of changing and there is a high chance for a more suitable cultural 
environment to come. 
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3.3.2 Analyses of influence -exerting process of culture upon 
Chinese marital rape law 
Knowing what the cultural elements are like in contemporary China, we must 
now ascertain how the cultural elements exert influences on marital rape law. I will 
analyze the cultural influences on three different objects: legislators, judges, and the 
people. 
1. Legislators 
As shown in chapter 2, the current provisions of Chinese law make marital rape a 
crime. How did such provisions come about? How did the memes criminalizing 
marital rape manage to get the chance to play a role in current Chinese statutes? The 
legislative background may lead us to the answer. 
In the codes of early Qing and before, wives were the complete dependants of 
their husbands, with husbands enjoying the absolute right over their wives.376 Also, 
rape, QTANG JIAN, was extramarital in nature.377 Under such provisions, marital rape 
is, by definition, impossible.378 It was the Revised Qing Code, DA QING XIN XING 
LV, in 1910 that took the first step in Chinese law on the long march to bring women 
equal status, which is essential for the possibility of the concept of marital rape. 
Though the first step seems rather small now, however, by decriminalizing the sexual 
relation of unmarried women with men, DA QING XIN XING LV started to erode 
the absolute inferior status of women that had lasted for thousands of years. 
What caused such a significant legislative change? L egal reforms in late Qing, 
including the making of DA QING XIN XING LV, were mainly the result of 
commissions chaired by Shen Jiaben (1840- 1913).379 Shen Jianben was a nation - 
renowned law scholar at the time. Like many people at his time, facing the survival 
crisis of Chinese nation, he strongly felt the need of reforms of Chinese laws, 
claiming that Chinese people "should refer to the laws of foreign countries and take 
the advantage of their remits for the improvements of Chinese laws ".38° Therefore, in 
all the revisions of codes chaired by him, he firmly adhered to the principle of 
"merging the west into the Chinese ". The revised codes not only imitated western 
laws in both structures and contents, but also followed the legal notions based on the 
innate equality and rights of people.381 So the first step in DA QING XIN XING LV 
to liberate women from the sexual subjugation of men was actually activated by 
western legal cultures. 
Here we see a vivid picture of memes spreading. Some memes traveled from 
western countries and spread into the minds of a small number of individuals in China: 
Mr. Shen Jiaben and his colleagues. After the memes have taken over these 
legislators' minds, the legislators, then, materialized these memes into the codes they 
made, which started the change leading to the concept of marital rape. Therefore, the 
memes did not go through the problems of life to play their role in Chinese legislation. 
They directly traveled through several individuals' mind and became the words of the 
written law. 
Since they are newly come individual memes, they met fierce resistance from the 
exiting memes i n China a t the time. W e see a t ypical b attle between two kinds o f 
376 See Chapter 2. 
377 See Chapter 2. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Wang limin, The History of Chinese Law, p459. 
38° Ibid. p460. 
381 Ibid. 
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opposing memes, which often happens in the process of meme spread. The 
representatives of the conservative objectors were Zhang zhidong and Lao Naixuan, 
who criticized that the Revised Qing Code had actually "corrupted the basic Chinese 
ethics (LI JIAO) ". 382 In particular, they argued, the decriminalization of the adultery 
by unmarried women was against the fundamental principle of the "differences 
between men and women (NAN NV YOU BIE) ".383 Among all the legal reforms in 
late Qing, the making of DA QING XIN XING LV was the most controversial and 
had also taken the longest time to complete. Though they had not taken over the mind 
of most Chinese people, the new legal memes from the west did manage to settle 
down in at least the minds of several Chinese legislators, like Mr. Shen Jiaben. 
Later on, the Criminal Code of the Republic of China in 1928 redefined the 
concept of rape, eliminating its extramarital nature. And the Republican family law in 
1929 prescribed in its General Principle that a woman is an equal "natural person" as 
a man.384 These further prepared the ground for the legislative recognition of marital 
rape as a legal concept. These changes were the results of the legislative principles at 
the time. 
Two principles were followed in the making of both the Criminal and the Civil 
codes by the legislators o f the Republic of China. One is to absorb the 1 atest legal 
theories and legal principles of the western countries, referring also to the concrete 
codes of these countries. The other is to further eliminate the influences of traditional 
Chinese ethics (LI JIAO) on law.385 These two legislative principles clearly tell us that 
the legislators were the carriers of the new memes from the west, determined to help 
the new memes to defeat the old memes in Chinese society. Codes thus made are 
more likely to function to promote the spread of the new individual memes than to 
solve any realistic problems of life. 
Current legislation in the People's Republic of China has criminalized marital 
rape, with continuity from the law of the Republic of China. The continuous 
development of law concerning marital rape is a result of the continuity in legislative 
principle. P rofessor W u C hangzhen, o ne o f t he d rafters o f m arriage 1 áw, s ays t hat, 
since the last years of Qing Dynasty in the end of 19th century, it has always been one 
of the most fundamental principles to modernize the Chinese society by the 
modernization of law.386 Under such a principle, the law will promote the modern 
ideas of gender equality and women's rights and eliminate the feudalist ethics of 
Confucianism in the society.3ß7 Therefore, in the eyes of the legislators, traditional 
cultural elements, like the Confucian family ethics, is not something that the laws they 
make should be based upon; but, rather, something that they should make the laws 
damage. 
So, the brief legislative history provides a clear map of how the memes of the 
current legislative criminalization of marital rape have come about. We can see three 
characteristics of the development of the legislative memes. 
First, the statutes are the result of the spread of western memes in China. The 
beginning of modern Chinese criminal law starts at the end of 19th century under the 
great pressure from the Western legal culture by means of directly transplanting or 
382 Ibid. p463. 
383 Ibid. 
384 See chapter 2. 
385 Xie Zhendong, The Legislative History of the Republic of China, vol. 2, China Politics and Law University 
Press, 2000, p756; Wang Limin, The History of Chinese Law, China Finance and Economy Press, 2001, p515, 
p517.. 
386 Wu Changzhen, Marriage Law and Me, Law Press, 2001, p6. 
387 Ibid. p7. 
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borrowing many of western legal elements.388 And the so- called modernization of 
Chinese law is in fact a process of westernization, this process has been a continual 
one in the last one hundred years.389 Many of the substantial changes from traditional 
Chinese laws originally came from pure western legal principles and notions. And the 
legislative criminalization of marital rape is just one of them. Though the legislation is 
materialized from memes in the minds of Chinese individual, the legislators, we can 
always trace the spread of the memes back to western countries where they 
originated.390 
Secondly, the spread of the memes of marital rape has, by and large, been 
confined to the minds of a small number of legislators. This may be because it is 
rather easier for the memes to infect a small number of individuals, the lawmakers, 
than all the people in society. Besides, the lawmakers themselves are eager to borrow 
western legal memes. And this provides a very favourable environment for the memes 
of marital rape to occupy successfully the mind of Chinese lawmakers. Also, the 
legislative criminalization of marital rape, which marks the final success of the spread 
of the memes, is just a simple process of materializing some individual memes into 
written language. This is also much easier for memes to guide people's actual 
attitudes t owards the a ctions o f m arital coercive s ex. F or these reasons, i t i s m uch 
easier for the memes of the criminalization of marital rape to spread themselves 
around legislators. 
Finally, the memes of current legislative criminalization of marital rape are got by 
the Chinese legislators not from the observation of the wide -spread memes in realistic 
Chinese society. Instead, legislators ignored, c onsciously or unconsciously, the live 
memes in current society concerning the facts o f m arital coercive sex, and impose 
their personally preferred memes on the code. This manifestation of an ignorance of 
reality can be proved by either the judicial inconsistency with the statutes or the 
surveys in rural areas. 
Briefly, the memes of marital rape exert their influence on legislators not through 
the problem of life, the proper channel that they ought to go through. Instead, the 
memes do so through pure memetic replication in the minds of the individual 
legislators. This is to say, cultural elements in the current Chinese legislation of 
marital rape does not seek to address something that is deemed by contemporary 
society to be problematic. Without responding to an actual social problem, the 
legislation is only the materialization of simple personal memes of the lawmakers. 
2. Judges 
Judicial decisions of the court are also the individual memes of the judges. 
Whether the judicial decisions are following the legislation or not depends on whether 
or not the legislative memes have taken over the minds of the judges. Legislative 
memes' domination i n judges' minds i s w hat usually happens i n the codified 1 egal 
systems. Unfortunately this does not seem to be what is happening in China in terms 
of marital rape law. 
Indeed the legislative memes have taken over the minds of some judges, like 
those in the recent Ping case in Shanxi in 2001. But these are in a minority. While 
legislation criminalizes marital rape, empirical data shows that most of the judicial 
decisions firmly stick with the "no rape in marriage" principle. This is evident from 
388 Li Xiandong, From DA QING LV LI to the Civil Code of the Republic of China, China People's Police 




the results of the majority of the cases in the Table of Cases in the previous chapter, as 
well as from the case comments by the Supreme People's Court on Wang and Bai 
cases.391 This means that the minds of most judges in China are still armed with the 
traditional memes that decriminalize marital rape. 
Why so? The answer given in the comments on Wang Weiming case by the 
Supreme People's Court is: "it is because of the widely- accepted ethics ".392 So it is 
because the judges think the traditional ethics are widely accepted in society that they 
decide to take the side of the ethics and pay the prices of the inconsistency with the 
code. Wang 's case is not the only one. In Wu 's case in Sichuan, the judge, Long 
Chifang, conceded that the defendant had committed the legislative crime of rape, 
however, "thinking about the traditional ethics that people commonly hold about 
husband and wife ", the defendant was not convicted. The psychology here of the 
judges can be well described by the doctrine of the partial supporters of the 
criminalization of marital rape, who think, though marital rape ought to be 
criminalized, unfortunately,, "thinking of the actual conditions of our country, where 
traditional ethics are still deeply rooted in people's mind ", we'd better not do it 
now.393 Clearly, the legislative memes have already got into many judges' mind, but 
another meme, the belief that traditional ethics are still dominating, greatly weakens 
the power of the legislative meme. 
While the judges yield to the belief that most people are still loyal to the 
traditional ethics, data has shown that the people are actually ready to accept the new 
memes from the judges about marital rape. Take Qingdao for example, only 13.9% of 
people voluntarily take the choice of recognizing marital rape in Question 5 in the 
survey, however, when they are faced in Question 8 with the conviction of the 
husband's raping his wife, over 70% chose to accept it. The increase is as much as 
56 %, which is a very good demonstration of how powerful judges can be in spreading 
the legislative memes among the communities which are presently dominated by 
traditional ethical memes. 
We see an interesting paradox here. Judges could have been very efficient 
spreaders of the legislative memes but they are now actually the helpers of the 
counter -legislative memes. However, the reason that judges fail to work as the 
spreaders of the legislative memes, as they ought to, is because the judges think there 
are too many people who have not yet accepted them. Such a situation ought to be 
reversed. This is because for any normal legal system judges ought to be the carriers 
or spreaders of the legislative memes. This legislative /judicial consistency is essential 
to any legal system. The second reason we must convert the judges is that once they 
are converted, they could be the most powerful spreaders of the legislative memes. 
Such a conversion of the judges is easy to achieve. The tip is to weaken the 
memes weakening the power of the legislative memes in the judges' mind. The 
memes we need to weaken are the worries caused by the belief in the dominating 
status of the traditional ethics in current Chinese society. Specifically we could 
weaken such a belief by bringing another meme to the judges, which is the awareness 
that, though the traditional memes are indeed currently widespread in the society, the 
minds of most common people are now ready to accept from the judges different 
memes about marital rape problem. Thus, judges do not have to accept the traditional 
391 No. 1 Criminal Division, Supreme People's Court: Reference for. Criminal Trial, vol.3 in 1999 and vol. 2 in 
2000, 
392 Ibid. 
393 Fu Liqing, "Marital Rape Should Wait - -- Between To Be and Ought To Be ", Cases and Judicial Interpretations of 
Criminal Law, vol. 4, p416. Or the website: chinalawinfo .com/xin /disxwpl.asp ?code =129 &mark =1504 (2002/2/11). 
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memes just because they are currently widespread. And the conversion could be 
achieved. The legislative memes would take over the judges and let them play a much 
helpful role in the further spread of the memes criminalizing marital rape in the whole 
society. 
However, instead of promoting the legislative memes, judges are presently 
working as enemies of legislative memes and allies of traditional memes. With the 
traditional memes in mind, marital coercive sex does not constitute the same problem 
of law to the judges as would be the case if the judges were subject to the legislative 
memes. With the different problems there, the judges certainly find the solution 
offered by the legislation improper. Unsurprisingly, the legislation of marital rape 
becomes ineffective. 
3. The people 
The above discussions about legislators and the judges seem to have explained 
from the legislative and judicial perspective how cultural elements resulted in the 
failure of current Chinese marital rape law. Now I will take a broader view to see how 
cultural elements work among the ordinary people to contribute to the failure of 
current Chinese marital rape law. Results of Question 5 in the survey confirm the 
current widespread of the traditional ethical memes among the people. In order 
understand how these ethical memes work to influence marital rape law, I will take 
the advantage of the concept of the problem of life, the influence -exerting mechanism, 
to explain my interpretation. 
I make these observations from the following three perspectives: 
(1) No problems of life constituted 
For t hose i ndividuals, who think s ex i s the wife's duty t o the husband, a wife 
should fulfil the duty even if she does not feel like it. Therefore, on the occasions that 
the wife resists the husband's sexual demands, it is alright for him to use force. To 
these people, marital coercive sex is not a problem at all but just a normal part of 
marriage life. 
This "unproblematic" meme, once combined with the natural conduct of marital 
coercive sex, does not constitute a problem of life. And, according to Zweigert and 
Kötz, laws are just solutions to problems of life. As long as the problem of life does 
not exist, naturally, there would be no such a legal problem either. So, this type of 
meme does not make marital coercive sex a problem of law, let alone a crime. 
The concrete process in which these memes work is by taking over the mind of 
the victims, the wives. When a wife with this type of meme suffers from her 
husband's coercive s ex, she may feel t he physical and p sychological hurt; b ut, she 
will just grin and bear it. She is unlikely to complain because the memes have 
successfully prevented her from turning the hurts into complaints. The memes have 
attached to the actions of her husband the meaning that "it happens between husband 
and wife and it is normal ". 
Surveys have shown that there are a large number of females with this view in 
current society, especially in rural areas. 
ender * sex and marriage Crosstabulation in Yongxing and Dachan 
sex is the necessary result of marriagesex isn't the necessary duty, refusable 
male 41.1% 58.9% 
female 33.3% 66.7% 
gender * sex and marriage Crosstabulation in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
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sex is the necessary result of marriagesex isn't the necessary duty, refusable 
male 48.5% 51.5% 
female 54.2% 45.8% 
ender * sex and marriage Crosstabulation in Qingdao 
sex is the necessary result of marriage sex isn't the necessary duty,refusable 
male 26.8% 73.2% 
female 42.3% 57.7% 
33.3% of the females interviewed in Yongxing and Dachang think sex is the 
necessar duty of marriage while the percentages are 54.2% in Shenxian and 
Pengzhuang, 42.3% in Qingdao respectively. Females with these memes are not likely 
to feel their legal rights have been infringed by their husband's coercive actions. 
Therefore, if these women suffer marital coercive sex, law will never know about the 
happenings. In this case, marital rape law is just in vain: actions of marital rape are 
happening but the victims refuse to use the law. And according to the data, there could 
be 33.3% to 54.2% of the actual happenings of the actions of marital rape to which 
marital rape law would possibly never be enforced. 
(2) Circumvent the Law: Non -legal solutions 
There are, however, many people who think marital coercive sex is a problem of 
life one way or another. In Question 5, 48% of the people in Yongxing and Dachang 
think that it is not illegal but at the same time feel that "it is not good ". The 
percentages are 57.5% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, 7.4% in Qingdao. We see a 
sharp difference here between rural areas and the cities. With as little as 7.4% of 
people having the memes of taking marital coercive sex as "not illegal" but "not 
good ", this type of memes will not have much influences in cities like Qingdao. But 
special attention does need to be paid to these memes in rural areas. 
With these memes, marital coercive sex does constitute a problem of life. It can 
be a moral problem, or a ethical problem or merely a minor problem between husband 
and wife in everyday family life. Whatever it is, moral or any other, the meaning 
attached by this type of meme to marital coercive sex is not as a legal problem. This 
consequently decides the preferred solutions to such problems. 60% of people in 
Yongxing and Dachang would like to take the non -legal solutions to the problem, 
either between the husband and wife or within the family. The percentage is 63% in 
Shenxian and Pengzhuang. The consequence is circumvention of marital rape law. 
The concrete process of how the memes work is also by taking over the mind the 
female victims. 
ender * nature of the action Crosstabulation in Yongxing and Dachan 
it is the crime of 
rape,without her consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not good 
common domestic 
violence,circumstances decides 
male 10.3% 41.1% 48.6% 
female 1.3% 58.8% 40.0% 
ender * means of dispute settlement Crosstabulation in Yongxing and Dachan 
it's personal privacy that needs 
no external interference 
settle within family before 
senior members but not in 
court 
go to the court if 
necessary 
male 54.2% 5.6% 40.2% 
female 46.9% 13.6% 39.5% 
gender * nature of the action Crosstabulation in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
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it is the crime of 
rape,without her consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not good 
common domestic 
violence,circumstances decides 
male 12.1% 42.4% 45.5% 
female 3.9% 64.7% 31.4% 
gender * means of dispute settlement Crosstabulation in Shenxian and Pengzhuan 
it's personal privacy that needs 
no external interference 
settle within family before 
senior members but not in 
court 
go to the court if 
necessary 
male 51.5% 6.1% 42.4% 
female 46.0% 18.0% 36.0% 
In Yongxing and Dachang, 58.8% of the females interviewed think marital 
coercive sex as a problem is "not illegal ". 60.5% of the females prefer the non -legal 
solutions to this problem. In Shenxian and Pengzhuang, 64.7% of the females 
interviewed consider marital coercive sex as "not illegal" and 64% of the females 
prefer the non -legal solutions to this problem. According to the data, in the current 
society, when marital coercive sex occurs, more than half of the possible victims 
would likely to choose some non -legal rather than legal remedies. 
(3) Circumventing the Law: Tolerance 
Now I will investigate the memetic influences upon the wives who do consider 
marital rape is a problem of law and are ready to seek legal solutions. This third type 
of meme contributing to the failure of current marital rape law can be observed from 
Question 7 in the questionnaire about people's attitudes towards the wives who charge 
their husbands of rape. 
In Yongxing and Dachang, 17.6% of the people interviewed think she is absurd 
and another 1 1.2% sympathize the husband, the sum o f w hick m akes up to n early 
30 %. Correspondingly, in Shenxian and Pengzhuang, the percentage is as high as 
17.2% + 27.6% ° 44.8 %. People who take one of the two choices tend to be 
unfriendly to those victims of marital rape who pursue legal remedies. Thus, the 
above percentages mean an unfriendly social environment to such victims, and this 
unfriendly environment also contribute to the failure of current Chinese marital rape 
law. 
By adopting the memetic approach, we can consider the operation of marital rape 
law from an individual, rather than a general, perspective. We therefore have the 
chance to put ourselves into the position of the individual victim. Seeking a legal 
solution is seeking legal protections. Naturally she would think about what she could 
get from law and what it costs her. Legal remedy for marital rape is supposed to 
punish the offender, giving protection to the victim. But it has some side effects under 
traditional memes observed in Question 7. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, under such traditional memes, the victim 
will pay extra cost if she chooses legal remedy. This means the temporary 
compensation by official marital rape law would probably be cancelled out by a 
greater harm in the future. All of these are because, when using the official law, the 
woman has broken the "folk law ", which is in fact the traditional memes. 
So, even if the current marital rape law is effectively enforced in judicial practice, 
it does not necessarily guarantee the achievement of marital law's purpose to protect 
the victims. The disjunction between the law and the traditional memes raises the cost 
of legal remedy and makes the law fall short of the promised protection. Not being 
able to able to offer the protection expected by the victims is one failure of the marital 
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rape law. And the extra costs of legal actions may even keep some of the victims who 
hope to seek for legal protections from really doing so. They will eventually choose 
the option of tolerance. This is another failure of marital rape law. 
However, all the costs or failures are not from the law itself but from the 
unfavourable memetic environment, in which the modem marital rape law operates. 
Given a more suitable m emetic environment, w here people would not consider the 
charge of marital rape as something unacceptable, the antagonism of the community 
would not exist. Without antagonism, extra costs for legal remedy would also 
disappear. 
To overcome this third cause of the failure of marital rape law, therefore, it is far 
from enough for legislative memes to just take over the mind of the judges. As this 
failure results from unfavourable memes spread out in the society, only when the 
legislative memes have taken over the mind of most individuals, can modem marital 
rape law provide better protection to the victims. 
The case of law circumvention by tolerance also has its explanation from the 
perspective of the problem of life. In this case, the victim does have the subjective 
meaning to attach to the natural action of marital coercive sex to constitute a legal 
problem of marital rape. However, she also realizes that people around her have 
different understandings of the action of marital coercive sex. She also realizes the 
negative reactions this different understanding will elicit from the people around if 
she activates a legal action for the marital coercive sex. Naturally she can be clearly 
aware of the harms these reactions would cause to her. Consequently, another 
problem of life to the victim is constituted by the reaction of the people around 
together with the victim's subjective awareness of the reaction's being harmful. 
Then the victim has two problems of life which are related to each other. The first 
problem of life is based on the action of marital coercive sex while the second 
problem of life is activated by her action of making the first problem of life a problem 
of law. Often under the traditional ethical circumstances, the victim has the subjective 
feelings of greater pain in the second than the first problem of life.394 In order to avoid 
the greater pain, it would be quite understandable for her to eliminate the activation of 
the second problem of life, which is to seek legal remedy for the first problem of life. 
As a result she would choose to tolerate the relatively smaller pain in the first problem 
of life. 
4. Conclusions 
Though the law are the individual memes of the lawmakers, it should be the 
memes that the lawmakers get from those contained in the problems of life not those 
got directly from books or high -class notions and theories. Unfortunately, the 
legislative background shows that the current Chinese marital rape law is the latter. 
Empirical data shows that, in the minds of the people, there are no sufficient new 
memes to attach the meaning to the actions of marital coercive sex to constitute the 
crime of rape. Traditional memes with their remaining power prevent the constitution 
of marital rape as a problem of law to the people in general. 
Judges, standing between the legislation and the realistic life, have both the 
opposing memes in mind. They are presently the crucial targets for both of the memes 
to win in the battle. 
3" See Suli, The Rule of Law and its Local Resources, China Politics and Law Press, 1996, p23. 
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3.3.3 Further analysis: spread of the memes 
The above analyses have shown significance of memes to the effective operation 
of marital rape law. So we will carry on with further analysis about the spread of 
memes to find out what is the most efficient way to develop the favourable memetic 
environment for the marital rape law. 
According to the answers to Question 11, different carriers have different powers 
in spreading the memes of marital rape. Judges and lawyers are taken by 70% to over 
80% people in both the cities and the rural areas as the most trustworthy people for 
their opinions about marital rape problem. This shows the judges and lawyers with 
their authority in people's eyes can grant the memes of marital rape special power to 
win the victory over the traditional memes. Accordingly, the explicit criminalization 
of marital rape in the cases settled in the courts will be efficient in making the people 
accept the concept of marital rape. 
Statistics of Question 12 shows that there are always over half of the people in 
rural area who have never heard of the term "marital rape" (50.3% in Yongxing and 
Dachang, 56.3% in Shenxian and Pengzhuang). In the cities there percentages are 
much lower (19.4% in Qingdao). This conforms to the contrast in the attitudes 
towards to marital rape law in the rural and urban areas. If one has no chance to get in 
contact with a meme, naturally, it is impossible for him/her to accept the meme. 
Therefore, more chance to get in contact with the memes of marital rape seems 
another means of spreading them. 
Specifically, more writings or discussions about the topic of marital rape in public 
media, 1 ike n ewspapers and m agazines, t elevision and t he Internet, w ill b e h elpful. 
Especially if judges and lawyers express in the writings and discussions their opinions 
for the criminalization of martial rape, with their authority, it will further improve the 
efficiency. 
3.3.4 Conclusions 
After all the analysis, I can now draw the conclusions obtained by the memetic 
approach about marital rape law problem in China. 
1. Different description of the cultural environment 
For the cultural environment of the marital rape law, the memetic approach draws 
attention to the existing dominance in people's mind of the memes decriminalizing 
marital rape especially in the rural areas. However, the memetic approach also notices 
the difference between the cities and the countryside: the dominance of memes 
decriminalizing marital r ape i s remarkable i n the rural areas w hile i n the cities the 
dominance is less evident and the memes criminalizing marital rape are about to win 
over. 
The memetic approach has also noticed that the existing dominance of the memes 
decriminalizing marital rape is not absolute and unchangeable but is right in the 
process of changing. And the establishment of the dominance of the legislative memes 
that criminalize marital rape is not quite difficult if appropriate measures are taken. 
Even in the rural areas, many people are against the actions of marital rape and 
support legal solutions of such problems. Though most people are not currently 
regarding actions of marital coercive sex as the crime of rape, however, they are quite 
ready to accept the new explanations from the legal authorities. And all these provide 
fertile soil and a promising future for the acceptance of the memes criminalizing 
marital rape. The memetic approach therefore finds a much more favourable cultural 
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environment for marital rape law than that claimed by the opponents of the 
criminalization of marital rape with the general culture approach. 
2 Memetic proposals to legal practice 
The memetic approach also gives to legal practices different advices from those 
by the general culture approach. 
(1) Legislation 
To the legislators, the memetic approach will advise that special legislation for 
marital rape is not necessary. There are two reasons for the advice. 
First, the existing provisions already criminalize marital rape. Any special 
legislation is just superfluous repetitions. 
Secondly, people supporting the special legislation for marital rape claim that it 
will help with the problem of the ineffectiveness of the current marital rape law; but 
this is not true. The above memetic analyses ought to have shown us that the causes 
for the ineffectiveness of current marital rape law lie not in the statutory law but in the 
cultural environment in which the law operates. Without changes of the cultural 
environment, special legislation for marital rape means nothing but some more 
wastepaper in wastebasket. 
(2) Judicial Practice 
To the judges, the memetic approach suggests that they should follow the 
principle of criminalization, rather than decriminalization, of marital rape. There are 
three reasons for the suggestion. 
First, the criminalization of marital rape is consistent with the legislation. In any 
normal codified legal system, judges ought to follow the code. Yet at present in 
China, in terms of marital rape law, inconsistency between legislation and judicial 
practices has been occurring in most of the cases. And this inconsistency is 
reprehensible and should be eliminated. 
Secondly, the reason for the courts deciding to adhere to the principle of "no rape 
in marriage" is not valid. Why "no rape in marriage" is adhered to as a principle in 
judicial practice, according to the Supreme Court, is because the traditional memes 
decriminalizing marital rape remain absolutely dominant in current society. The 
courts worry that the criminalization of marital rape cannot be accepted by society and 
thus will arouse strong negative reactions. 
However, the empirical studies above have shown cultural environment for 
marital rape law is not as antagonistic as anticipated. Even in the conservative rural 
areas, t hough t raditional m emes a re i ndeed enjoying d ominance i n p eople's minds, 
there are already a number of people who have accepted the concept of marital rape. 
Besides, if the courts make decisions in favour of the criminalization of marital rape, 
most of the people with traditional memes are also ready to accept the different new 
memes from the legal authorities. All theses mean that the worries of the judges, 
which lead to the adherence of marital exemption of rape, are not necessary. 
Finally, if the courts start to criminalize marital rape in practice, it will be an 
extremely great help to the further spread of the legislative memes. As previously 
said, instead of fierce resistance, the memes criminalizing marital rape delivered from 
the courts will be much more easily accepted by people. With the acceptance of the 
people around, more people will feel easier to accept the legislative memes and the 
whole memetic environment will change, more quickly, to adapt to the effective 
operation of marital rape law. 
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How, then, to make the judges follow the memes of the criminalization of marital 
rape? Judicial commentary seems to be helpful tool. In China, the Supreme Court, and 
the Supreme Procuratorate as well, has the power to give commentaries or 
interpretations on the specific legal problem in judicial practices, to give 
interpretations on legal provisions, to answer the questions raised by local courts. 
These commentaries and interpretations are usually c alled judicial commentaries or 
interpretations, which have the binding force of law. 395 Judicial commentary has 
been proved to be an active and efficient role in making up for the insufficiency of the 
legislation and unifying the judicial activities. In judicial practice in China today, 
judicial interpretation response to problem in practices promptly, guiding the judges 
in their judicial activities.396 With the advantages, judicial commentary can be an 
efficient tool to convert the judges to the criminalization of marital rape. 
The judicial interpretation could be made as follows: 
1. Clarify that, according to the Criminal Law, the subject of the crime of rape 
are general subjects, making clear that, as a principle, a husband can be the 
subject of the crime of rape against his wife. 
2. Make clear that "no trial without complaint" principle is applied in a marital 
rape case and the wife can withdraw her complaint within a certain period 
of time. 
The second point of interpretation aims to provide better protection to the victims 
of marital rape, which is also the purpose of marital rape law per se. Empirical data 
has shown there are still traditional ethical elements in the current Chinese society, 
which decide, as a matter of fact, that legal actions are not always the best way for the 
victims of marital rape to protect themselves. With the second point, the law gives the 
victims the chance to seek what they think by their own judgment is the best 
protection. 
Such a proposal, is more flexible than the partial cirminalization of marital rape, 
which criminalizes the marital rape only under fixed circumstances of separation, 
divorce proceeding or null marriage. It is true that, as the collected cases have shown, 
marriages involved in most of marital rape cases are not in the normal subsisting state. 
But such rigid prescriptions cannot protect the victims in the possible cases with 
legally normal marriage state. With its flexibility, the memetic proposal can expand 
the range of legal protection to the victims of marital rape that occurs when the 
involved marriage has no legal flaws. 
Another reason why the memetic proposal is better than the rigid partial 
criminalization lies in its ability to maintain a rigorous definition of the concept of 
rape. By criminalizing marital rape under some special circumstances, the consistency 
of the c oncept of r ape in general has actually b een damaged. It becomes uncertain 
when an action is rape and when it is not. Thus, logically speaking, we would no 
longer b e able t o d efine the g eneral c oncept o f rape w ith the 1 ack o f consent. T he 
memetic proposal does not have this problem. It does not need to change the 
substantial concept of rape because what it proposes is procedural. So the memetic 
proposal is much better at maintaining the logical consistency of the general concept 
of rape. 
Also, when the cultural environment in China has changed to be appropriate for 
the complete criminalization of marital rape, the rigid conditional criminalization 
prescribed will have to be changed again so as to cover the marital rape cases in 
395 Zhang Zhiming, "Study of Legal Interpretation Problems in Contemporary China ", Problems of Legal 
Interpretation, edited by Liang Zhiping, Law Press, 1998, p220. 
396 Ibid. 
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normal marriage and bring marital rape back to the standard concept of rape in 
general. 
In contrast, the memetic proposal will deal with the change of cultural 
environment in a different way. The law is not the only constraint to regulate human 
behaviours i n t he w orld. H uman b ehaviours are also r egulated b y t he c onstraint o f 
nature, which requires that one do certain things whether one wants to or not; the 
constraints of nature that demand, for example, that when one, steps off a cliff, he 
will fall. 397 
With the case of marital rape, we can also see the constraint of nature. Memes are 
also beings of the nature. Prior to legal constraints, many human actions are already 
regulated by the constraints of memes. Why do most marital rape cases involve 
abnormal m arriages? T his i s b ecause for husbands and w ives i n m arriages t hat are 
usually thought to be normal and stable, when marital rape occurs, the wives generally 
will not complain. Wives might have different reasoning for not complaining: it might 
be the love for husbands, which makes them rather tolerate; it might also be the 
ethical memes in mind that they should not complain even if they personally do not 
like it. Whatever the reasons might be, it is certain memes in her mind that stop her 
from complaining. And we could see it as constrain of nature as long as we see 
memes a s b eings o f n ature. S imilarly, w hen t he c ultural e nvironment h as c hanged, 
there will be no more memes to make the victims retract their complaints and the 
second point of the proposal in the judicial interpretation will automatically stop being 
enforced. This is also the constraint of nature. 
The constraint of nature makes even clearer the fallacy of an argument of the 
people against the criminalization of marital rape. With the general culture approach, 
the opponents assume that traditional family ethics are dominating the current society. 
And the traditional ethics highly value the stability and harmony of marriage. They 
then go on to argue that if marital rape is criminalized, wives can accuse their husband 
of rape for a common action of coercive sex. This will inevitably cause the instability 
of marriage and will therefore be unacceptable by the society dominated with 
traditional values of stable marriages. 
Such an argument is obviously illogical. If the current society is really dominated 
by the traditional ethics as claimed, then people in the society will have the memes 
that do not attach a problematic meaning to the marital coercive sex. And with the 
constraint of nature, wives will therefore not complain. So even if the criminalization 
of marital rape is introduced in the statutes, it will be ineffective and the normal 
marriages will accordingly not be affected. 
If normal marriages are really damaged or introduced by the criminalization of 
marital rape, then it means that wives will complain about their husbands' coercive 
sex. This means that people are not necessarily dominated with the memes of the 
traditional ethics. And this is against the premise of the above argument. So, in either 
way of reasoning, such an argument is always in the dilemma of self -contradiction. 
Conclusively, this constraint of nature tells us it is not necessary for the 
opponents to worry about that the criminalization of marital rape, if applied in current 
China, will damage the stable and normal marriages. 
397 Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, p2, Cordell Hull Speakers Forum. 
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Chapter 4 Ma.Rita. Rape ha the UK - -- a 
supporting case 
It is now widely agreed in the western world that marital rape is a crime But, for 
quite a long period of time in history, criminal laws in the west generally excluded 
marital coercive sex from the crime of rape, like the 1871 Federal Germany Criminal 
Code,398 the US Model Penal Code,399 and other western laws.40° 
Modern law, however, takes a different approach. Art. 177 of the 1998 German 
Criminal Code abolished the "extramarital" character of rape and therefore recognized 
marital rape as a crime.401 In the American case Mario Liberta in 1984, Judge 
Wachtler from Court of Appeals of New York said: "To ever imply consent to such an 
act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has 
never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on 
demand. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a 
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right 
to control her own body as does an unmarried woman"402: On July 5th 1993, North 
Carolina became the last state in the US to abolish the exemption of marital rape. 
If we look back at the historical backgrounds and the social conditions at the time 
when the problem of marital rape arose, we will see more than a pure legal problem 
but an obvious cultural element in it. In this chapter, we will focus mainly on England 
and Scotland as examples for rather detailed study to see whether the memetic 
approach I d eveloped for C hina i s s uitable for t hese UK j urisdictions, w hich are a 
very different culture. If successful, it means that my proposed approach has the 
capacity to surmont the cultural differences and be applied in different legal systems. 
This would be of great help to the construction of Chinese marital rape law when 
using western laws for reference and would also offer a probable methodological 
improvement for culture and law studies in general. 
398 "Article 177 Rape: 1.Anybody who by force or threat of immediate bodily harm forces a woman to submit to 
extra- marital sexual intercourse or who misuses a woman for extra- marital sexual intercourse ..." The German 
Penal Code of 1871, trans. Gerhard O. W. Mueller and Thomas Buergenthal, Sweet & Maxwell Limited. London, 
1961, p103. 
99 
"§ 213.1. Rape and Related Offenses. 
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with.a female not his wife is guilty of rape if: 
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or 
kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or ..." Model Penal Code. http: / /uk.westlaw.com/ 
400 For example, The Austrian Penal Act (1852 and 1945 as amended to 1965): "Section 125. He who by dangerous 
threats, actually exercised violence or by fraudulently induced stupor, renders a female unable to resist him and 
misuses her while in this condition for extramarital intercourse commits the felony of rape." Trans. Emeritus 
Norbert D. West and Samuel I. Shuman, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 1966, p63. 
401German Penal Code, (Chinese Version), China Legality Press, 1999, p69. 
402People v Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152 (1984). 
122 
4.1 Marital rape in the UK 
4.1.1 Brief Legal history of marital rape in the UK 
Traditionally in England, there was a marital exemption of rape. In 1763, the 
English jurist, Lord Hale wrote: "[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed 
by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract 
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot 
retract "403 This point of view had been accepted by most, though not all, judges in 
England as a basic principle, according to which a husband had the right to force his 
wife to have sex with him without committing the crime of rape. The Parliament also 
perpetuated this marital exemption of rape. 
Section 1 of the " Sexual Offences Act 1956 " provided: 
"(1) It is felony for a man to rape a woman. 
(2) A man who induces a married woman to have sexual intercourse with him by 
impersonating her husband commits rape. " 404 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s.1 gave a more explicit definition of 
rape: 
"1. - --(1) For the purpose of section I of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (which 
relates to rape) a man commits rape if : 
a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the 
intercourse does not consent to it ; and 
b) at that time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or is reckless 
as to whether she consents to it. 405 
According to this definition, the unlawfulness of the sexual intercourse is essential 
to the crime of rape. And the word "unlawful" here, under the old common law 
interpretation, is understood as "extramarital ", with which, correspondingly, the crime 
of rape referring only to the sexual intercourse outside marriage. Therefore, the Act 
allowed the marital exemption for rape. 
However, though the marital exemption of rape in the statutory law seems to stay 
stable and unchanged, case law, on the other hand, has evolved. Hale's golden rule, 
according to Owen J., has been eroded by custom throughout the passage of time.406 
As early as 1888, it has been doubted in R. V. Clearance407 by some of the judges 
hearing the case.408 The year of 1949 saw the first recorded prosecution of a husband 
for the rape of his wife.409 In this R. v Clarke case, a separation order had been made 
before the actions of the defendant. The order contained a provision that the wife was 
no longer bound to c ohabit with her husband. B yrne J. held that such a separation 
order had the effect of revoking the consent which the wife, by process of law, 
namely, by marriage, had given to the husband to exercise the marital right during 
4 °3 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, ch. 58, 1736, p629. 
4°4 Current Law Statutes, General Editor John Burke, Sweet & Maxwell, Stevens & Sons, W. Green & Son, 1956, 
69/1. 
405 'Current Law'Statutes, Sweet & Maxwell, Stevens & Sons, W. Green & Son, 1976, 82/1. 
406 
R v R [1991] 3 WLR 770. 
407 R. v Clarence (1888) 22 Q. B. D. 23, C. C. R. 
408 RuR[1991]3 WLR 772. 
409 
R. v Clarke [1949] 2 All E. R. 448; 33 Cr. App. R. 216, C.C.A. 
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such time as the ordinary relations created by the marriage subsist between them. This 
might be seen as the beginning of the erosion on the marital exemption of rape by 
finding certain circumstances in which wife can revoke her consent that used to be 
thought irrevocable. 
In R. v. Miller410, there was no separation order on which a revocation of consent 
could be based. Lynskey J affirmed the existence of the exemption and the husband 
was acquitted of raping his wife. However, this cases, as well as a number of other 
cases, can be seen as already limiting the ambit of the exemption by examining when 
the implied consent is revoked.411 Later, in R. v. Steele412 the Court of Appeal held 
that, other than by court order, revocation could also be express agreement between 
the p arties. In 1990, O wen J. at Leicester Crown C ourt added, b esides the express 
agreement between the parties, further circumstances in which consent could be 
revoked. This is either by an implied agreement between the parties or by a unilateral 
withdrawal from co- habitation with a clear indication that consent had been 
revoked.413 
Clearly there has been here a gradual whittling away of the exemption. Eventually 
in R. v. C.414 1990, Simon Brown J. followed the Scottish case of Stallard v. H. M 
Advocate415 and decided the marital exemption no longer exists: "In my judgment, the 
position in law today, as already declared in Scotland, that there is no marital 
exemption to the law of rape ".416 
In this referred Scottish case, which took the lead in recognizing marital rape, 
David Johnston Stallard was charged with rape of his wife while the couple were still 
living together. At trial, the judge rejected a preliminary submission by the defence 
that, by the law of Scotland, a husband was not amenable to a charge of rape of his 
wife while they were still cohabiting. The accused accordingly appealed to the High 
Court on this preliminary issue. The High Court dismissed the appeal and rejected the 
suggestion that they were creating any new crime. The Lord Justice General said: 
"Rape has always been essentially a crime of violence and indeed no more than an 
aggravated assault ". The law of Scotland already protected a wife from assault by her 
husband where that assault was accompanied by "gross indecencies ".417 
Finally, the explicit abolition of marital exemption of rape in England occurred in 
1992, marked by the decision of case R v. R. The defendant in the case married his 
wife in 1984. As a result of matrimonial difficulties the wife left the matrimonial 
home in 1989 and returned to live with her parents, informing the defendant of her 
intention to petition for divorce. The defendant also communicated to the wife his 
intention to "see about a divorce." While the wife was staying at her parents' house, 
the defendant forced his way in and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, in 
the course of which he assaulted her. He was charged on indictment with rape and 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The judge rejected his submission that by 
virtue of section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, the offence of 
rape was one which was not known to the law where the defendant was the husband 
of the alleged victim. He thereupon pleaded guilty to attempted rape and assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm and was convicted. On the defendant's appeal against 
41° 
R. v Miller [1954] 2 Q. B. 282. 
41 R. v Miller [1954] 2 Q. B. 282; [1954] 2 W. L. R. 138; [1954] 2 All E. R. 529. 
412 
R. v Steele (1976) 65 Cr. App.R. 22 
413RuR[1991]3 WLR767. 
414 
R. v C (1990) 140 N. L. J. 1497 
415 
S. u H. M. Advocate, 1989, S. L. T. 469. 
416 
S. u H. M. Advocate, New Law Journal, 1990, vol.140, p1498. 
417 
S. u H. M. Advocate, 1989, S. L. T. 469. 
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his conviction of attempted rape, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed 
the appeal, for that the marital exemption of rape "no longer even remotely represents 
what is the true position of a wife in present -day society ".418 
On October 13, 1991, the House of Lord considered the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal and held that there was no longer a rule of law that a wife was deemed to have 
consented irrevocably to sexual intercourse with her husband; and that, therefore, a 
husband could be convicted of the rape or attempted rape of his wife where she had 
withdrawn her consent to sexual intercourse; that section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976 did not give statutory recognition to and perpetuate the 
former rule; and that, accordingly, the defendant's conviction would be upheld 419 In 
considering the case, Lord Keith concluded that the word "unlawful" in section 1(1) 
of the Act of 1976 is mere surplusage and should be ignored.42° 
Following the decision of the House of Lords the case was taken to the European 
Court of Human Rights under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.421 But the ECHR finally concluded that "there was no reason to disagree with 
the national courts' conclusion that marital rape was not excluded from the definition 
of rape in s.l of the 1976 Act as the term "unlawful" contained therein was 
superfluous. The national courts' decisions did not violate Art.7 as they continued a 
perceptible evolution of case law, which had reached the stage, at the date of the 
applicants' actions, where they (husbands) could have been found guilty of rape 
(against their wives) ".422 
The R. v. R. case was of historical significance. Because of the case, the English 
Law Commission began to study the legal problems about marital rape and a report 
was published in 1990 suggesting the complete abolition, of the notion of marital 
consent and the marital exemption for rape:423 
"... there are no valid reasons for distinguishing between non -consensual sexual 
intercourse within marriage on the one hand; and, on the other hand, non -consensual 
sexual intercourse between parties who are not married, or who are married but are 
subject to one of the circumstances that at present bring such conduct within the crime 
of rape. "424 Thus, "The Commission's provisional conclusion, on which it seeks 
comment, is therefore that the present marital immunity in rape should be abolished in 
all cases. "425 
In R. v. R. Lord Keith also suggested: 
"... one of the most important changes is that marriage is in modern times 
regarded as a partnership of equals, and no longer one in which the wife must be the 
subservient chattel of the husband. Hale's proposition involves that by marriage a wife 
418 R. v R. [1991] 2 All E. R. 257. 
419Ry.R[1991]3WLR767. 
42oRv.R[1991] 
3 WLR 776. 
421 "Article 7 (1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed..... (2) 
This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time 
when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ". 
European Convention on Human Rights, Collected Texts, 7th Edition, Strasbourg, January 1971, p5. 
422 (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 363, SW v. United Kingdom, Before the European Court of Human Rights, 22 November 
1995. 
423 The Law Commission(1990), Rape Within Marriage, Working Paper No. 116. 
424 Ibid. 5.1, p83 
425 Ibid. 5.2, p83. 
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gives her irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband under all 
circumstances and irrespective o f t he state o f h er health o r how s he h appens to be 
feeling at the time. In modern times any reasonable person must regard that 
conception as quite unacceptable. "426 
And the support of the case R v. R verdict by the European Court of Human Rights 
brought a thorough change to the social attitude towards marital rape in England or 
even the whole western society. In the new definition of rape in 1956 Act 
Amendment, the word "unlawful" was deleted and therefore approved the conclusion 
of R v. R. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 Chapter 33 s 142 Rape of 
women and men provides: 
"For section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (rape of a woman) there shall be 
substituted the following section- - 
"1.-- Rape of woman or man. 
(1) It is an offence for a man to rape a woman or another man. 
(2) A man commits rape if -- 
(a) he has sexual intercourse with a person (whether vaginal or anal) who at the 
time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and 
(b) at the time he knows that the person. does not consent to the intercourse or is 
reckless as to whether that person consents to it. "427 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides: 
"1. Rape 
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if - -- 
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with 
his penis, 
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and 
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. ,A428 
4.1.2 Cultural elements behind 
I Individual memes as the decisive role 
When people talk about the English marital exemption of rape, Lord Hale's well - 
known remarks are always quoted as the source of its legal validity. However, Lord 
Hale merely stated his opinion but gave no further or more fundamental legal 
authority to explain why, "by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract ", the 
wife "hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband" and she cannot retract the 
consent given. 
As Lord Hale cited no sound legal authority for his statement, what, then, gave his 
statement the legal validity and made it such a widely applied legal principle? 
"It has been widely asserted that Sir Matthew Hale was the first English lawyer to 
hold that a husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife by force cannot be 
convicted of rape. He may have been the first text writer to mention the point, but we 
may doubt whether he were the first to hold this opinion, for in medieval England, as 
elsewhere in Europe, the obligations of matrimony were governed by the law of the 
church ". So the principle he stated in his History of the Pleas of the Crown "would 
426 
R v R [1991] 3 WLR 770. 
427 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Current Law Statutes, Sweet & Maxwell, W Green, c 33, 33/142. 
428 Sexual Offences Act 2003, Current Law Statutes, Sweet & Maxwell, W. Green, c 42, 42/1. 
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hardly have seemed novel to .a contemporary ecclesiastical lawyer, and we may doubt 
whether it would have seemed novel to a common lawyer. It is improbable, at least, 
that he invented it from simple misogyny ",429 
From these long quotations, we see that Lord Hale was confident with the validity 
of his statement because it was already a common belief at his time which was easily 
derived from the even more common belief of people in the society at the time, the 
religious belief of women's affiliated status to men in marriage. As a person believes 
a belief, the belief is certainly valid to him. And the necessary derivations from the 
belief are accordingly also valid to him. Therefore, Lord Hale's statement as a valid 
legal principle got its validity from the beliefs of people, or from the memes of the 
individuals in the society at the time. 
The obligations of matrimony at the time, as Barton observes, were governed by 
the law of the church. It should be reasonable to infer the close connection between 
the common memes of women's affiliated status in marriage and the religion of 
Christianity, given the fact that Christianity at Lord Hale's time was widely accepted 
in English society.43° "Importantly, the existence of any spousal exemption indicates 
an acceptance of the archaic understanding that wives are the property of their 
husbands and the marriage contract is an entitlement to sex. "431 The understanding 
that wives are the property of their husbands may sound archaic today but it once was 
the most undoubted truth in people's mind. "..., she shall be called Woman, because 
she was taken out of Man. "432 Woman is derived from man because she is just a rib of 
man. Was anything more authoritative than the Bible at that time in the Christian 
cultures? It was superior to any authority that could be cited from any legal literature 
because the Bible worked as the cornerstone of the memes of the whole society and 
the whole civilization, in which legal ideas were just a minor part. 
Therefore, behind the same marital rape exemption principle of western 
jurisdictions, like England, is the sound social memetic foundation to support the 
marital exemption for rape: the idea of women's affiliated status, which was greatly 
consolidated by Christian religion and turned out to be a part of western tradition 
which had enjoyed thousands of years history and which remained dominant until 
recently. 
Lord H ale did n of h ave t o w orry t hat h e h ad n o authority t o c ite; the c ommon 
sense, the well- accepted idea of women's subservient status, was the best authority 
that Lord Hale had. Though the authority is not a legal one, it was this authority that 
gave Lord Hale's notion of marital rape exemption the self -evident status as the 
mathematical axiom has. 
Clearly the marital exemption of rape as a legal principle in the past in England 
established itself on the ground of the individual memes in the society at the time. 
What about the current legal principle of the criminalization of martial rape? Can we 
also find the role of the non -legal memes of the current human individuals in 
establishing the current legal principle? I will try to find the answer from the reasons 
given by the judges for the criminalization of marital rape. 
429 
J. L. Barton, "The Stoìy of Marital Rape ", Law Quarterly Review, 1992, 108(Apr), 261 -262. 
439 However, it is important to notice, as I will demonstrate later, that Lord Hale's statement as a valid legal 
principle was not derived directly from the book of the Bible but from the realistic beliefs people held in their mind 
in the real life. Only after the Biblical notions of Christianity had already become the realistic memes in human 
mind, did they have the power to grant the validity to Lord Hale's statement as a legal principle. 
431 Raquel Kennedy Bergen, Marital Rape, March 1999. 
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432 Chapter2 -23, Genesis, from The Holy Bible, Revised Standard version. 
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On the appeal by the defendant of the case R. v. R., the court held that "there was 
no longer a rule of law that a wife was deemed to have consented irrevocably to 
sexual intercourse with her husband ". With the phrase "no longer ", the court actually 
admitted two things. First they admitted that the rule used to exist in the past, which 
means the admission of the validity of marital exemption of at Lord Hale's time. 
Secondly, they admitted there was a change to the rules concerning the problem of 
marital r ape, w hich i nvalidated Lord H ale's p rinciple o f m arital e xemption o f r ape 
and validates the current approach of the criminalization of marital rape. As the 
European Court of Human Rights has stated, a perceptible evolution of case law "had 
reached the stage, at the dates of the applicants' actions, where they could have been 
found guilty of rape ".433 
But why? How has the case law about marital rape so evolved? According to Lord 
Keith, the reason for the legal change lies in the more general changes in people's 
ideas about marriage and women's status: "one of the most important changes is that 
marriage is in modern times regarded as a partnership of equals, and no longer one in 
which the wife must be the subservient chattel of the husband ". That is, obviously, the 
change o f m arital r ape 1 aw has resulted from the change i n people's m emes about 
marriage in general. In Hale's time, people generally agreed that by marriage a wife 
gives her irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband under all 
circumstances. Today, however, people would find such a conception totally 
"unacceptable ".434 Instead, modern people generally take husbands and wives as equal 
partners, each of which enjoy their own independent rights and personalities. Such a 
change in memes about marriage is substantial and dramatic, and it is this change that 
caused the changes in law establishing the current criminalization of marital rape. 
The number of people holding the modern memes about marriage and the status of 
women are not few. As Lord Keith said, "In modern times any reasonable person 
must regard that conception as quite unacceptable" 435 "Any reasonable person" 
literally refers to most, if not all, people in society. Therefore, it is the wide - 
acceptance by most individuals in modern English society of the non -legal memes of 
the equal status and rights of women in marriage that establishes the legal principle of 
the criminalization of marital rape. 
Conclusively, for both marital exemption of rape and the criminalization of 
marital rape in England, what plays the decisive role behind are always certain wide 
spread memes in the society, which work as the general meme- complexes to derive 
the specific memes of marital rape or marital exemption of rape on the concrete 
problem of life. 
We can see in the Scottish cases the same activator to drive the change from the 
exemption to the criminalization of marital rape. In the early 1800s, Baron Hume 
stated in his Commentaries that a husband "cannot himself commit a rape on his wife, 
who has surrendered her person to him in that sort".436 The statement was followed by 
the judges till the very recent cases.437 
433 R v R [1991] 3 WLR 767. 
434 R v R [1991 ] 3 WLR 770. Also: "... the abandonment of the unacceptable idea of a marital exemption from 
rape conformed with a civilized concept of marriage and with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, the 
very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom." See: SW v United Kingdom, CR v 
United Kingdom, 21 E.H.R.R.363, p402. 
436 R v R [1991] 3 WLR 767 
436 Hume D., Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes, vol. 1, The Law Society of Scotland, 1986, 
p306. 
37 See H.M. Advocate v Duffy, 1983 S. L. T., 7; H.M. Advocate v Paxton, 1985, S. L. T. 96; 
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Advocate v. Duffy in 1982 is the first attempt in Scotland that a husband was 
indicted for the rape of his wife.438 In the case the accused and the complainer were 
husband and wife but they w ere living apart at the time of the alleged action. The 
court held that "The common law must take contemporary attitudes and mores into 
account ", finding that in modern times it is quite illogical and unreasonable to think 
that a husband cannot rape his wife.439 However, instead of explicitly challenge the 
authority of Baron Hume, the court recognized his authority but held that Hume must 
have been dealing with the situation where husband and wife were living together, not 
the situation where they were living apart.44° Similarly, in Advocate v. Paxton in 1984, 
the involved parties were also living separately, but the separation had lasted only a 
matter of weeks and the parties still met regularly for social outings.441 The court 
again recognized that a man cannot be guilty of raping his wife "who has surrendered 
here person to him that sort", but held where it is admitted that the parties are de facto 
separated, not living at bed and board and the wife has withdrawn herself from the 
society of her husband then she could not be said to have "surrendered her person" 
and the ordinary law of rape would apply.442 
But in the Scottish case of Stallard in 1989, judges explicitly claimed that they 
were no longer bound by Baron Hume's statements about husbands' immunity. The 
court took as the activations of the change also the social change in the ideas about 
women's status in family. 
The reason given for the husband's supposed immunity in 18th and early 19th 
century, said the court, was, according to Hume, because the wife had "surrender her 
person" to her husband "in that sort".443 By the second half of the 20th century, 
however, according to the court, the status of women and the status of a married 
woman have changed dramatically. A husband and wife are now for all practical 
purposes "equal partners ".444 Thus, it could not still be seriously maintained that by 
marriage a wife consents irrevocably to intercourse in all circumstances, including 
intercourses obtained by force. "Any such consent is revocable, and revocation is a 
question of fact in all the circumstances, not a matter of legal fiction ".445 Therefore, it 
is the factual non -legal memes about women's status in family that exploited the 
validity of the exemption principle, promoting the evolution of rape law from the 
complete exemption, through the partial criminalization, to the complete 
criminalization of marital rape today. 
Along with the gradual changes of case law, we can see a vivid picture of memetic 
struggle behind: the new memes of women's rights grow stronger, prevailing over the 
old ethical memes. The balance of power between the two groups of memes decides 
the course of the development of marital rape law. So here is something identical to 
what we have seen in China: non -legal memes working as the social foundation for 
the actual operation of marital rape law in all the three stages of exemption, transition 
and criminalization. 
2 Influence -exerting mechanism: the problem of life 
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But, how do these non -legal memes manage to infiltrate into the realm of law? 
What mechanism lies there in between for the memetic infiltration? 
In Lord Hale's England and Baron Hume's Scotland, the common memes in the 
society took marriage as the mark of the irrevocable consent wives gave to husbands. 
Therefore, when marital coercive sex occurred, people at that time did not see it as the 
same as the coercive sex between men and women with no marital relationships, 
which was generally defined as rape. So, at the sociological level, marital coercive sex 
as was not perceived at the time to be the problem of rape. Since the problem of rape 
did not exist here, there would of course have been no law necessary to remedy the 
problem. 
Here we see a same influence -exerting mechanism as that we found in China. The 
same natural actions of marital coercive sex, as those in China, also existed in 
England at Hale's time and Scotland at Hume's time. However, the common memes 
at t he t ime a ttached t o s uch a ctions t he m eaning t hat w as d ifferent from w hat w as 
attached to the actions of rape. Accordingly, with the lack of the constituent of the 
subjective meaning, marital rape as a problem of life could not have been constituted. 
Without the problem of life, as Zweigert and Kötz say, correspondingly, there would 
be no such a problem of law. That is, marital rape at the time was not at all a legal 
problem and surely there would have been no marital rape law either. 
Modern notions of seeing husbands and wives as equal and independent persons 
see no differences between the marital coercive sex and coercive sex between men 
and women without marital relations. Therefore, modem memes in English and 
Scottish societies attach the same meaning to marital coercive sex as they do to the 
actions defined as rape. With such a subjective meaning combined with the natural 
action of marital coercive sex, marital rape as a problem of life is constituted. When 
people seek legal solutions for this problem of life, marital coercive sex is legally 
criminalized as rape and a marital rape law appears accordingly. 
So it is the problem of life that works as the mechanism for memes in England 
and Scotland to exert influences on law in case of both marital exemption of rape and 
marital rape. Such an influence -exerting mechanism exists only in the realistic social 
environment not in any books or theories. This realistic mechanism shows that, even 
if the Christian memes s upported the marital exemption of rape, the support is not 
derived directly from t he b ook o f Bible. Only when t he m emes h ave o ccupied t he 
mind of human individuals and become live memes in a social environment, can they 
have really performed their function. 
3 Achieving changes in law 
As we have seen above, when the judges decided R v. R, the English statutes still 
explicitly prescribed the marital exemption of rape. The inconsistency between 
statutory law and judicial practices were obvious. At the time, though almost 
everybody agreed that the law ought to be reformed, however, there were still 
controversies about whether the change ought to be done through parliament or 
through the courts. M. Giles commented that "the Courts have gone beyond the 
bounds of their legitimate law- making powers ", arguing that "it is clear that justice is 
best served by statutory law". 446 In the Scottish case Stallard, Counsel for the 
appellant also used the point, arguing that the law on this matter of marital exemption 
of rape was so firmly established that only Parliament should change it.447 
446 Marianne Giles, "Judicial Law -making in the Criminal Courts: the Case of Marital Rape ", Criminal Law 
Review, 1992, June, p407. 
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However, despite all the controversies, the fact was that the English judges made 
the decisions that substantially conflicted with the statutes. The actual development of 
marital rape was first carried out not by the legislature but by the judges. This may be, 
according to Giles, something advantageous of the judge made law. "The advantages 
of judge made law in this kind of case are obvious ", observed Giles, "It enables 
development of the law to take place in accordance with changing social conditions 
and attitudes. It enables `justice' to be done in an individual case, and in other similar 
cases coming before the courts. Its effect is immediate and specific ".448 
Giles seems to imply that England could be said to be lucky to be a case law 
country. Case laws are judge -made laws. Judges are the people who deal with the real 
cases all the time, trying to extract the law from the precedents. Precedents and cases 
are actually slices of social realities, they are the true problems of life. Legislators are 
lawmakers but not law practitioners while judges in case law systems are both. Once 
they m ake a 1 aw t hey can apply i t i mmediately to a p roblem o f l ife t hat w aits for 
solution. Therefore judges might be more sensitive to changes in social environment, 
and make quicker reactions in law to such changes in life. And in the developing 
social environment, case law may have a better chance to reveal law's dynamic 
nature, giving a better chance to law's gradual and continuous development. 
Whether or not we agree with Giles' comments on the advantages of English case 
law, that is what has factually happened with marital rape in England. Judges dealing 
with the case R. v. R. found that the memetic conditions in the English society had 
dramatically changed from those in Lord Hale's time. They found that an action that 
had not been thought legally problematic by old memes ought now to be regarded as 
rape by the non -legal memes commonly shared by people in current English society. 
With the new memes, a new social problem of marital rape appeared to them asking 
for a legal solution. And a new law was therefore found by them to solve the new 
problem of life of marital rape. This is why judges in case R. v. R. could add their 
gloss to the statutes that the word "unlawful" in section 1(1) of the Act of 1976 is 
mere surplusage and should be ignored 449 And this is how marital rape law came into 
existence in England. 
There are of course people arguing that judge made law has equally obvious 
disadvantages. They claim that the judge made law is either consciously or 
subconsciously a reflection to a certain extent of the judge's own personal 
interpretation of social values at the specific time and place, which may or may not be 
accurate and may or may not reflect legitimate cause for changing the law. As they 
put it, such cases often display "result reasoning ".45° 
However, despite the alleged disadvantages, it is the fact that the criminalization 
of marital rape was first achieved in England by the judges before the statutes did. All 
this happened because of the "changing social conditions and attitudes ". We have to 
be impressed with the powerful influence of memes upon law. 
Continuity is supposed to be important to the law and case law has its essential 
principle of ratio decidendi. However, once the "social conditions and attitudes ", or 
the well accepted memes, change, all the hitherto important principles seemed to be 
forgotten and the law inevitably changed accordingly. 
448 Marianne Giles, `Judicial Law -making in the Criminal Courts: the Case of Marital Rape ", Criminal Law 
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English authors argued against the illegitimacy of judge's power to criminalize 
marital rape before the parliament. However, with the "dramatically" changed social 
memes, all those rational lawmaking processes seemed to be skipped. 
Here, the law seems to have become the puppets of the memes, totally losing its 
basic principles and its expected rationality. In terms of lawmaking, it seems no 
longer that human beings are using social values as tools to make law but that the 
memes are using human beings as tools to change law. 
4 Spread of the legal memes 
As previously shown, the judges in England were driven on the way to 
criminalize marital rape because of the wide acceptance of the corresponding memes 
in the society. However, the corresponding memes were not marital rape itself but the 
basic notions of women's rights. It is these basic notions and the related memes that 
foiiii a so- called meme- complex (Refer to Chapter Three), and the meme of marital 
rape per se is just one meme in this complex. 
But the acceptance of the basic notions of women's rights in the meme- complex 
doesn't necessarily mean the specific meme of marital rape has also been well 
accepted. Many people may have already had in mind the basic principles of women's 
rights, but still they may not have the concrete meme of marital rape. This might be 
because some people have not personally experienced, or have never heard of or 
thought of, such a problem. This might also be because some people may be under the 
influences of both women's rights notion and traditional family ethics. These people 
may have accepted the women's rights as basic principles, however, when they run 
into the concrete problem of coercive sex within marriage, they might still have the 
remaining influences of traditional ethics. Thus it is not likely for them to have the 
standard meme of marital rape in mind. 
At this time, judges make their own individual interpretation of the basic social 
values, which are the accepted notions of women's rights, and apply it to the concrete 
problem of marital coercive sex in the cases they are hearing. Then they arrive at the 
conclusion of the criminalization of marital rape. Thus, such a conclusion, when it is 
first arrived a t, m ight h ave b een o my t he i ndividual m eme o f a few j udges, which 
might not be yet accepted by the majority of the society. Like other memes, it also 
needs time to spread. 
Theoretically, with law's nature as individual memes of lawmakers, when the 
judges find a new law for the first time, the memes may not well shared by the 
majority of the people. Therefore, in case law countries, judges as lawmakers as well 
as law practitioners may sometime also function as meme spreaders. It is a pity that I 
cannot g o b ack i n t ime to c onduct s urveys i n England w hen m arital r ape w as first 
criminalized. So I don't have the empirical data so detailed and precise as I have 
about China to prove the memetic condition in the English society at the time. But I 
do be able to draw a most likely picture of the English society at the time from the 
indirect empirical evidences available. 
During my research, I didn't find much writings in the UK arguing against the 
criminalization of marital rape. This might show that, when marital rape was first 
criminalized, the necessary background memes had been better accepted by the law 
people in the UK than that in the present China. However, law people, though very 
important, are only a small community. The evidences about the whole society should 
be more important. 
These important evidences are the transitional cases. The transitional cases in 
England before R. v. R, where marital rape was criminalized only under certain 
132 
f 
special circumstances, may also evidence the gradual process of the spread of the 
marital rape memes. At the very beginning the complete concept of marital rape was 
not accepted by the judges as well. But they did feel the urge by such a meme and that 
might be why they managed to find circumstances under which the hitherto 
irrevocable consent of wives to sex could be revoked, thus limiting the marital 
exemption of rape. Gradually more and more circumstances where wives' consent to 
sex can be revoked were added till the final complete criminalization of marital rape. 
Here we see a typical process of a meme, the concept of marital rape, appear, spread 
and finally accepted. 
Both the first and the second evidences have been previously seen in China as 
well. From this we may be able to conclude that it was quite likely there was a similar 
process of memetic replication in the UK as it is in present China before the complete 
criminalization of marital rape. 
4.1.3 Conclusions 
Concerned memes, or cultural elements, about women's status, are the ultimate 
source of validity for both the past marital exemption of rape and the current marital 
rape law in England and Scotland. Just like China, we also find an inconsistency in 
England between statute and case law in terms of marital rape. This inconsistency is 
also due to the role played by cultural elements, and the inconsistency is also the 
direct reflection of cultural elements' decisive effects on law. 
When these cultural elements exert their influences on law, they do it through the 
mechanism of problems of life as we have discussed in the Chinese case. We find that 
the dual constituent structure of this mechanism also work in England and Scotland. 
With this mechanism and other theories of memetics, we can explain the phenomena 
of the development of English and Scottish marital rape laws, just as we did with 
Chinese marital rape in the previous chapters. 
4.2 Comparative conclusions and their universality 
We have now observed the evolution of marital rape laws in China and the UK as 
well as the role played by cultural elements in it. We find that these evolutionary 
processes have differences as well as resemblances. 
4.2.1 Resemblances and differences 
The first resemblance is that in both China and the UK there seems to be a 
common stage when the criminalization of marital rape was only the individual 
memes of the minorities, the law people, against the memes of the majorities, the lay 
people. 
In China, as we have seen, the criminalization of marital rape is still, by and 
large, the result of the individual memes of the legislators, which are not yet well 
accepted by the majority of people in contemporary Chinese society. In contrast, 
though basic notions of innate women's rights, as memes native to the West, may be 
more widely accepted in the countries of England and Scotland than in China, 
concrete applications of the basic notions upon the specific law problem of marital 
rape, however, also faced the challenges of traditional family ethics just as in China. 
Dominated by basic notions of women's rights, the court hearing concrete marital 
rape cases may have derived from the notions the convictions in these specific cases. 
But such criminalization of marital rape was only in the ad hoc case by case style, and 
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it often needed some extra circumstances of the cases. The early marital rape cases in 
either China or England, which needed abnormal marital status for the convictions, 
were good examples of the kind. Such a criminalization of marital rape is, therefore, 
partial and incomplete. At this stage in the west, the criminalization of marital rape 
was still individual memes of the judges (or plus jury members) as well, which were 
not yet well accepted by the majority of the societies either. 
From this results the second resemblance of gradualness. As in the early stages, 
the c riminalization o f m arital r ape w as t he i ndividual m emes of a few 1 aw p eople, 
these memes, naturally, took time to spread themselves to the mind of more people. 
Such a m eme- spreading p rocess r eflected i tself in t he r ealm o f p ositive 1 aw as t he 
gradual process for the legal changes to take place. This resemblance lies not only in 
necessary transitional period for the general non -legal memes about women's rights to 
become the legal memes of marital rape law but also in the changes within the 
positive laws. Usually, in the first stage, only cases with abnormal marital conditions, 
such as separation, legal proceedings for divorce, void or voidable marriage, etc, can 
result in a conviction for the defendant. Then gradually comes the full recognition that 
a man c an be g uilty of r aping his wife while the couple are still under t he normal 
marital conditions. Such gradualness in the final establishment of standard concept of 
marital rape seems common to both China and the UK. 
Resulted from the first resemblance is also the third resemblance which lies in the 
conflict between the statutes and judicial practices, shared by China and England. In 
China, judicial practices are conflicting against the statutes by sticking with the 
traditional principle of marital exemption of rape, while in England judicial practices 
conflicted against the statutes by criminalizing marital rape before legislation did so. 
Apart from the resemblances, we also see differences between China and the UK. 
One difference, as already shown above, is that in China the legislation the step 
ahead of judicial practices to criminalize marital rape, while things went just the other 
way round in the England. In England it was the judicial practices that criminalized 
marital rape before the statutes did. So in terms of the criminalization of marital rape, 
Chinese judicial practices lag behind legislation while western legislation lags behind 
judicial practices. 
The second difference is the general meme- complexes in the societies as a whole 
for the specific meme of marital rape. From Chapter Three, we know that, for the sake 
of successful replication, memes sometimes need to co -exist to form meme- 
complexes in the same kind of way as co- adapted gene- complexes. One important 
effect of a m eme- complex i s t hat a m eme d epends, o n t he e xistence o f s ome other 
memes in its complex to survive. The criminalization of marital rape is derived from 
the idea of women's innate rights, which originated in the West in the recent 
centuries. Here we find a meme- complex, which could be generally named as 
women's rights notion, with the meme of marital rape as just a single common meme 
in this complex. 
As the modern women's rights notion originated in the West, the meme complex 
therefore is more native like to the western countries of England and Scotland than in 
China. If I could take the Occident as a whole, in which England and Scotland are 
included, in contrast to the Orient as a foreign civilization, in which China is included, 
then t he o rigin o f t he n on -legal m emes a bout women's r ights a nd gender e quality, 
which are fundamental to marital rape law, is native to the Occidental countries. And 
the first criminalization in the English cases, as shown previously, were developed by 
the judges out of these more fundamental memes in the complex. The judges held that 
these fundamental memes had been already widely accepted in the English societies 
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as basic principles of life. This means that the criminalization of marital rape in the 
west had in advance a fairly appropriate memetic environment with the necessary 
complex generally accepted in the societies as basic principles. 
In China, the case is different. Either the legal memes of marital rape, like the 
legislation, or the non -legal memes about women's equal rights, which work as the 
social source of the legal memes, are of foreign origin Though an individual might 
get from his own personal experiences the idea of protecting wives from their 
husbands, the power of traditional ethics remains strong. This means the systematic 
and theoretical meme -complex, which is necessary for the criminalization of marital 
rape, is not as well accepted by Chinese individuals as it had been in England and 
Scotland before the first criminalization of marital rape there. So, in terms of the 
necessary meme -complex, marital rape faces different social environment in China 
from that in the UK. 
4.2.2 Common core 
However, beneath all the resemblances and differences, I find the common core 
which is substantial to culture -law relation in both the societies above, Chinese and 
the UK. This common core exhibits itself in the following aspects. 
1. T he d ecisive effects of n on -legal m emes, o r cultural e lements, upon law are 
common to both the societies above. The decisive effect can include that the memes 
work as the ultimate source of the validity of marital rape law, and that the memes 
work as the realistic motive power to promote the reform of positive law to 
criminalize marital rape. In both China and England, the decisive effects are displayed 
in the ineffectiveness of the statutes. 
The current Chinese legislation that criminalizes marital rape are the memes 
borrowed from the foreign soil by the legislators. The Chinese judges don't find these 
memes are widely accepted, and Chinese society therefore presently lacks sufficient 
memes from on which the legislation can derive validity. This is why the legislation 
that has actually criminalized marital rape doesn't have the validity that the law 
should have. In contrast, since there are sufficient authorizing memes of marital 
exemption of rape in the current social environment, there is in fact a valid rule of "no 
rape in marriage" in current society, customary instead of statutory. Hence the 
inconsistency between the statutes and the judicial practices in China. 
In England, since the judges found sufficient memes in the social reality to grant 
validity to the rule of marital rape, therefore, even the statutes in force were couched 
in terms of outdated perceptions and judicial practices created a new rule which has 
the factual validity granted by the memes: hence the inconsistency between the 
statutes and the judicial practices in England, which promoted the later reform of the 
statutes. 
2. It is common to all the societies that the memes must enjoy a sufficiently wide 
acceptance to have the capacity to play an effective role. Chinese society lacks the 
memes granting validity to the rule of marital rape, but this is not to say that there is 
no such memes at all in the contemporary Chinese society. Current Chinese society 
does have such memes, and the statutes are examples of them. The problem is that the 
memes are not accepted by a sufficient number of people and the weak authority 
results in the statutes' ineffectiveness. In contrast, when the rule of marital rape was 
applied by the courts in England and Scotland, it did not necessarily mean that there 
were no memes of marital exemption of rape at all. There were probably people who 
continue to be i nfluenced b y the traditional i deas. Therefore w e c annot completely 
exclude t he p ossibility o f t aw circumvention i n t he UK as w e h ave s een i n C hina. 
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Although a `sufficiently' wide acceptance of the memes cannot be precisely or 
quantatively measured, they must influence a majority of individuals for them to play 
their role effectively in law. It is because of the necessary prerequisite of wide 
acceptance that memes have to take time to achieve that the gradual process is 
inevitable for the effective marital rape law to be finally established. 
3. It is common to all societies that only live memes can have a role to play. By 
live m emes, I m ean the m emes t hat are factually accepted i nto human m ind r ather 
than those in the unread books and the contentious theories. In current China, even if 
each person had one copy of the statutes criminalizing marital rape, marital rape law 
could not be effectively functioning as long as people refuse to accept or even read 
them. In the western countries of England and Scotland, even if everyone had a copy 
of the Holy Bible, they would not return to the marital exemption of rape as long as 
the people do not agree with the biblical ideas of women's affiliated status to men. 
4. The problem of life, as the influence -exerting mechanism to bridge up memes, 
the mental beings, and law, the realistic social being, are also the most essential 
commonness between Chinese and the British societies in how cultural elements make 
an impact on law. 
My definition of problem of life owes a lot to the concept of normative 
"meaning ". And it is from this concept of meaning that I have developed my 
understanding of the inner dichotomy structure of the problem of life. With this 
dichotomy, the concept of the problem of life has actually contained in it what are 
usually called cultural elements. Thus this concept can be trans -cultural. That is why it 
explains the evolution of marital rape not only in China but also in the. UK. In fact it 
explains the evolution of the crime of rape in general. 
4.2.3 Reinterpretation of the evolution of rape in general 
England has a long case law tradition, but it was not until 1976 that rape was 
defined for the first time in legislation. The statute was the Sexual Offenses Act 1976 
as mentioned above. From the title of the Act, Sexual Offenses, we see that rape as a 
legal problem was categorized here according to only its objective part, or the natural 
action of coercive sex, which, in memetic terms, is the epistemic memes about rape. 
Such a categorization therefore cannot reveal rape's subjective part, that is, the non- 
epistemic memes that people have about the problem of rape. It was this subjective 
part, or the attached meaning, makes the problem of rape social and, consequently, 
legal. 
However, most codified traditions seem to adopt a different categorization of rape. 
In China, the 1928 Criminal Law put rape in the chapter of Offences against 
Morals.451 In Italy, rape was also under the title of Crimes Against Public Morality 
and Decency in 1930 penal code.452 Actually, most countries, prior to the 1970s, 
categorized rape as an offense against morality or good customs.453 
Under such categorization, though the natural action of rape is the human conduct 
of c oercive s ex, t he s exual a ction i tself i s n of what i s c onsidered t he key element. 
Instead, it is the object that the action infringes, or the object the law of rape protects, 
that is considered as the standard for such statutory categorization. Rape is not seen 
only as a pure natural action of coercive sex but as a complexity with some a non- 
451 Major Laws of the Republic of China (LIU FA QUAN SHU). See Major Laws of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan, Magnificent Publishing Co. Tainan, 1991, p1091. 
452 The Italian Penal Code, trans. Edward M. Wise, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 1978, p177. 
4" Cai Daotong, p504. 
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epistemic meaning attached. And the meaning is that the action is against good 
customs or public morality. 
But with other chapters in these penal codes about crimes against the person or 
personal rights, where the crime of rape was not included, we can therefore see that, 
under this categorization, rape is thought to be against good customs or public 
morality rather than the women's rights of sexual self -determination. Accordingly 
women under such a law of rape are only the object of the natural coercive sexual 
action but not that of the rape action in the legal sense. 
However, the chapter in which the crime of rape was categorized soon changed. 
In the 1979 criminal law of People's Republic of China, rape was moved to the 
chapter of the crimes against personal rights.454 In Italy, a legal reform in 1996 moved 
sexual offences from "crimes against public morality and decency" to the "crimes 
against the person ", marking the legislator's new definition of the object of the crime 
of rape.455 
Such changes are not just the simple changes of the places that the crime of rape 
was written in the codes. Since the standard for the categorization of crimes in these 
codes is the objects that the criminal actions infringe, changes in the chapters in which 
rape is categorized are therefore the changes in the interests that people think the 
action of rape infringes, which are in fact the subjective meaning the people attached 
to the action of rape as a problem of law. With the subjective meaning changed, 
though the same natural action of coercive sex remains, the same natural action 
constitutes d ifferent p roblems u nder d ifferent c odes: i n t he e arlier codes t he action 
constitute the problems of public morality and good customs while in the modern 
codes it constitutes a problem of the infringement of personal rights, which are 
already substantially different crimes. Obviously, this rape is already not that rape. 
With the law working as a solution to the problem of life, the substantial change 
of rape as a legal problem is just the reflection of the change of rape as a problem of 
life. And the two- constituent structure of the problems of life (and of law) is always 
the important for the understanding of such a transformation between the two. 
The above change in the substantial content of rape, which is from a crime 
against moral to a crime against personal rights, is not the only one in the evolution of 
the crime of rape. According one study, "from the perspective of historical analysis, 
the object of the legal protection against the crime of rape has experienced three 
stages of development: from `the protection of the personal possessions of men' to 
`the protection of public morality and good customs', and then to `the protection of 
women's rights of sexual self -determination "'.456 If so, the change I discussed above 
is only the development from the second to the third stage. A look into the first stage 
may give us deeper impression about the substantial changes in the nature of the 
crime of rape.457 
In China, for example, the mortgage of wife in Qing Dynasty is an example of 
women as men's possessions. Under such circumstances, the legal victim of rape is a 
man instead of a women, the owner or possessor of the woman. Though, as a matter 
of fact, the natural action of coercive sex does physically harm the woman, but, as a 
matter of law, the crime of rape infringes the rights of the owner or possessor of the 
454 The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, 1979. See http: / /www.chinalawinfo.com 
455 Law n. 66 in 15 February 1996 moved the crime of rape from "Crimes Against Public Morality and Decency" 
to "Crimes Against Personal Liberty", marking the redefinition of the objects that the crimes infringes. See 
Foreword in CODICE PENALE ITALIANO (Chinese version), translated by Huang Feng, China Politics and Law 
University Press, 1998, p40. 
456 Cai daotong, p504. 
457 Rape in DA QING LV LI is a good example of the first stage. 
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woman. Corresponding to this legal definition of the crime of rape is the subjective 
meaning that people attached to rape as a problem of life. As women are just the 
possessions of men, when someone damages property of another, it is the legal rights 
of the owner that are infringed. 
This subjective meaning attached to rape is well confirmed by what could happen 
to the victims of rape. According to historical documentation, many women who had 
been raped, instead of seeking legal protection, would afterwards kill herself or would 
be deserted or even killed by her own family because of the loss of her chastity.458 In 
many civilizations, including.China and Europe, these tragedies were not, in the past, 
rare.459 Such social phenomena could be well explained with the subjective meaning 
that regards women as men's possessions because, when a possession or property has 
been damaged, it is quite natural to throw it away or destroy it. 
However, some people may argue that even under such legal circumstances, rape 
as a crime of law could also be seen as an infringement of the women's own rights, 
for example their personal,or familial reputation was infringed. Actually women's, as 
well as their families', rights on the reputation were just the derivation of men's rights 
to things: the infringement of the reputation of the female part was in fact the 
exhibition of the loss of her capacity to give herself to man with chastity, which meant 
the undamaged possession that man desired.46° 
Thus women themselves could not seek the protection from the law because the 
law, essentially different in nature from modern law of rape, didn't see any 
infringements of women's rights by the action of rape. Thus, though the natural action 
of coercive sex have remained the same in both the ancient and modern societies, it is 
impossible to say that the ancient crime of rape is the same crime as the modern crime 
of rape 
What this tells us is that, when we study rape as a concrete problem of life, as 
well as of law, we cannot take only the natural action of coercive sex as the whole 
content of r ape. We must take into consideration both the objective part of natural 
action and the subjective part of meaning attached to get the right understanding of 
rape as a crime of law. Legislation may have different criteria for categorization of 
crime. It can be the objective part of natural actions only, like rape in English statutes. 
It can be the subjective part of attached meaning only, like rape in Chinese and Italian 
statutes. However, serious studies of rape as a concrete crime, or a problem of law, are 
quite another thing, which must cover both of the constituents. 
Given such a methodical principle of study, we know that a crime of rape that 
infringes men's rights and a crime of rape that infringes women's rights are 
essentially different problems in nature of life and of law. However, since these 
different crimes share the same objective part, the natural action of coercive sex, they 
have been given the same name of rape. But we should realize that this linguistic 
coincidence in the title of the crimes reflects their commonality in the objective 
constituent o nly. If w e w ant t o a chieve a m ore p recise and c omplete c ognition o f 
rape, we must consider also the subjective part. And since infringing men's rights and 
infringing women's rights are two strikingly different meanings attached to the action 
of coercive sex, we therefore see here two essentially different crimes. If Professor 
Cai is right in saying under the statutory title of rape, there have been three different 
subjective meanings attached to the same natural action of coercive sex, then it is not 





that the same crime of rape has experienced three stages of development but that there 
have been three substantially different crimes that have been constituted by the natural 
action of coercive sex.461 
Only under the modern crime of rape, can the crime of marital rape be possible. 
The modern crime of rape, differing from the ancient crime of rape, infringes 
women's personal rights of sexual self -determination not men's property rights in 
possessions nor public morality and good customs. When rape is the crime against 
women's personal rights of sexual self -determination, the husband's coercive sex can 
certainly constitute rape; the fact the accused and the, alleged victim are married is 
irrelevant. When rape was an invasion of male property rights, the husband's coercive 
sex could certainly not constitute the crime because everybody has the full right to use 
and dispose of his own possessions. When rape was the crime against the traditional 
public morality and good customs, husband's coercive sex could not either constitute 
the crime because sexual disputes within couples have never been an offence against 
the traditional public morality and good customs. 
Laws of rape have been changing and this is because the crimes of rape have been 
changing. The crimes of rape have been changing is because crimes, which are the 
problems of law or the reflections of problems of life, aré constituted with two parts, 
the objective and the subjective. When the objective part remains the same, changes 
of the subjective part can always cause the corresponding changes in the problems of 
life and of law, and consequently the changes in law itself. The subjective part of the 
problem of life is just the memes of the people, we can therefore see how the problem 
of life works as the intermediate mechanism to exert memetic (cultural) influences on 
law. 
461 It is a commonsense that the same physical action can be substantially different crimes of law (or problems of 
law) with different meanings attached. Here it is time that has changed the meaning attached to the same natural 
action of coercive sex, causing the so- called evolution of rape. We can also have examples that people at the same 
era of time have different attachable meanings to the same physical action, making the different possible crimes 
out of the same action. Concurrent crime in modern criminal laws is a very good example of this, where one action 
can result in different titles of crime with different legal meanings attached. The civil case discussed in Chapter 3 
(See page 109) could be another example. Whether the action of the tour agency was tort or breach of contract 
depends on what meaning was attached to the action. However, in all the cases above, it is always that there is only 
one action which could result in different legal liabilities given different meanings attached. 
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CRpíter 5 Theoretieai Context of Marital 
Rape Revisited 
In the effort to solve the problem of Chinese marital rape, we found in the first 
chapter some theoretical problems concerned, which are the methodological 
insufficiency of comparative law and the conceptual deficiency of culture. At the end 
of the thesis, I will revisit- the theoretical context to see whether the solution of the 
practical problem can help with the theoretical problems related. 
5.1 Methodological improvements for comparative law 
In Chapter One, I identified two malfunctions of comparative law. They are the 
incomparability of family laws and the helplessness to the legislators. 
5.1.1 Comparability of family laws 
As previously observed i n Chapter One, comparatists currently find c omparing 
family laws difficult. The reason for this are cultural elements, such as those listed by 
Zweigert and Kötz: "strong moral and ethical feelings" rooted in "the particularities of 
the prevailing religion, in historical tradition, in cultural development, or in the 
character of people ".462 These cultural elements are causing confusion, even invalidity 
to its basic assumption "that the legal system of every society faces essentially the 
same problems "463 and that "different legal systems give the same or very similar 
solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life ".464 Consequently these 
interfering cultural elements result in the "areas in comparative law where judgment 
must be suspended, where the student simply cannot say which solution is better. "465 
Actually that the cultural elements present difficulties to comparatists is resulted 
from the way that the functionalist understand the mechanism of how cultural 
elements exert their influence on law. Functionalists tend to take culture as an 
autonomous entity external to the concrete problems of life. They even view culture 
as antagonistic to the concrete problems of life. In the eyes of a functionalist, there are 
two parallel factors exerting their own influences on law separately, which are cultural 
elements vs. concrete problems of life. For example, functionalists consider marriage 
law as a solution to marriage as a problem of life. If not for cultural factors, marriage 
laws in different societies could be well compared since they all deal with the same 
problem of marriage. Unfortunately, the disturbing cultural factors, like moral and 
ethical feelings, make deep impacts on law and eventually cause the incomparability 
462 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
463 Zweigert & Kötz, p34. 
464 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
465 Ibid p39, p40. 
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of family law problems like these, even though the laws are dealing with the same 
problems of life.466 
This functionalist view does not take cultural elements as part of problems of life 
but as something external to the problems of life. Therefore functionalists do not see 
the dichotomy structure of a problem of life, the objective part, which is the natural 
events or actions, against the subjective part, which is the concept developed from the 
normative meaning or cultural element. Nor do they see this dichotomy as the 
mechanism for cultural elements to constitute problems of life and further on to 
influence, law. As a result, cultural elements in the eyes of functionalists can only 
disturb the process of proper comparative law. 
With such an understanding about cultural influences on law, it seems natural for 
functionalists to see family law as special and different from other areas of law. 
Because cultural impacts are so much more obvious in family law than in other 
branches of the law like tort and contract, functionalists claim that cultural elements 
tend to exert stronger influences on family law than on other branches like the law of 
obligations. 467 Such a claim will inevitably lead to the conclusion that cultural 
elements exert different influences on different branches, heavier on some while 
lighter on others. Such functionalist understandings about cultural elements in law 
have led to the two malfunctions of comparative law that I have discussed in Chapter 
One. 
However, given the problem of life as the mechanism between law and 
memetic /cultural influences, the memetic approach seems not only able to show why 
the functionalist understandings are problematic but it can also provide a better 
understanding about the incomparability of family law and thus show a way out of 
this predicaments. 
First by taking up the concept of the meme, the memetic approach no longer takes 
culture as a general and homogeneous entity but as basic and microscopic units. With 
the concept of meme as the equivalent of the concept of meaning, memetic discovers 
the dichotomy in the inner structure of Zweigert and Kötz's concept of problem of 
life, which is the foundation of the functionalist view of comparative law. Thus, the 
memetic approach finds that the necessary constituent of the problem of life, the 
subjective part, is in fact what is usually called cultural elements. Cultural elements 
exert influences on law by means of influencing problems of life. From this we know 
that cultural elements are never external to or independent from the problems of life. 
On the contrary, each problem of life always has cultural elements merged inside as 
its own constituent. This is a very important revision of the functionalist view on how 
culture exerts influences on law. 
Each problem of life has its own constituent of cultural elements, and the problem 
of life is the foundation for the existence of law that works as solution to the problem. 
Accordingly, all branches of law are equal in being influenced by cultural elements. 
Therefore it is not right to think that some legal branches like family law are 
susceptible to stronger cultural influences while cultural impacts on other branches, 
like tort and contracts, are lighter. It is only because cultural differences in the area of 
family law may be greater between different legal systems so that they are more 
apparent. This does not mean, however, that there are less cultural influences on other 
areas of law like the law of obligations. 
We cannot deny the cultural elements in tort and contract laws just because they 
are more similar between different jurisdictions. Similarly, we cannot exaggerate the 
466 Zweigert & Kötz p39. 
467 Glendon, "Irish Family Law in Comparative Perspective ", 9 Dublin University Law Journal (1987), 1. 
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cultural elements in family law just because they are more different between different 
jurisdictions. There is an analogy for this. If you write a word with a black pen on the 
blackboard, you cannot deny the word is there on the blackboard just because the 
word is as black as the board. If you write one word with the black pen on a 
whiteboard, you cannot claim there more than one word you write there on the 
whiteboard just because of the sharp contrast of colour between the word and the 
board. 468 
As previously quoted, Zweigert and Kötz's view of comparative law is based on 
the fundamental assumption that each society faces essentially the same problems of 
life. Only the laws that function as the solutions of the same problems of life are 
comparable. Otherwise they are incomparable. And it is a "beginner's" mistake to 
compare the incomparables.469 However they seem to find that in family laws, due to 
the disturbing cultural influences, essentially different solutions may also be offered 
to the same problems of life and accordingly leads to the 'suspension of effective 
comparative law.470 
Alan Watson says: "when the starting point is a branch of law, the difficulty 
arising from the variations of political, moral, social and economic factors for any 
valid comparison recedes to some extent, "471 But in the branch of family law, 
what Zweigert and Kötz have found seems to be not the recession but the boom of the 
difficulty. And they are not clear how to compare the legal problems like: "Should 
freedom of testation be curtailed in the interests of a decedent's widow and 
family ?Under what conditions should divorce be possible? Should same -sex 
marriages be permitted or some comparable legal regime be on offer? Should 
unmarried persons be allowed to adopt? "472 
In contrast, in contract law, tort law and other braches of law that have not too 
many cultural differences, Zweigert and Kötz are confident with their functionalist 
comparative law. They can talk from a comparative perspective about how different 
legal systems deal with similar problems like when offers are binding, the protection 
of t he purchaser's interest i n 1 and from the possible h arm by at hird p arty, and s o 
on.473 
I would like to quote again their example of the protection of the purchaser's 
interest in land from harm by the third party. With this example, Zweigert and Kötz 
suggest that the comparatist must sometimes look outside the law.474 While protection 
is afforded by the land register system in Germany, the same function is performed in 
the United States by filing and title insurance companies. However, whether outside 
or inside the law, the example, according to Zweigert and Kötz, points to the general 
conclusion that we can find the same or very similar solutions to the same problems of 
life even in different legal systems. 475 Despite the differences in historical 
development, conceptual structure, and style of operation of the law in Germany, 
France, England and the US, the same problem of life is shared by these societies, 
468The fallacy here actually involves the common misunderstandings about the concept of culture. Usually, as one 
of the misunderstandings, people tend to take the beliefs or values that are different from their own as cultural 
elements. Interestingly, they are reluctant to admit the fact that their own beliefs or values, which they take for 
granted, are also cultural elements. This misunderstanding results from one of the essential attributes of the 
concept of culture, the externality, which I discuss in more detail in the next part( p152) . 
469 Zweigert & Kötz, p34, p35. 
470 Zweigert & Kötz, p40. 
471 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, p5. 
472 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
473 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
474 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
475 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
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which is the need to protect the purchaser of an interest in land from the harm that 
could result from outstanding and unknown rights of third parties. The problem exists 
in all the societies mentioned above and, therefore it is an obvious that, as implied in 
the conclusion arrived at, the solutions are the same or similar because "the problems 
of life" are the same. 
Taking a closer look, we can find the commonality of this problem of life lies not 
only in the objectively existence of the land, the purchaser's ownership of the land 
and the possible harms from third parties; but also in the well- accepted meme of 
people about all the facts, the meme that the rights of the purchaser as the owner of 
the land need to be protected against the competing interests of third parties. It is the 
combination of the objective facts together with the meme about the facts that 
constitutes this concrete problem of law: how to protect the interests of land purchaser 
against possible harms by third parties. The meme is not necessarily a legal one; it can 
also be moral, general cultural or merely accepted commonsense. But the non -legal 
meme that the rights of lard purchaser need to be protected is an indispensable part of 
the concrete problem of life on how to protect. Otherwise, the objective facts alone 
cannot constitute the problem of life, which Zweigert and Kötz think a ctivates the 
creation of the concerned laws. So it is the commonality of both the objective facts 
and the subjective meme about the facts that constitutes the commonality of the 
concrete problem of life, and consequently generates the commonalities or similarities 
of the laws in different countries. The only differences that may take place are on how 
to protect, which are procedural and technical, because different societies may have 
their own particular ways to achieve the same protection. 
But, in family law Zweigert and Kötz seem to find that "different legal systems 
answer these questions q uite differently".476 I may infer from the claim that, in the 
case of family law, different legal systems may have quite different solutions for the 
same problem of life, which is actually a denial of the conclusion arrived at in the first 
place. 
I take one of the examples given by Zweigert and Kötz, say, "Should same -sex 
marriages be permitted, or some comparable legal regime be on offer ? ", to see 
whether there is a realistic existence of the same problem of life and whether this 
same problem of life has quite different solutions in different legal systems. As 
Zweigert and Kötz do not give any further analysis after giving the family law 
examples, I will go on with further analysis with the question. 
In some modern societies, mainly the western countries in Europe and North 
America, there appears a new meme, which is a growing recognition of the rights of 
the homosexuals. 77 The implication of the meme is that homosexual people ought to 
have the same rights as the heterosexuals, including the right to marriage. With the 
spread of the meme, there appears the demand for the recognition of the relation based 
on homosexuality, which is just like the relation based on heterosexuality called 
marriage. The demand naturally leads to the argument whether same -sex marriages 
should be permitted or not. This argument is what makes the new "the problem of 
life ": the equal recognition of homosexual relation, or, as people usually call it, the 
same -sex marriage. In this new problem of life, the new meme about homosexuality 
plays an indispensable part. Although the natural fact of homosexual relations has 
always been there, it was not until the appearance of the new meme and its 
combination with the fact of sex activities between people of same g ender that the 
same -sex marriage as a realistic problem of life come into being. So far, it is only a 
476 Zweigert & Kötz, p39. 
477Willekens H, "The Latest in Comparative Family Law", EuroData Newsletter, :9(1999), p. 13 -15 
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problem of life, not yet a problem of law. However, as the meme is winning over its 
opponents and becomes more widely accepted in the society, law, as the reflection of 
its social environment, must correspondingly change. This is when the problem of 
whether same -sex marriages should be permitted or not comes from the realm of real 
life into the realm of law and becomes a legal problem. Afterwards, when this 
problem exists in more than one societies and different laws have been made about 
the problem, some comparable legal regimes will be available. 
So it is possible to make comparison between the laws in some European 
countries where there has already been a growing recognition of the homosexual 
couple in the legal regulation. For example, all the Nordic countries, except for 
Finland, as well as the Netherlands have created the institution of "registered 
partnership ", thus enabling homosexual couples who wish to do so to acquire all the 
rights and duties of spouses, with the sole substantial exception of the rights 
pertaining to parent -child relations.478 In Belgium, a kind of registered pailuership has 
been created that, though symbolically recognizing the legitimacy of the homosexual 
couple, is of very little practical import, because each party can terminate partnership 
duties at will without having to give notice.479 In France, a partial recognition of the 
legitimacy of the homosexual union has taken the road of social security law and of 
case law deeming homosexuality an irrelevant element in awarding the surviving 
cohabitee damages for the loss of consortium and in custody decisions.480 Registered 
partnerships above are different from each other, and they are also different from the 
so- called same -sex marriage. However they are all legal remedies for the same 
problems of life, that is, the problem of giving the legal recognition to the homosexual 
relations. That is why we can talk about them and make comparisons between them. 
All these talks and comparisons have a fundamental prerequisite, which is that 
demand for the recognition of homosexual relation is shared by all the countries above 
as a problem of life. Once the same problem of life is there, we have the foundation 
for the comparison of different legal remedies. 
However, on the other hand, in some other societies that are traditional and 
conservative, people still see homosexuality as an abnormal deviance and marriage is 
defined inherently as the special relation between man and woman. This means that 
people in those societies have their own perfectly self -satisfying theories, values or 
beliefs about the irrelevance between marriage and homosexuality. With these 
theories, values or beliefs, the so- called problem of same -sex marriage is completely 
eliminated at the level of real life. B ecause, though the natural fact of h omosexual 
relation also exists in these societies, with no subjective recognition of homosexuality 
to combine with the fact, same -sex marriage cannot become a realistic problem of life. 
While the problem of life doesn't exist at all, it would be unreasonable to talk about 
the law on this problem. 
Now we have two groups of societies. One group has the demand for recognition 
of h omosexual r elations, w hich I c all l iberal, w hile t he o ther h as n o s uch d emand, 
which I call conservative. If we. try to make comparison between these two groups of 
societies, we will run into the problem of comparability. 
As we have known, societies within the liberal category do share the same 
problem of life of the recognition of same -sex relation, but the societies under the 
conservative category do not have such a problem of life at all. Though both liberal 





share the subjective memes about the fact. Therefore, they do not share the same 
problem of life that is based on the natural fact of homosexual relations. As there is no 
same problem of life shared by these two categories of societies, there are no laws of 
same -sex marriages that fulfill the same function. Given the basic prerequisite that "in 
law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill the same function ", 
the so- called same -sex marriage laws are incomparable between these two categories 
of societies. 
So, Zweigert and Kötz's question: "Should same -sex marriages be permitted, or 
some comparable legal regime be on offer ?" is n ot a counter -example, but another 
supporting example of the conclusion that "different legal systems give the same or 
very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life ". Because, in this 
case, different legal systems are actually addressing different problems of life. It is 
true that the student simply cannot say which solution is better, however, it is not 
because the solutions are too different but because the solutions are incomparable, as 
they are the solutions to ,different problems of life. So it is an apple and orange 
problem. Consequently, it might not be appropriate for Zweigert and Kötz to cover it 
under one single question because using the question "Should same -sex marriages be 
permitted, or some comparable legal regime be on offer ?" to refer to different legal 
systems i n different c ivilizations is in fact t o c ompare t he i ncomparable, w hich, i n 
Zweigert and Kötz's own words, is a mistake of "the beginner ".481 
Thus, though family laws do have problems of comparability in contrast with tort 
law a s s uch, b ut t he p roblems o f c omparability are n ot t he k ind t hat Zweigert and 
Kötz suggest. That is, the incomparability of family laws is not caused by stronger 
cultural influences than other branches of law but is because people are actually trying 
to compare the incomparable. Therefore the fault lies neither in family law nor in 
cultural influences but in the comparatists' own misunderstanding. 
Fortunately, with the memetic approach, we now can see that family law is not so 
special as we thought compared to branches like tort or contract law in terms of 
cultural influences. Because, all branches of laws are to solve their problems of life, 
and every problem of life consists of both the objective part and the subjective 
cultural part. So culture exerts its influence on family law in exactly the same way as 
it does to the law o f obligations. The difference is that the cultural constituents, the 
memes, inside the problems of life that family law tries to tackle are more easily 
different from country to country while those of tort or contract law are more likely to 
resemble each other. And the difference is only that of quantity not that of quality. So, 
instead of being special, family law follows substantially the same principle as other 
branches of law, like tort or contract, in terms of the relation between law and culture. 
Conclusively, different subjective parts mean essentially different problems of 
life. Current confusions about the incomparability of family laws are rooted in 
mistaking the essentially different problems of life for the same problems of life and 
the according attempt to compare the incomparable. To avoid this mistake, we must 
realize that we cannot decide a concrete problem of life only b y its objective part. 
With the improvement in methodology, comparatists should know better about what 
ought to be compared and what ought not to. They should also know better where the 
differences start and where the commonalities stop. As a result, comparative law 
could do better in promoting its basic ability to make comparisons between different 
legal systems. This is how memetic approach has helped with the first malfunction of 
comparative law mentioned in Chapter One. 
481 Zweigert & Kötz, p34, p35. 
145 
5.1.2 Help with the legislators 
The second malfunction, as I mentioned, of current comparative law is its failure 
to assist with legislators. The memetic approach may also be able to help with this 
malfunction. A s sa id i n Chapter 0 ne, c omparative 1 aw i s e xpected t o o ffer a ids t o 
legislators when they attempt to borrow laws from other legal systems. However, in 
case of the laws with strong cultural influences, like marital rape law, this function of 
comparative law would easily fail. 
One of the reasons current comparative law fails to provide such help is its failure 
to make comparisons of culture -impacted law. If a law in the original society is found 
incomparable with any laws in the receptor society, there must be a lack of some basic 
social foundation, which is essential for the law to survive in the receptor society, and 
successful legal transplantation is therefore a lso impossible. The memetic approach 
can be helpful at the point because it has achieved the clarification, of the problems of 
incomparability in family laws. By clarifying why some family law problems are 
incomparable, legislators could have better ideas about what laws can be borrowed 
while what cannot. 
Specifically, for those incomparable family law problems, it is not that they are 
the same problems and incomparable. On the contrary, they are often essentially 
different problems at all. This means it is not that different societies have different 
laws for the same family problems but that different societies have substantially 
different family problems of life. Different problems naturally will need different 
solutions. Laws, as Zweigert and Kötz say, are solutions of problems of life. 
Therefore legislators must make sure that they do have the same problems of life in 
their own society that needs it as solution before they decide to borrow a law. 
Otherwise, if legislators borrow a law from a foreign society that functions to solve a 
problem of life that they do not have in their own society, the borrowed law would 
have no need to exist and would therefore be ineffective. Hence an unsuccessful legal 
transplant. 
Current Chinese marital rape law, in a degree, has been one of these legal 
transplants. Though, by following western legal principles, current Chinese legislation 
has criminalized marital rape, however, marital c oercive sex had already b een well 
solved, by ethics or other norms. Therefore, when marital rape law was transplanted 
into China, there were, initially, no problems that needed it to solve. Consequently, 
such a borrowed law could only be ineffective. If the Chinese legislators do want to 
make the transplanted marital rape law effective, their work is not to improve law. 
Rather, the only thing they c an do, as the memetic approach has pointed out, is to 
make marital rape become a problem of life that needs the law to solve. 
Fortunately this is what has been happening. As shown in Chapter 2 and 3, the 
memes of the criminalization of marital rape are being accepted by more and more 
people. With the memes spreading, the society will consider marital coercive sex as a 
problem of life and of law. Only when marital rape has appeared in Chinese society as 
a problem of life that needs legal solution, can the borrowed law of marital rape really 
have the chance to perform its function. 
The lesson we should learn from the ineffectiveness of the borrowed marital rape 
law in China is again how to decide whether a problem of life actually exists. The 
objective part of the marital rape as a problem of life, the natural action of coercive 
sex between husband and wife, has always been there, in China and the West, in 
modern and ancient times. Therefore, the key factor to decide the realistic existence of 
the problem of life is to decide whether the subjective part, or the corresponding 
memes, actually exists. 
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Since what we study is a problem of life, the subjective part we seek must also be 
the memes of life, that is, live memes. Therefore when legislators try to decide that 
there is a problem of life in their own society so that they can offer a solution of law 
to it, the subjective part they find must be the wide -spread live memes in the society. 
Any memes from books or other societies, as long as they are not yet accepted in the 
realistic social environment, cannot be the basis for legislators to decide that the 
corresponding problem of life exist in their society and to consequently legislate for it. 
This is where the legislators of current Chinese marital rape law made mistakes. They 
legislated supposing marital rape already existed in Chinese society as a problem of 
life that needs a legal solution. However, legislative background shows that the 
memes they have in mind are not obtained from the realistic Chinese society but are 
only some abstract conceptions from the west. That is, these memes are not yet live 
memes in Chinese society and the problem of life therefore didn't actually exist, 
which consequently caused the ineffectiveness of the current marital rape law. 
To decide the existence of a problem of life that needs legislation, it is always 
necessary to ensure that live memes exist in the realistic society, not in books or other 
societies. Such a conclusion arrived at from memetic approach could be quite helpful 
to legislators when they try to achieve more successful and effective legal transplant 
from foreign societies. 
5.1.3 Unity of functionalism and culturalism 
So, the memetic approach seems to be helpful with the two functions of 
comparative law, in either comparing culturally- impacted laws or helping legislators 
in legal transplantation. Why it can do this is because the memetic approach has 
actually united both the functionalist and the culturalist approaches in comparative 
law. 
Usually functionalist approach and c ulturalist approach are thought t o be two 
separate or even antagonistic approaches in comparative law. The functionalist 
approach bases its methodology on what Zweigert and Kötz call the problem of life. 
As we know, the problem of life in Zweigert and Kötz's understanding refers only to 
the natural facts, which in my terms is the objective constituent. Thus, by excluding 
the cultural elements from the problems of life, the functionalist approach can easily 
find the commonalities of natural facts in different societies. It is upon these 
commonalities of natural facts that Zweigert and Kötz claim that different societies 
have essentially the same problems of life.482 As law's function is to solve these 
problems of life, accordingly, Zweigert and Kötz establish the possibility of 
comparative law upon the commonalities of natural facts in different societies, which, 
to their understanding, is to compare the different solutions for the same problems of 
life.483 
The culturalist approach, on the other hand, establishes its methodology upon 
the concept of culture, which refers to people's values, opinions, attitudes, etc. about 
physical facts, or, in my terms, is the subjective memes or meanings about the 
physical facts. Contrary to the functionalist approach's emphasis on the commonalties 
of natural facts, the culture approach emphasizes the inherent cultural differences 
between societies as well as the influences of the cultural differences on law. With 
cultural differences as their foundation, the culturalist approach tends to stress the 
482 Zweigert & Kötz, p34. 
483 Zweigert & Kötz, p34-35. 
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diversity instead of the commonality of laws in different legal cultures. Naturally, 
culturalism is pessimistic about comparative law.484 
As Pierre Legrand argues, 
"Because insensitivity to questions of cultural heterogeneity fails to do justice to 
the situated, local properties of knowledge, the comparatist must never abolish the 
distance between self and other. Rather, she must allow the self to make the journey 
and see the other in the way he must be seen, that is, as other. The comparatist must 
permit the other to realize `his vision of his world'. Comparison must not have a 
unifying but a multiplying effect: it must aim to organize the diversity of discourses 
around different (cultural) forms and counter the tendency of the mind toward 
uniformization. Accordingly, the comparatist must emphatically rebut any attempt at 
the axiomatization of similarity, especially when the institutionalization of sameness 
becomes so etravagant as to suggest that a finding of difference should lead her to 
start research afresh! To quote Gunter Frankenberg, `analogies and the presumption of 
similarity have to be abandoned for a rigorous experience of distance and difference' I 
argue that comparison must involve `the primary and fundamental investigation of 
difference "',485 
It seems differences between culturalism and functionalism could not be greater 
in either their theoretical foundation or their objective of study. But actually they 
share some essential commonalities. The first commonality is that they both separate 
natural facts from the cultural elements of these natural facts. The second 
commonality, which is the result of the first, is the incomparability of culturally - 
impacted laws. Confronted with cultural influences on law, functionalist sadly claim 
that comparisons have to be "suspended" and they feel sorry for the helplessness of 
their functionalist approach while culturalists proudly claim that "I told you so" and 
they feel happy with the difficulties caused by cultural elements to comparative law 
because this is exactly what they preach. Happy or sorry, they arrive from different 
roads at the same destiny of the incomparability of culturally- impacted laws. 
The memetic approach seems to offer a third way out. The problem of life is the 
fundamental concept for the functionalist approach. However, by developing its 
dichotomy structure, the memetic approach has successfully merged cultural elements 
into this functionalist concept. Thus in the memetic understanding of the problem of 
life, natural facts and the cultural elements are perfectly combined together. This is 
the most significant difference of the memetic approach from either functionalist or 
culturalist approaches. With this uniqueness, the memetic approach has actually 
combined functionalism and culturalism as an organic one. With the two inalienable 
elements finally reunited, the memetic approach will not encounter the dilemmas of 
either functionalism's sad helplessness or culturalism's happy exaggeration of the 
incomparability of culturally- impacted laws because cultural elements in memetic 
eyes are no longer disturbing external factors but have become the inherent 
constituent inside the problems of life and of law. 
Why cultural elements can be merged into the problem of life as one constituent 
is due t o another specialty oft he m emetic approach. Under m emetic approach, w e 
observe culture no longer as a general and homogeneous concept but as the basic 
memes of each human individual. Each meme is always related to its natural 
counterpart in human society to constitute the problem of life, which, in turn, becomes 
484 Legrand, "How to Compare Now ", Legal studies: The journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law, 
16(2), 232 - 242. 
485 Legrand, "The Impossibility ofLegalTtransplant ", Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 1997, p123 -124. 
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a problem o f law i n 1 egal studies. Such a m ode o f t hinking p rovides m ore precise 
conclusions about whether the problems of life in different societies are the same or 
not, and thus p rovides b etter foundation t o make comparisons o f t aws. And t his i s 
why I have been able to make comparisons of marital rape laws, which are usually 
inextricably linked to incomparable family laws, between China and the UK, which 
are usually thought to be strikingly different legal systems and cultures. 
5.2 Conceptual clarifications: culture v. meme 
If the memetic approach has demonstrated any advantages in culture and law 
studies, the success flows from the conceptual construction of the meme and the 
meme's substitution of the general concept of culture. Concepts are cornerstones of 
theories. The strength of the fundamental concept decides the strength of the theory 
built upon it. As I have previously shown, the deficiencies of culture approach in legal 
studies owe a lot to the deficiencies of its basic concept of culture. Thus, the memetic 
approach owes its success to better definition of its fundamental concept of meme. 
Now I will go back to where I started to revisit the basic conceptual foundations 
of both approaches for further and detailed comparisons of the concepts of culture and 
meme. 
5.2.1 Different angles of view upon the same essence 
1. The same essence 
The objective that the concept of culture reflects is the same thing in essence as 
that of the meme concept. We can get to know this from the usual definitions of 
culture. 
We have seen quite a few definitions for the concept of culture in Chapter One. 
The definitions may vary in different ways, but, despite all the differences, they all 
share the same view about the essential nature of culture that culture is a group of 
memes. In Tylor's definition, "knowledge, belief, morals, law," are obviously memes 
and mostly unmaterialized memes. "Art" is also an often materialized meme. Custom 
and habits are the patterns of how people do things, or, in another word, actions, 
which are therefore materialized memes. Capabilities of human beings all result from 
their thoughts, which are also memes. So we find from the substance of Tylor's 
definition of culture nothing but memes. In Cotterrell's definition, "Belief, attitudes, 
cognitive i deas, v alues and m odes o f r easoning and p erception" are surely m emes. 
"Understandings, outlook" are also memes. So we find the same thing in nature as 
that in Tylor's definition. Thus, we can be sure that cultures are memes and memes 
are culture; they are the same thing in essence. 
2. Different angles of view 
The concepts of culture and meme share essentially the same object of study, but 
they turned out to be two different concrete concepts. What starts the divergence is a 
superficial technical distinction, which is the difference in the two concepts' 
perspectives of the same thing. 
Meme is an individualistic concept, referring to an individual meme, while 
culture is a collective or general concept, referring to what is typical or shared in the 
society. So the concept of meme indicates solely and directly the inner essence shared 
by the two concepts - -- the memes, without caring about the external form of how the 
memes appear to be when they gather together. The concept of culture, on the other 
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hand, has two connotations: first, the inner essence of memes; secondly, the external 
exhibiting form of the essence, which is the form of aggregation, collective or group. 
Technically the concept of culture is a more complicated one, covering not only the 
inner essence but also its form of external appearance, or its camouflage. 
Accordingly, the concept of culture exists only to the outsiders because an insider 
cannot see the external appearance. This means the concept of culture exists only 
when different cultures exist to those who see from outside a culture. An insider who 
knows only his own culture ought not to feel the existence of culture because, once 
inside, he sees no external appearance of collectiveness but only himself and many 
other individuals. But, if a person from a different society looks a t another society 
from the external point of view, he would find at the first sight, instead of the 
differences between individual memes, the special integral characteristics of the 
meme- complexes in the society. That, then, is the general and collective concept of 
culture. Thus external view, which I call the externality of the concept, is 
indispensable to the concept of culture. 
So, I can say that the usual concept of culture is actually the external view on the 
generality of widely-shared individual memes. Its constitution needs three necessary 
conditions: 1) individual meme as the innermost nature; 2) generality as the essential 
mark of culture from individual memes; 3) external view to make the concept 
positive. 
When a meme is held only by one individual, it is only a basic cultural element 
that has the probability to constitute the general concept of culture but lacks 
generality. When the meme is shared by all or a sufficient majority of people, it gains 
its generality in the society. With the first two stages completed, culture as a general 
concept has come into its substantial existence but is still in the potential not 
conspicuous state. Now comes an outsider to view it externally, the existence of 
shared individual memes as a general whole gets out of the concealed state and 
becomes visualized before people consciousness. And this is what we positively have 
as the general concept of culture. 
Thus, without the general and external view, if I want to be radical, I can say that 
culture is not a real being, only individual memes are. A good analogy can help with 
the understanding of the point. A cloud is the external and collective form of 
appearance of moistures or water droplets. A cloud exists only to the person who 
looks generally at all the moistures as a whole from the outside while, once inside, he 
sees only real moistures or droplets, not a piece of cloud with its particular shape or 
color. Without the external view, the usual concept of cloud will just vanish. Thus, to 
internal moistures, a cloud doesn't exist, only moistures do. 
To say that culture is not a real being is only technically valid in terms of the 
concept's connotation referring to the superficial external appearance of the inner 
essence. However, such a radical view may be of practical significance. First, it helps 
to achieve a clearer understanding of culture's inner essence as memes. Secondly, it 
helps to clarify the puzzle of how culture exerts its influence. 
As culture is not a real being, it certainly cannot exert influences upon individuals 
as a positive entity. Taking an internal view, we see no culture but only individual 
memes; we see no cultural influences but only the influences that individual memes 
exert on one another. So the so- called cultural influences are in fact the external 
appearance of the influences that individual memes massively exert on one another. 
To some extent, it would be closer to the truth to say that there is no cultural influence 
but only individual memes' influence. 
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To return to the analogy. It would make the understanding easier. Colour and 
shape are essential to the existence of cloud but they are in fact the external 
appearance of the collectiveness of certain water droplets and therefore, do not exist 
in the eyes of droplets. Droplets of water may exert influences on one another, which 
will change the color and shape of a piece of could, but the color and shape can never 
exert any influence on any droplet. 
3. A fallacy to correct 
The concept of culture views its objective from a macroscopic and external point 
of v iew u pon a s ociety or s ocial group as a w hole, a nd i t s ees culture. The m eme 
concept views its objective from a microscopic and internal point of view upon each 
individual separately, and it sees individual memes. The understanding about the 
importance of the external view in the constitution of the general concept of culture 
can be very helpful in clarifying why some common opinions about law and culture 
are fallacious. 
For instance, when talking about the Chinese marital rape problem, the supporters 
of the criminalization of marital rape tend to think the decriminalization of marital 
rape is a result of the traditional Chinese cultural elements, while the criminalization 
of marital rape is what legally ought to.486 Why Chinese law cannot do it now, 
according to these people, is because of the interference by cultural elements, like 
traditional Chinese ethical ideas about family and marriage. However, these people 
are less likely to view the arguments of the criminalization of marital rape as cultural 
arguments. Instead, they are more likely to take the arguments based on the women's 
rights of sexual self -determination as absolute and universal as Professor Cai does, 
instead of relative and cultural.487 
Such a biased viewpoint reveals not only the western -centricism but also the 
conceptual fallacies. Actually both the ideas of women's independent rights of sexual 
self -determination within marriage and the ideas of women's sexually affiliated status 
to their husbands within marriage are ideas about the sexual relations within marriage. 
That is, they are both memes. Therefore they are both cultural elements in nature, 
even the notion of women's independent rights of sexual self -determination, on which 
the western- originated marital rape law is based, is equally cultural in nature as the 
traditional Chinese ethical ideas. 
The conceptual fallacy here is a typical result of the characteristic of externality of 
the concept of culture. All people may have the tendency to be self -centered; they are 
more 1 ikely t o t ake t heir o wn b eliefs a s absolute and n ecessary while t he different 
beliefs of other people as contingent and accidental. That might be why western- 
centricists in China see the counterpart memes in an inappropriate way. However, 
knowing the externality of the concept of culture, we can realize that these western- 
centricists have taken an external view on the memes of the traditional Confucian 
ethics but not on the memes of modern western notion of women's independent 
rights. This leads to their view of taking the Chinese memes as relative cultural 
elements but their western ones as absolute. Rationally speaking, this is certainly 
fallacious. 
The different perspectives are not only the reason for two different concepts of 
culture and meme, but also the final reason for all the other minor distinctions 
between the concept of cùlture and the concept of meme, which I will discuss in detail 
next. 
486 Cai Dongtong, "Jurisprudential Research into Marital Rape" Criminal Law Review, vol.10, 2002, p499. 
487 Ibid. 
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5.2.2 More conceptual differentiation 
1. Collectivity and individuality 
As the concept of culture takes a macroscopic view on society, it usually sees the 
most typical or representative groups of memes, which are the most dominating and 
powerful. This decides the collectivity of the concept of culture and is also the 
evidence to show that culture is widely accepted memes, or stable memes as I also 
call them. With such a view, the concept of culture may overlook many unstable 
memes, or instant memes as I also call them. 
As the concept of meme takes a rather microscopic view on individuals in the 
society, it sees only individual memes spreading around. This decides the 
individuality of the concept of meme. With such a view, the concept of meme doesn't 
try to grasp the whole society in one hand, but it can usually get a more accurate and 
complete picture, which is therefore closer to the reality. 
Many other differences between the two concepts are related to this collectivity - 
individuality distinction. With the general view on societies, the concept of culture is 
often marked with the collective or general symbols of societies: racial boundaries, 
geographical boundaries like countries and nations, or other symbols that can mark 
the existence of an autonomous society. It is for this reason that we often talk about 
Chinese culture, European culture, Black culture or Arab culture. If several individual 
legal systems share some common legal memes, people will again, instead of viewing 
them individually, put them together and give them a collective name called legal 
culture. So, we talk about Anglo- American legal cultures or the Continental legal 
cultures. Marks of social boundaries are always very good symbols of culture. 
In the concept of meme, on the other hand, marks of social boundaries, like race, 
nation or country will lose their eminent importance as in the concept of culture. The 
concept of meme takes the individual meme as the only criterion and the concept is 
just self -defined by the individual meme as it is with no references to other elements, 
whether geographic, racial, etc. The individualistic view prevents the concept of 
meme from paying too much attention to the collective features of a country, a nation 
or other geographic types of community. Thus, either the special culture of a country 
or that of a legal family is not the core of the concern of this microscopic approach but 
is often ignored. Social marks like racial or geographical boundaries weigh much less. 
Therefore we do not talk about Chinese memes, European memes, British memes, etc. 
Instead we talk about marital rape memes as "marital rape" is the substantial contents 
of the memes per se not an external feature oft hem. Usually we can only name a 
meme with itself, which is different from culture. 
2. Feelings of different cultural influences in different legal branches 
With the internal view, the concept of meme does not see culture as a positive 
entity but only piecemeal memes dissolved in the problems of life to exert influences 
on law. Memes as social factors, which are cultural elements according to the concept 
of culture, can never be seen as autonomous and alienable from economic or other 
social factors. With the strong emphasis on the external view and the generality of the 
concept, the concept of culture, on the other hand, inevitably takes culture as a 
positive entity, exerting influences on law distinctively from and equally to economic, 
political and other social factors. The external view of the concept of culture upon its 
observatory objective is a v ery important feature o f i t, which I h ave referred to as 
externality. 
This externality feature can well explain the so- called difference of cultural 
influences on family law problems compared to tort problems. The external view 
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upon the meme part of the problem of life actually means that cultural influences exist 
only when the subjective parts of the problems of life are different. That is to say, 
given that the objective part of the problem of life is the same, if the subjective meme 
parts are different, then people feel the existence of the so- called culture. On the other 
hand, given the same objective part, if the subjective meme parts are also the same, 
then people do not feel the existence of culture. 
Subjective memes in family problems more often than no differ from society to 
society while those in tort problems are relatively more similar. For example, the 
memes of a Chinese individual about marriage or marital rape are often remarkably 
different from a Muslim or from a Christian. But there may not be much disagreement 
about whether someone whose leg has been broken by wrongful conduct should be 
compensated for his loss. Marital rape problems, with the different memes inside, 
appear different from each other and thus give people strong feelings of cultural 
influences in marital rape law. Broken leg problems with similar memes may not 
appear to differ from each,other so much and thus do not provoke such strong feelings 
of cultural influences in tort law. However, either the disagreements on marital rape or 
the agreements on broken legal are all memes, which therefore all are culture 
elements in nature. With memes always there as the constituent in each problem of 
life, we can see that culture elements weigh exactly the same in either family law 
problems or tort problems. So it is not appropriate to say culture exert more influences 
on family law than tort law. It is just that subjective memes in family problems are 
often more distinctive than those in tort problems.488 
As the analogy of a black word on the white or black board has told us, though 
the word is always there, people sometimes see it and sometimes not. Similarly, the 
so- called difference of cultural influence could also be a delusion since it is just a one - 
sided feeling from a certain point of view - -- too macroscopic point of view. Bigger 
differences of subjective parts in the family problems with the same objective part are 
the cause of people's feeling that culture exerts greater influences on family law while 
smaller differences of subjective meme parts in the tort problems with the same 
objective part are the cause of people's feeling that culture exerts smaller influences 
on tort law. The fact is that, from a microscopic point of view, the substantial cultural 
elements hold the same weight in all the problems of life. 
3. Clarification of vagueness 
Cotterrell says that culture is the "shared understandings ", "common outlook" 
typical of a particular society or social group.489 However, Cotterrell's "common 
outlook" reveals that the concept of culture refers only to a few typical or dominating 
memes in the society. However, in any society, not only these several dominating or 
typical groups of memes exist, there are many more not so dominating and typical 
ones. If we use the general concept of culture, which refers in fact only to the 
488 Why are subjective memes in problems of family more distinctive than those in problems of tort? This is a 
question about the origin of meme. This is a very good question for memetics about how and where memes come, 
but it is too remote to be necessarily relevant to the current discussion about law and society. When we study 
culture and law, we care about how culture exerts its influences on law but we don't care about how or from where 
culture comes. We know cultures are there, that is all we need. Knowing where to start and where to stop is 
essential for any rigorous and scientific study. As Max Weber says: "The social relationship thus consists entirely 
of the probability that individuals will behave in some meaningfully determined way. It is entirely irrelevant why 
such a probability exists but where it does there can be found a social relationship ". So, we don't have to know 
why, we only need to know some memes are more distinctive while some are less, and that's enough for 
sociological discussion. 
489Cotterrell, "The Concept of Legal Culture ", Comparing Legal Cultures, Dartmouth, p25. 
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dominating ones or the so- called high cultures, to cover all of them, we are actually 
ignoring many others. And this is the vagueness of culture. 
The concept of individual meme, in contrast, can be much clearer. Meme refers to 
not only the high culture elements, like religion, ethic, etc., but also any mental beings 
that conduct human behavior, like a special personal view on life or the world. Meme 
refers to not only outcomes of human rationality, like cognitive memes, but also those 
resulted from human passions, instincts or even impulses, like the desire to eat when 
hungry, the desire to possess out of instinctive greed or the meme to have sexual 
intercourse caused by sexual impulse. Meme refers to not only the stable mental 
beings, like beliefs or values, but also the instant memes, like the instantaneous meme 
of a rapist that activates his action. 
With the broader connotation, the concept of meme can overcome the defects of 
partiality of the concept of culture, including much larger variety of what's usually 
called cultural elements that exert influences on law. When talking about law and 
culture, we do not have to be restricted to those several dominating religions, ethics, 
or the writings of the philosophers who died hundreds or thousands of years ago. 
Rather, we can concentrate on the real lively human individuals who we know so well 
and who are the real subjects of the law, we can always specify exactly what meme 
are exerting the influences. Thus we can easily overcome the vagueness of the 
concept of culture. 
4. Difference -oriented or commonness -oriented 
Culture as a concept is general and homogeneous in nature, and that's why one society 
usually has only one symbolic culture to mark itself from other societies or cultures. When the 
culture in Britain is listed side by side with the culture in China, inevitably, the most likely 
meaning implied is that they are two different cultures. "Cultural differences" seems always 
the most related term with the concept of culture. Thus, the concept of culture seems to be 
inherently difference- oriented. 
Memes, on the other hand, don't have the whole society as the basic unit of 
conceptual foundation as culture does. Instead, the concept of meme bases itself on 
the subindividual mental beings in the mind of human individuals. From such an 
individualistic perspective, memes in any two societies can be different as well as 
common. Confucianism is of course different from either Christianity or human rights 
notion. But it is not so surprising to find many human individuals in today's China 
who share the same viewpoints about marital rape with human individuals in either 
today's Britain or even Britain two centuries ago. Therefore, compared with culture, 
the concept of meme can be as easily commonness- oriented as difference -oriented. 
With this special advantage of the concept of meme, we can discover both cultural 
differences and cultural commonnesses in the societies, China and the UK for 
instance, where only differences are found under the general concept of culture. This 
is why I can do comparative studies in the previous chapter on both the differences 
and the resemblances between China and the UK on their marital rape laws, though 
they are usually thought to be incomparable due to cultural differences. 
The most important reason why memetic approach can do this is its special ability 
to locate cultural commonness in the usual cultural differences. And the special ability 
in turn is resulted from the commonness- oriented nature of the concept of meme. 
With this nature, memetic approach can not only make comparisons of marital rape 
laws in China and the UK but can also solve the problem of incomparability of family 
laws and other laws with strong cultural influences. 
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5.2.3 Reconceptualization of culture with meme 
After the conceptual comparisons between culture and meme, I will now try to 
accomplish the reconceptualization of culture with memes. 
1. Redefinition of culture with meme 
The confusion of the concept of culture comes from its generality. Covering the 
wide range from hot spicy Sichuan food to marital rape, from Scottish kilts to 
Confucianism, overly general conception like this is easily problematic. However, the 
distinction I have made between the materialized and unmaterialized memes might be 
helpful in attempting to clarify the confusion. 
In his book Culture in Plural, de Certeau examines culture from several 
methodological and theoretical points of view, and, thanks to him, we can identify the 
following different interpretations and uses of the term of culture:49° 
1. The features of "cultivated" human beings, that is, corresponding to the 
model developed in stratified societies through a category that introduces 
its norms where it imposes its power. 
2. A patrimony of "works" to be preserved or diffused. 
3. The image, perception, or comprehension of a world belonging to a given 
milieu (rural, urban, Indian etc.) or to a time (medieval, contemporary 
etc.). 
4. Modes of behaviour, institutions, ideologies, and myths that compose 
frames of reference and whose totality, whether it is coherent or not, 
distinguishes one society from another. 
5. Things acquired, insofar as they are distinguished from things innate. 
Culture leans in the direction of creation, artifice, and operativity in a 
dialectic that is opposed to it and combines it with nature. 
6. A system of communication, conceived according to models developed in 
theories of verbal language. 
The s ubstantial c ontents o n t he 1 ist d o s eem t o be v ery different and therefore 
some people have suggested that we should not e xpect that all the elements of the 
definition of culture fall into a systematic order in which they are rationally related to 
one another. Even de Certeau himself says: "Nothing authorizes me to speak of 
culture. I have no credentials for the task. "491 
But given the meme as the substantial core of culture, we may be able to find all 
different forms of cultural elements are related with meme one way or another. And a 
definition of culture in a systematic order seems possible. I will approach de Certeau's 
list in an order different from his, that is, 3, 4, 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
3. "The image, perception, or comprehension of a world" is obviously the meme 
about the whole world, the core of the concept of culture. "Belonging to a given 
milieu or to a time" means the meme is widely accepted within a society (given 
milieu) or at a time, which reveals that the existence of the concept of culture usually 
relies on the external view from another society(another milieu) or from another time. 
4. "Modes of ideologies" are still what I call memes, the inner core of culture. 
"Modes of behavior" are one form of materialization of memes. As discussed above, 
behaviors are materialized memes. "Modes of institutions" are the materialization of 
certain type of memes, the knowledge or perceptions about the human societies. 
"Modes of myths" are the materialization of another group of memes, which are 
490 De Certeau, Culture in Plural, Minneapolis & London : University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p103. 
.49I De certeau, p123. 
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spoken out in the myths. "Frames of reference" and "totality distinguishes one society 
from another" again reveal the importance of external view to the concept of culture. 
1. "The features of `cultivated' human beings" are the materialization of another 
special group of memes, mainly about the manner of speech and behavior, which are 
accepted by people during the process of education. "Developed in stratified societies 
through a category that introduces its norms wherever it imposes its power" reveals 
not only the external view from different strata in a society but also memes' function 
as norms for people's behavior. 
2. "A patrimony of `works' to be preserved or diffused" is the materialization of 
the memes of the people in past seen from an external view by the people from a later 
time. 
5. "Things innate" ought to be the physical things gifted by God and are different 
from memes, which are mental beings in the human mind. So, "things acquired, 
insofar as they are distinguished from things innate ", right reveal culture's nature as 
memes. That "culture leans in the direction of creation, artifice, and operativity in a 
dialectic" is further evidence that culture in essence is memes, the mental beings in 
human mind. 
6. Speaking and writing, as said above, are among the most important forms of 
memes' materialization. "A system of communication, conceived according to models 
developed in theories of verbal language" is the tool for the materialization of memes 
or a form of memes' materialization. 
So far, I seem to have gathered up the threads, through which different forms of 
cultural elements in de Certeau's conceptual bran-tub of culture are related with each 
other. I seem to have found in the concept of culture , two ingredients organized 
following two principles. 
The two ingredients are: 
1. Memes, that is, the unmaterialized memes, which are the mental beings 
inside human mind and also the core of the concept of culture. 
2. Materialized memes, which are physical objects, actions, attitudes, etc. 
The two organizing principles are: 
1. External view: only when different societies with different memes exist and 
when people view externally from another society upon the different the 
memes and their materialized forms, can they have the concept of culture. 
2. Classification of materialized forms: materialized memes are put into smaller 
groups and some of these specific small groups are named as culture by 
people. 
Instead of simply piling up a list of things that are usually called culture, my 
definition seems to at least find out the common essence of and the principles to 
organize different kinds of elements into the concept of culture. Thus the defmition 
does demonstrate a more systematic and logic order. 
2. Relocation of influence -exerting cultural elements on law 
If t he above d efinition h as c larified s ome v agueness o f t he concept o f culture, 
relocation of influence -exerting cultural elements aims to clarify more vagueness of 
culture approach in legal studies. Do all cultural elements exert influence on law? If 
so, what influences do hot and spicy Sichuan food have on marital rape law? If not, 
what cultural elements exert influence on law and on what branches of law? To 
completely eliminate the vagueness of current culture approach in legal studies, we 
need to be more precise. 
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To achieve this goal, the memetic approach seems to be the only choice available. 
Why memetic approach is helpful here is again because of its special understanding of 
the concept of the problem of life as the influence -exerting mechanism of culture on 
law. Since the problem of life is the mediator for cultural elements to have relations 
with law, therefore, any cultural elements, if to be influential, must generate some 
problems of life that need law as their solutions. That is, if a cultural element or a 
meme, when combined with certain natural events or facts, generate a problem of life, 
and the problem of life needs a certain law as its solution, which means it has also 
become a problem of law, then this cultural element is influential on law, which 
means this specific cultural element exerts influence on this specific law. 
For example, the cultural elements concerning women's status, like some parts of 
Confucian ethics or the modern value of gender equality, are the memes, when 
combined with natural facts of marital coercive sex, to decide whether marital rape 
exists or not as a problem of life, which is essential for marital rape as a problem of 
law. Therefore Confucian ethics and values of gender equality are the cultural 
elements that exert influences on marital rape law. In contrast, these memes don't 
combine with the natural actions of cutting down trees to generate problems of life 
and of law, therefore, they are not so influential on forest law. Or to be more specific, 
cultural elements like values of gender equality exert much less or virtually no 
influences on concrete problems of forest law. Memes of how to make hot and spicy 
Sichuan foods are of course also cultural elements. However, these memes are not so 
likely to combine with the natural actions of marital coercive sex to generate problems 
of life. Therefore, memes of hot and spicy Sichuan food are not so closely related with 
and exert much less or virtually no influences on marital rape law. 
Thus, in the memetic approach, we don't talk generally about whether culture is 
influencing law. Instead, we can talk about which specific cultural element is 
influential on which specific problem in which specific branch of law. By doing so, 
the memetic approach has reached a much higher level of precision than culture 
approach. With such precision, we know that it is inappropriate to carry out general 
discussions about culture's influences on law. Cultural element A can be very 
influential on law X while at the same time totally irrelevant with law Y. Law X can be 
greatly influenced by cultural element A while at the same time has nothing to do with 
cultural element B. So, we have to be more precise in analyzing the influence of 
culture on law. 
However some current culturalists, with their general and vague approach, seem 
to have misinterpreted the relationship between culture and law. Pierre Legrand for 
example emphasizes even the influences of the memes of French paintings on French 
law.4 2 He mentions a painting by the French painter, Jacques -Louis David, depicting 
Napoleon in his study drafting the French civil code by candlelight. Legrand thinks 
the paintings offers to comparatists at least as much understanding of the French legal 
mind as any article of the French civil code: "In the way this painting illustrates the 
historically- conditioned relationship between the legislative and judicial powers in 
France, it tells the comparatist at least as much about the notion of judicial restraint 
that governs judicial behaviour in France today as does article 5 of the French civil 
code prohibiting judges from engaging in overt law- making. "493 
This painting is indeed law- related because Napoleon in the painting is studying 
the draft of the French code. However, in the painting -law relation here, it is the legal 




memes materialized into the painting but not the other way round. Therefore it is that 
the legal memes are influencing the painting not that the memes of the painting are 
influencing law. An analogy can illustrates it better. If a religious painting depicting 
God delivering his Ten Commandments to Moses, the painting is indeed related to the 
Ten Commandments. However, it doesn't influence in any degree whatsoever the 
substantial contents of the Ten Commandments. This is the relation of David's 
painting with the French code. If we take all the law- related cultural elements as 
influencing law, we are being imprecise and vague, even fallacious. 
However, Legrand seems to insist that the David painting also exert influences on 
law: "This is because the David painting, and others like it, have helped to shape 
French minds within the legal community, and beyond, at least as much as what any 
provision of the civil code may have achieved, literally and symbolically. "494 But, as 
to exactly how the French legal minds are shaped, what parts of the legal minds are 
shaped, where concrete effects of the shaping lie in law, Legrand does not say. He 
describes in very general, and vague terms the painting's influences on law as a 
cultural element. He does not go on with deeper and more precise study of the above 
questions because, I am afraid, he actually cannot. With artistic paintings' influences 
on law, Legrand is actually suggesting the influences of hot and spicy Sichuan food 
upon Chinese marital rape law. One can make such a general and vague claim, but it 
cannot be supported with concrete and precise studies. This is typical of general 
culture approach in legal studies. Instead of being analytical, logical or scientific, their 





As a part of the effort to modernize Chinese law, Chinese legislators 
transplanted from the west the law of the crimininalization of marital rape. But the 
legal transplant has run into problems in practice. The biggest problem we have found 
is the inconsistency between the legislative criminalization and the judicial 
decriminalization of marital rape. However, this inconsistency has been found not 
only in the present China but also in the early days of marital rape laws in western 
societies like England. We can explain the empirical findings if we assume the 
continuous existence of powerful cultural memes. Some of them favour the 
continuous decriminalisation of marital rape. Others could potentially facilitate future 
criminalisation of marital rape. 
But once we have known the law's nature as memes, we know that the 
inconsistency in the present Chinese legal practice could be eliminated. We also know 
what we could do to promote the elimination of the inconsistency as well as the 
efficiency of the Chinese marital rape law. At the present stage, the legislative 
criminalization of marital rape is only the personal meme of some individual 
legislators but not accepted by a considerable number of members in the Chinese 
society. What this means is that the Chinese marital rape law is not recognized by this 
considerable number of people as legitimate "law" and therefore does not have its 
validity. the solution to the problem of Chinese marital rape law lies in the wider 
spread of the memes of the criminalization of marital rape to those who have not yet 
accepted so as to gain the law the validity in the society as a whole. 
Though the legislative criminalization of marital rape is not yet a legitimate law, 
however, from the memetic view, it is already live memes, or replicators, which have 
the capacity to replicate themselves and spread to more minds. So, currently 
ineffective marital rape law may not yet well function to criminalize marital rape 
actions in practice but can well function to make itself effective in the future. This 
conclusion happens to conform to what some people call the model of "reflexive 
law ". The term of reflexive law was first introduced by Gunter Teubner in 1982.495 
One of the meanings of the word of reflexive here describes "an action that is directed 
back upon itself'. In terms of law, reflexivity could be "making laws on law- making ", 
"adjudicating on adjudication ", or "regulating self -regulation ". If a positive legal rule 
is made, instead of forcing itself upon the society, the rule takes effects through the 
communicative processes with the social systems. So reflexive law realizes the goal of 
lawmaking in a rather flexible and indirect way. It is "to design self regulating social 
systems through its norms of organisation and procedure which are centered around 
communications predicated on a code of legality and illegality which reproduce 
themselves as legal acts ".496 As Professor Bankowski says, "Reflexive rationality does 
not seek to impose its structures on the institution it is regulating but seeks to bend to 
its logic to allow it to do what it wants. It does not try to identify and deal with social 
495 
G. Teubner, Reflexive Recht, ARCHIV FuR RECHTS -UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, 1982, p. 13et seq. 
496 Maher I: "Community law in the National legal order: A Systems Analysis ", in 36 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 1998, p241. 
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problems but rather creates `opportunity structures' which do not destroy patterns of 
social life. "497 
hi some degree, the legislation of Chinese marital rape law, though not well 
followed, well fits the model. The statutory law has criminalized marital rape, 
however, it is actually not imposing itself on the regulation of the problems it is 
supposed to regulate. Instead, the legislation is only working as an element that can 
influence the attitudes of common people or the judicial decisions of the judges. First 
the 1 egislation p rovides for t he v ictims w ho c riminalize t he a ctions o f m arital r ape 
with the chance they did not have to start legal actions. Also the legislation brings the 
idea of the criminalization of marital rape to more people's minds and therefore 
increases the chance of their acceptance. Eventually the making of such a positive rule 
helps to improve the social conditions or provide better opportunities for the rule to be 
operative, resulting in the strengthening of the rule itself. What memetics adds to the 
reflexive model is that, from the memetic view, we can see the concrete implement of 
the reflexive process, the memes. The legislative criminalization of marital rape, 
decisions of the judges and the attitudes of common people are all memes. Though the 
memes of common people and the judges may not follow the legislation at the time 
being, however, through the memetic interaction, the legislative memes of the 
criminalization of marital rape are reproducing and spreading themselves, getting 
themselves better known and better accepted. 
With this, the thesis could conclude its search for a solution to the 
ineffectiveness of Chinese marital rape law, which is to promote the quick spread of 
the memes of the criminalization of marital rape. One helpful way might be wide 
discussions about the problem of marital coercive sex. The discussions may let people 
to pay more attention to and think about the problem so that they can have their own 
opinions as well as know about different opinions. This will increase the chance for 
the memes of the criminalization of marital rape to be known and to be accepted. 
Public media, scholars and experts on law or sociology can make their contributions 
at this point. 
There are two measures that can be taken by the courts. In the long run, the 
courts should explicitly adopt in their reasoning the criminalization of marital rape. In 
those marital rape cases that already now result in a conviction of the defendant, the 
courts should no longer pay lip service to the defendant's marital exemption. Thus the 
people can get the clear message from the courts about marital rape. In the medium 
term, emphasising "violence" over "intercourse" will establish a memetic link 
between an accepted offence element with an as y et problematic feature. As in the 
West, this can be eventually severed. As empirical data has shown, the courts are the 
most efficient carriers to spread marital rape memes. Such a message from the courts 
will greatly promote the spread of the memes of the criminalization of marital rape. 
As data has also suggested, presently in Chinese society, most lay people would 
accept the criminalization of marital rape on the basis of the violence involved. Under 
such circumstances, it will be more convincing if the courts currently make violence 
involve the main ground for the criminalization of marital rape. The courts can also 
stress the abnormal marital status as a reason to criminalize marital rape because 
marital coercive sex taking place at this time is also easier for people to accept to be 
criminal. In contrast, the complete criminalization of marital rape based on the lack of 
consent is not yet able to be quickly accepted by society with the current state of 
mind. 
497 Z. Bankowski, Living Lawfully, Kluwer Academic, 2001, p202. 
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From the memetic view, once the general impression is established, though on 
the ground of violence and abnormal marital status, it prepares the appropriate "soup" 
for t he m eme o f t he complete c riminalization o f m arital rape b ased o n the 1 ack o f 
consent. With the soup prepared, the final acceptance of the memes of complete 
criminalization will follow. The ineffectiveness of current marital rape law will then 
be eliminated. This memetic proposal well conforms to the actual evolutional process 
of the marital rape law in England. It is also in accordance with the theory of reflexive 
law. 
The above practical conclusions on policy owe thanks to the theoretical 
breakthroughs made earlier. The most fundamental notion is the conceptual 
transformation from culture to meme, which has brought a brand new view of the 
nature of culture and law's relation with culture. The general culture approach bases 
its methodology on a homogeneous concept of culture. People employing this 
methodology easily misinterpret the current cultural conditions for marital rape law in 
China by viewing cultural elements homogeneously. Those who support the 
criminalization of marital rape see only the modern notions of human rights and 
women's personal rights while those who oppose the criminalization of marital rape 
see only the traditional Chinese family ethics. Consequently, with such a picture of 
the cultural conditions, the general culture approach has caused the confusions about 
the inconsistency of marital rape law and the inevitable arguments about whether or 
not marital rape should be criminalized. 
The memetic approach on the other hand bases its methodology on an 
individualistic concept of meme. With this individualism, the memetic approach gives 
a more precise picture of cultural elements concerning marital rape law i n Chinese 
society. It covers not only the major groups of the high cultures quoted as 
Confucianism and human rights notions but also all the ideas and thoughts concerning 
marital rape that each human individual has in his /her mind. With this picture about 
cultural conditions, the memetic approach gets rid of the confusions about the 
inconsistency of Chinese marital rape law by interpreting it as the struggle of different 
memes, and gives its own suggestions about how to achieve effectiveness of marital 
rape law. 
One of the special advantages of the memetic approach is that it sees the law 
also as memes in nature. In so doing, the relation between law and culture is no longer 
one between two entities of different nature. Instead, law /culture relation turns into 
the relation between different groups of memes. According to the memetic approach, 
cultural elements are memes, statutes are memes and judicial decisions are also 
memes. So what the memetic approach sees is not that the legislations as legal rules 
"seek to impose its structures on the institution it is regulating ". Instead, it easily 
understand the so- called reflexive law model because the memetic approach can 
easily interpret as memetic interactions the communicative process in which 
legislative criminalization of marital rape as a meme communicates or interacts with 
memes of judicial decisions as well as the memes in lay people's mind of their 
attitudes towards marital rape. Such an interaction first changes the memes in the 
society and reflectively promotes the law at normative level. Thus, the memetic 
approach sees the dynamic nature of the Chinese marital rape law and has different 
suggestions for the law's future from that by the culture approach. 
The new conceptual foundation, naturally, brings about some consequences in 
the theories of comparative law. With the individualistic concept of meme taking the 
place of the general concept of culture, we can find commonness of cultural elements 
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between the societies where overwhelming cultural differences used to be found. The 
newly found cultural commonness offers the key factor for the solution of the problem 
of incomparability of laws with strong cultural influences. Both the functionalist and 
the cultural approach in comparative law find themselves in a dilemma when 
attempting to compare culturally influenced laws, family law for instance. The reason 
for their problems is that the cultural elements, which influence the laws as the 
ontological foundations, are d ifferent. T he d ifferences i n t he c ultural o ntology thus 
have taken away the basic foundation for the comparisons of the laws. However, with 
cultural commonness within cultural differences found back, comparative law again 
has its essential foundations, on which laws with strong cultural influences like family 
laws can get rid of the problem of incomparability. 
However, the most important contribution to comparative law might be the 
rediscovery o f the c oncept of "the problem of life ". In this thesis, "the p roblem of 
life" is no longer an insignificant phrase as Zweigert and Kotz mentioned indifferently 
when talking of some other important problems. Rather "the problem of life" is 
specially redefined here as the fundamental concept to explain the influence -exerting 
mechanism between culture and law. The problem of life so defined consists not only 
of the objective part, which is the physical action or event, but also the subjective part, 
which is the cultural element. Based on the individualistic view of the memetic 
approach, cultural elements become the atom -like units of memes so that they can be 
handily combined with the physical actions or events to form the problem of life. The 
meme constituent of the problem of life is known to some people as the normative 
meaning attached to or people's attitude towards the physical action or event, which is 
the objective constituent. Therefore, given the same physical action or event, different 
meme constituents, or cultural elements, will make different problems of life. And the 
law, as Zweigert and Kotz put it, are the solutions to the problem of life. Different 
problems naturally will need different solutions, which means the differences in law. 
Thus the memetic approach discovers the intermediate mechanism for cultural 
elements to exert their influences on law. This is the problem of life. Cultural 
elements exert their influences directly upon the problem of life, via which they exert 
further indirect influences upon law. But the problem of life is always the factor that 
exerts direct influences on law. 
With the discovery of the influence- exerting mechanism, the memetic approach 
has answered the questions that the general culture approach has been unable to 
answer. Meanwhile, with the influence -exerting mechanism as the criteria, the 
memetic approach makes a special contribution in clarifying the vagueness in the 
relationship between culture on law. For example, with the problem of life, the 
memetic approach can well explain why family ethics and cooking skills are different 
in their relation with marital rape law though they are both cultural elements. 
But we might find the biggest value of the concept of the problem of life in the 
question about the possibility of legal transplant, which is also essential to the Chinese 
marital rape problem. W ith his wide range of e xamples, Alan Watson is extremely 
optimistic about the easy success of legal transplant. With his emphasis on cultural 
influences, Pierre Legrand, on the other hand, thinks legal transplant is virtually 
impossible. The concept of the problem of life seems to be able to show where they 
are fallacious. 
Many legal rules seem to be successfully borrowed into a different society and 
also o perating fairly w ell. W e always h ave t o double c heck whether t hey are truly 
functioning to solve the same "problems of life" as in the original society before he 
claims them as successful legal transplants, as Watson observes. A legal transplant 
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can be said to be successful in strict sense only when the same positive rule is 
functioning to solve the same problem of life in a different society. Whether the 
problems of life are the same depends not only on the objective parts but also on the 
subjective parts, which are the cultural elements. If a borrowed rule is functioning to 
solve a different problem of life in the receptor society, we ought not to say it is still 
the same legal rule as the original one because it is already a different solution to a 
different problem of life. It follows that we cannot say it is a successful legal 
transplant. An analogy may well illustrate this. If a student on a tour sleeps on his 
friend's floor and asks for his friend's The Chambers D ictionary a s p illow for the 
night. Shall we say the student borrows a "dictionary" or a "pillow "? The question 
may lead to more interesting discussions that are beyond the reach of the thesis. But, 
with the problem of life's decisive effect on law, it is sufficient to show that Alan 
Watson's "out of context" doctrine is inappropriate. 
Legrand is right in emphasizing the importance of cultural elements. But it is 
inappropriate for him to try to separate cultural elements from the concrete problems 
of life. Cultural elements do not exert influences on law as independent entities; 
instead, they are the constituents of the problems of life and influence law through the 
concrete problems of life. Legrand might need to check what problem of life a 
painting constitutes before he claims its influences on law. Cultural elements alone do 
not make legal transplant impossible. Legal transplant is impossible only when two 
societies do not share the same problems of life. Therefore, Legrand shall not try to 
make his cultural approach separate from or even antagonistic to the so- called 
functionalist approach. Actually functionalism and culturalism should not be 
separated at all but are an inalienable one. 
Based on the memetic approach, functionalism and culturalism finally achieve 
their reunification in the concept of the problem of life. However, the memetic 
approach is not just trying to be a peacemaker between the two. The memetic 
conclusions flow naturally and necessarily out of their own conceptual foundation, 
which bring about not only some new theoretical thinking to the discipline of 
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Appendfix II Survey Results in Beijing, 
Shangilani end Guangzhou 
From First Hand Horizon 
Opinions of interviewees about whether marital rape exists as social 
fact 
percentage 
It exists. 70.7% 
It doesn' t exist. 13.5% 
I don' t know. 15.8% 
100 
Opinions of interviewees with different marital status about whether 
marital rape exists as social fact 
married unmarried 
It exists. 76.1 65.3 
It doesn' t 
exist. 8.8 18. 3 
I don' t know. 15.2 16.4 
100 100 
Opinions of interviewees with different educational levels about 
whether marital rape exists as social fact 
Senior high, 
technical 
Junior high secondary and University 
school and professional Community and 
below schools college above 
It exists. 59.7% 68.2% 74.0% 83.8% 
It doesn' t 
exist. 23.9% 15.4% 10.0% 3.4% 
I don' t know. 16.4% 16.4% 16.0% 12.8% 
100 l00 100 100 
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Opinions of interviewees in different cities about whether marital 
rape exists as social fact 
Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 
It exists. 68.5% 77.5% 66.1% 
It doesn' t exist. 12.2% 12.9% 15.5% 
I don' t know. 19.3% 9.6% 18.4% 
100 100 100 
Attitudes of interviewees with different marital status towards legal 
solutions of marital rape 
percentage 
Strong objection. 2.20% 
Fairly against it. 8.30% 
Medium. 13.90% 
Fairly support. 32.10% 
Strongly support 37.50% 
It' s hard to say. 6% 
100.00% 
Attitudes of interviewees with different marital status towards legal 
solutions of marital rape 
unmarried married 
Strong objection. 2.1 2.3 
Fairly against it. 5.1 11.5 
Medium. 12.8 14.9 
Fairly support. 29.5 34.7 
Strongly support 45.5 29.6 
It' s hard to say. 4.9 7 
100 100 
Attitudes of interviewees with different educational level towards 
legal solutions of marital rape 
Senior high, 
Junior technical 
high secondary and Communit University 
school and professional y and 
below schools college above 
Strong objection. 2.2% 2.2% 2.5% 2.0% 
Fairly against it. 11.2% 8.8% 7.5% 5.4% 
Medium. 20.1% 14.0% 11.5% 10.8% 
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Fairly support. 29.9% 32.2% 34.5% 30.4% 
Strongly support 26.9% 36.2% 39.5% 48.6% 
It' s hard to say. 9.7% 6.6% 4.5% 2.7% 
100 100 100 100% 
Attitudes of interviewees in different cities towards legal solutions 
of marital rape 
Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 
Strong objection. 3. 2% 0. 6% 2. 8% 
Fairly against it. 10.6% 6.4% 7.9% 
Medium. 12.5% 13.2% 15.8% 
Fairly support. 31.2% 27.7% 37.3% 
Strongly support 34.1% 49.5% 29.0% 
It' s hard to say. 8.4% 2.6% 7.0% 
100 100 100'' 
Have you heard that the new Marriage Law will have special 





"Have you heard that the new Marriage Law will have special 
prescriptions about marital rape ?" by age 
18 -19 20 -24 25 -29 30 -34 35 
Yes. 55.60% 61.90% 67.90% 68.10% 67.60% 
No. 44.40% 38.10% 32.10% 31.90% 32.40% 
100 100 100 100 100 
"Have you heard that the new Marriage Law will have special 
prescriptions about marital rape ?" by city 
Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 
Yes. 60. 5% 70. 7% 60.8% 
No. 39. 5% 29.3% 39. 2% 
100 100 100 
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Appendix II Survey Resu- is in Qingdao 
City and the Rural Areas 
1. SAMPLE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
( vTick the right choice) 
Sex : 1. Male 2. Female 
Marital status: 1. Married(including divorced & widowed) 2. Unmarried 
Age: 1. 18 -25 2. 26 -30 3. 31 -40 4. 41 -50 5. above 50 
Education : 1. Illiterate 2. Primary school 3. Junior high 4. Senior high 5. University or above 
Occupation : 1Farmer ; 2Uurban contracted employee ; 3. Worker in state -owned enterprise 4. 
Student; 5.Tteacher or technician or researcher 6.Businessman; 7.Doctor; 8Soldier; 9. Public 
official; 10. Others (Please indicate) 
Permanent family location: 
1. Coastal area 2. Inland provincial capital; 3. Medium or small sized city 4. County town 5. Village 
Place you stay longest in the last three years : 
I. Coastal area 2. Inland provincial capital; 3. Medium or small sized city 4. County town 5. Village 
( vTick the choice you think right) 
I . In your opinion, if two people are legally married, sexual life is : 
(1). the inevitable result of marriage. No one should refuse the spouse unless he /she is physically ill. 
(2).not the necessary duty of marriage. One can refuse sexual life when he /she does not feel like it. 
2. In your opinion, that the husband forces his wife to have sex without her consent: 
(1). never happens. 
(2) is very common in reality. 
(3).occasionally happens. 
(4). I don't know 
3. In your opinion, the problem of coercive sexual life between husband and wife: 
(1). whether serious or not, is personal privacy between husband and wife only and needs no external 
interference. 
(2). if serious, could be settled within family with the help of senior members but not in the court. 
(3). if serious, should be settled in the court. 
4. Do you think special legal prescription is necessary or not for the husband's coercive sexual action 
against his wife? 
(1) Yes. 
(2)No. 
5. In your opinion, if the husband forces his wife to have sex with him when she doesn't consent, 
(I). now that it is against the wife's will, the action is essentially the crime of rape. 
(2). though it is bad, the action is not illegal because of their- legal marriage. 
(3). the action is a kind of domestic violence and whether it is criminal or not should be decided on the 
specific circumstances or the seriousness of the case. 
(4) nothing wrong with it 
6. If the husband forces his wife to have sex, in which of the following cases do you think the action is 
criminal? 
(1). As long as the wife says no. 
(2). As long as the wife resists. 
(3). Only when the wife is physically hurt. 
(4). It never is. 
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7. If a wife accuses her husband of raping, as a bystander, you will: 
(1). Support the wife completely. 
(2). Support the wife's application for divorce but not her accusation of rape. 
(3). Think it is an absurd story and the wife is ignorant about law 
(4). Sympathize with the husband, thinking that the wife is inhuman and treats her husband unfairly. 
(5). Others: (please indicate) . 
8. The husband forces the wife to have sex, and the court sentences him for raping. What do you think 
of the verdict? 
(1) Reasonable; 
(2) Unreasonable, 
(3) Can 't quite understand why the court made the decision. 
9. The husband forces the wife to have sex, and the court finds him not guilty of rape. But the husband 
is punished based on ordinary domestic violence according to the specific circumstances. What do you 
think of the result? 
(1) Reasonable; 
(2) Unreasonable, 
(3) Can't quite understand why the court made the decision. 
10. The husband forces the wife to have sex, and the court finds him not guilty of rape. Then the wife 
succeeds in applying for divorce. What do you think of the result? 
(1) Reasonable; 
(2) Unreasonable, 
(3) Can 't quite understand why the court made the decision. 
11. As for the question whether the husband's coercive sexual action against his wife is a crime or not, 
the opinion of which of the following people do you find the most trustworthy? 
(I ).Government officials 
(2).Senior family members 
(3).Public figures or stars 
(4).Academic scholars; 
(5).Judges or lawyers 
(6).Others (please indicate). 
12. Have you ever heard of the phrase "marital rape"? 
(1). Yes. 
(2). No. 
If you have heard of "marital rape ", please go on with the following questions: 
13. What is the source from which you heard about marital rape? 
(1). Television 
(2).Newspapers or magazines 
(3). The Internet 
(4). Friends or people around 
(5). Others : (please indicate) 
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2. METHODS OF INVESTIGATION 
In the city of Qingdao as well as the county town of Shenxian in Shandong 
Province, I adopted the random sampling approach by the means of both interviews 
and questionnaires. More specifically, I just picked up the people on the streets or in 
the parks, interviewing them and asking them to fill out the questionnaires. In the city 
of Qingdao, people usually understand Mandarin apart from their own dialect so there 
was n o p roblem communicating. W hat's m ore, people i n Q ingdao u sually h ave n o 
problem to read and write. In most cases, I just gave them the questionnaires to fill in. 
And only in some special cases, the interviewees would need the piloting from the 
interviewers. Since I have a cousin working in the city with his wife, to whom I owe a 
lot of thanks, as I had expected, it wasn't that difficult a task for me to collect the 200 
valid questionnaires needed within one week. 
In the county town of Shenxian, what I specifically did was to set up a table by 
the side of the street, just like a newsstand, and offer some nice little gifts to attract 
people to participate in my investigation. I set up two tables, with distance in between, 
one for male and the other one for female. I trained my cousins, who were educated in 
universities, and my friends & relatives in my home village to work together to help 
with the interviews and the filling -in of the questionnaires. In Shenxian, we usually 
had to do more piloting than in Qingdao city due to the difference in education. 
In the Pengzhuang village in Shandong and the two villages in Shanxi, I took all 
the available villagers aged over 18 as my objects. Since many of them were not 
highly educated, the interviewers usually interviewed every interviewees in person 
rather than just sending around questionnaires. But the interviewees were conducted 
in accordance with the questionnaire. The interviewers spoke out in dialects the 
questions and choices, then asked the interviewees to decide which choice was his /her 
answer to the question. So all the interview results would turn out to be 
questionnaires. As different dialects are spoken in the two provinces, I trained local 
people to be my interviewers. As marital rape is such a sensitive topic, especially to 
the female interviewees, interviews with females were always conducted separately 
by female interviewers. This is what is usually called in Chinese as "women's talk ", 
and it turned out to be very e fficient to let the female interviewees speak out their 
mind. 
At t his p oint, I o we s pecial thanks to my wife, a s mart a nd c onsiderate w ornan, who 
studies law in Peking University. She offered her help on every aspect of my surveys. And her 
help was especially indispensable in the interviews with the female interviewees. She had not 
only helped with the training of the interviewers but had also interviewed many female 
interviewees herself. Moreover, Shanxi is her home province and it is because of our marriage 
that I have learned the dialect in Yongxing and Dachang villages while she has learned the 
dialects in Pengzhuang village and Shenxian county, the language skills of which had been 
essential in the success of the surveys. 
As these are individually- conducted small -scale surveys, most questionnaires 
were filled in in person by the interviewees. Therefore there were no problems of 
response rates as in large -scale surveys. After I have decided the number of 
questionnaires I would plan to have from each place, I would work till I have had the 
number and then be satisfied. So, just as I have planned in advance, the data obtained 
from the surveys are 800 questionnaires, 200 from the medium -sized city of Qingdao 
and 6 00 from t he rural areas. Among t he 6 00 r ural questionnaires, I h ave h ad 3 00 
from the two villages in Shanxi and another 300 from the village and the county town 
in Shandong. 
176 
3. SURVEY RESUTLS IN YONGXING & DACHANG 
Questions Choices Count & 
percent 
1. In your opinion, if two (1). the inevitable result of 113 
people are legally married, 
sexual life is : 
marriage. No one should refuse the 
spouse unless he /she is physically 
ill. 37.8% 
(2).not the necessary duty of 
marriage. One can refuse sexual 
187 
life when he /she does not feel like it. 62.2% 
2. In your opinion, that the (1). it never happens. 26 
husband forces his wife to have 8.5% 
sex without her consent: ' (2).it is very common in reality. 48 
15.9% 
(3). it occasionally happens. 200 
66.7% 
(4). I don't know 27 
9.0% 
3. In your opinion, the problem (1). whether serious or not, is 152 
of coercive sexual life between personal privacy between husband 
husband and wife: and wife only and needs no external 
interference. 50.8% 
(2). if serious, could be settled 
within family with the help of senior 
27 
members but not in the court. 9.0% 
(3). if serious, should be settle in 120 
the court. 40.2% 
4. Do you think the special (1) yes. 141 
legal prescription is necessary 
or not for the husband's 47.0% 
coercive sexúal action against (2) no. 159 
his wife? 
53.0% 
5. In your opinion, if the (1). now that it is against the wife's 19 
husband forces his wife to will, the action is essentially the 
have sex with him when she crime of rape. 6.4% 
doesn't consent, (2). though it is bad, the action is 




(3). the action is a kind of domestic 
violence and whether it is criminal 
or not depends on the specific 
136 
circumstances or the seriousness of 
the case 
45.2% 
(4) nothing wrong with it 0% 
6. If the husband forces his (1). As long as the wife says no. 30 
10.1% 
177 
wife to have sex, in which of 
the following cases do you 
think the action is criminal? 
(2). As long as the wife resists. 43 
14.4% 




(4). It never is. 37 
12.2% 
7. If a wife accuses her (1). Support the wife completely. 70 
husband of raping, as a 23.4% 
bystander, you will: (2). Support the wife's application 
for divorce but not her accusation 
121 
of rape. 40.4% 
(3). Think it is an absurd story and 53 
the wife is ignorant about law 17.6% 
(4). Sympathize with the husband, 
thinking that the wife is inhuman 
33 





8. The husband forces the wife (1) reasonable; 95 
to have sex, and the court 31.6% 
sentences him for raping. What 
do you think of the verdict? 
(2) unreasonable, 132 
43.9% 
(3)can't quite understand why the 74 
court made the decision. 24.6% 
9. The husband forces the wife (1) reasonable 197 
to have sex, and the court finds 65.6% 
(2) unreasonable, 72 him not guilty of rape. But the 
husband is punished based on 
24.0% 
(3)can't quite understand why the 
court made the decision. 31 
ordinary domestic violence 
according to the specific 
circumstances. What do you 
think of the result? 
10.4% 
10. The husband forces the (1) reasonable; 213 
wife to have sex, and the court 71.0% 
(2) unreasonable 68 finds him not guilty of rape. 
Then the wife succeeds in 
22.6% 
applying for divorce. What do (3)can't quite understand why the 
the decision. 
19 
you think of the result? court made 6.5% 
11. As for the question whether (1).government officials 10 
the husband's coercive sexual 3.2% 
(2)senior family members ,- 32 action against his wife, the 
opinion of which group(s) of the 
following people do you find the 
10.6% 
(3).stars or public figures 6 
2.1% 
most trustworthy? (4).academic scholars; 32 
10.6% 
(S) judges or lawyers 213 
70.9% 
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(6).others (please indicate). 8 
2.6% 
12. Have you ever heard of the (1). Yes 149 
phrase "marital rape"? 49.7% 
(2). No. 151 
50.3% 
13. What is the source from (1). Television 17 
which you heard about marital 11.7% 
rape? (2).newspapers or magazines 97 
64.9% 
(3). The Internet 2 
1.1% 
(4). Friends or people around 22 
14.9% 
(5). Others : (please indicate) 11 
7.4% 
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4. SURVEY RESUTLS IN SHENXIAN & PENGZHUANG 
Questions Choices Count & 
percent 
1. In your opinion, if two (1).the inevitable result of 156 
people are legally married, 
sexual life is : 
marriage. No one should refuse the 
spouse unless he /she is physically 
ill. 
51.9% 
(2).not the necessary duty of 144 
marriage. One can refuse sexual 
life when he /she does not feel like it. 
48.1% 
2. In your opinion, that the (1).it never happens. 21 
husband forces his wife to have 7.1 % 
sex without her consent : (2).it is very common in reality. 55 
18.4% 
(3). it occasionally happens. 184 
61.3% 
(4). I don't know 40 
13.2% 
3. In your opinion, the problem (1). whether serious or not, is 
of coercive sexual life between personal privacy between husband 148 
husband and wife: and wife only and needs no external 
interference. 49.4% 
(2). if serious, could be settled 
within family with the help of senior 
39 
members but not in the court. 12.9% 
(3). if serious, should be settle in 113 
the court. 37.6% 
4. Do you think the special (1) yes. 
legal prescription is necessary 
or not for the husband 's 
coercive sexual action against (2) no. 
his wife? 
5. In your opinion, if the (1). now that it is against the wife's 21 
husband forces his wife to will, the action is essentially the 
have sex with him when she crime of rape. 6.9% 
doesn't consent, (2). though it is bad, the action is 173 
not illegal because of their legal 
marriage. 
57.5% 
(3). the action is a kind of domestic 
violence and whether it is criminal 
or not depends on the specific 
107 
circumstances or the seriousness of 
the case 
35.6% 
(4) nothing wrong with it 0 
0% 
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6. If the husband forces his 
wife to have sex, in which of 
the following cases do you 
think the action is criminal? 
(1). As long as the wife says no. 3 
1.1% 
(2). As long as the wife resists. 31 
10.3% 




(4). It never is. 83 
27.6% 
7. If a wife accuses her (1). Support the wife completely. 41 
husband of raping, as a 
bystander, you will: 13.8% 
(2). Support the wife's application 
for divorce but not her accusation 
124 
of rape. 41.4% 
(3). Think it is an absurd story and 
the wife is ignorant about law 
52 
17.2% 
(4). Sympathize with the husband, 
thinking that the wife is inhuman 
83 
and treats her husband unfairly. 27.6% 
(5). Others: 0 
(please 
indicate) 0% 
8. The husband forces the wife (1) reasonable; 80 
to have sex, and the court 26.8% 
sentences him for raping. What 
do you think of the verdict? 
(2) unreasonable, 152 
50.8% 
(3)can't quite understand why the 67 
court made the decision. 22.4% 
9. The husband forces the wife (1) reasonable 178 
to have sex, and the court finds 59.3% 
him not guilty of rape. But the 
husband is punished based on 
(2) unreasonable, 96 
32.0% 
ordinary domestic violence (3)can't quite understand why the 
according to the specific 
circumstances. What do you 
think of the result? 
court made the decision. 26 
8.7% 
10. The husband forces the (1) reasonable; 189 
wife to have sex, and the court 63.0% 
(2) unreasonable 96 finds him not guilty of rape. 
Then the wife succeeds in 
32.0 /o 
't applying for divorce. What do (3)can quite understand why the 15 
you think of the result? court made the decision. 
5.0% 
11. As for the question whether 
the husband's coercive sexual 
action against his wife, the 
(1).government officials 0% 
(2)senior family members ; 0% 
opinion of which group(s) of the 
following people do you find the 
most trustworthy? 
(3).stars or public figures 0% 
(4).academic scholars; 29 
9.5% 
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(5) judges or lawyers 260 
86.5% 
(6).others (please indicate). 12 
4.1% 
12. Have you ever heard of the (1). Yes 131 
phrase "marital rape"? 43.7% 
(2). No. 169 
56.3% 
13. What is the source from (1). Television 30 
which you heard about marital 22.6% 
rape? (2).newspapers or magazines 76 
58.1% 
(3). The Internet 0 
0% 
(4). Frie *nds or people around 30 
22.6% 
(5). Others : (please indicate) 4 
3.2% 
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5. SURVEY RESUTLS IN QINGDAO 
Questions Choices Count & 
percent 
1. In your opinion, if two (1).the inevitable result of 69 
people are legally married, 
sexual life is : 
marriage. No one should refuse the 
spouse unless he /she is physically 
ill. 
34.3% 
(2).not the necessary duty of 
marriage. One can refuse sexual 
131 
life when he /she does not feel like it. 65.7% 
2. In your opinion, that the (1).it never happens. 7 
husband forces his wife to have 6.5% 
sex without her consent : (2). it is very common in reality. 11 
10.2% 
(3). it occasionally happens. 80 
74.1% 
(4). I don't know 10 
9.3% 
3. In your opinion, the problem (1). whether serious or not, is 
of coercive sexual life between personal privacy between husband 59 
husband and wife. and wife only and needs' no external 
interference. 
29.6% 
(2). if serious, could be settled 
within family with the help of senior 17 
members but not in the court. 8.3% 
(3). if serious, should be settle in 124 
the court. 62.0% 
4. Do you think the special ( 1 ) yes. 174 
legal prescription is necessary 
or not for the husband's 87.0% 
coercive sexual action against (2) no. 26 
his wife? 
13.0% 
5. In your opinion, if the (1). now that it is against the wife's 28 
husband forces his wife to will, the action is essentially the 
have sex with him when she crime of rape. 13.9% 
doesn 't consent, (2). though it is bad, the action is 
not illegal because of their legal 
15 
marriage. 7.4% 
(3). the action is a kind of domestic 
violence and whether it is criminal 
or not depends on the specific 
157 
circumstances or the seriousness of 
the case 
78.7% 
(4) nothing wrong with it 0 
0% 
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6. If the husband forces his 
wife to have sex, in which of 
the following cases do you 
think the action is criminal? 
(1). As long as the wife says no. 22 
1 1.1 % 
(2). As long as the wife resists. 31 
15.7% 




(4). It never is. 9 
4.6% 
7. If a wife accuses her 
husband of raping, as a 
bystander, you will: 
- 
(1). Support the wife completely. 113 
56.5% 
(2). Support the wife's application 




(3). Think it is an absurd story and 
the wife is ignorant about law 
17 
8.3% 
(4). Sympathize with the husband, 
thinking that the wife is inhuman 








8. The husband forces the wife 
to have sex, and the court 
sentences him for raping. What 
do you think of the verdict? 
(1) reasonable; 140 
70.1% 
(2) unreasonable, 24 
12.1% 
(3)can 't quite understand why the 
court made the decision. 
36 
17.8% 
9. The husband forces the wife 
to have sex, and the court finds 
him not guilty of rape. But the 
husband is punished based on 
ordinary domestic violence 
according to the specific 
circumstances. What do you 
think of the result? 
(1) reasonable 78 
38.9% 
bl (2) unreasona e,  100 
50.0 /° 
(3)can't quite understand why the 
court made the decision. 22 
11.1% 
10. The husband forces the 
wife to have sex, and the court 
finds him not guilty of rape. 
Then the wife succeeds in 
applying for divorce. What do 
you think of the result? 
(1) reasonable; 160 
79.6% 
(2) unreasonable 17 
8.3% 
(3)can't quite understand why the 
court made the decision. 24 
12.0% 
11. As for the question whether 
the husband's coercive sexual 
action against his wife, the 
opinion of which group(s) of the 
following people do you find the 
most trustworthy? 
(1).government officials 6 
2.8% 
(2)senior family members ; 11 
5.6% 
(3).stars or public figures 2 
.9% 
(4).academic scholars; 6 
2.8% 
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(5) judges or lawyers 167 
83.3% 
(6). others (please indicate). 9 
4.6% 
12. Have you ever heard of the (1). Yes 161 
phrase "marital rape "? 80.6% 
(2). No. 39 
19.4% 
13. What is the source from (1). Television 41 
which you heard about marital 25.2% 
rape? (2).newspapers or magazines 59 
36.7% 
(3). The Internet 37 
22.9% 
(4). Friends or people around 35 
21.8% 
(5). Others : (please indicate) 0 
0% 
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6. CROSSTABULATION STUDIES 
Question 1 in Yongxing and Dachan 
sex is the necessary result of 
marriage 
sex isn't the necessary duty, 
refusable 
male % within 
gender 
41.1% 58.9% 
female % within 
gender 
33.3% 66.7% 
Total % within 
gender 
37.8% 62.2% 
Question 1 in Pengzhuanq village and Shenxian 
sex is the necessary result of 
marriage 
sex isn't the necessary duty, 
refusable 
male % within 
gender 
48.5% 51.5% 
female % within 
gender 
54.2% 45.8% 
Total' % within 
gender 
51.9% 48.1% 
Question 1 in Qingdao 










Question 3 by gender in Yongxing and Dachang 
it's always personal privacy between 
husband and wife only, which needs 
no external interference 
settle within family 
before senior members 
but not in court 
go to the court 
if necessary 
male % within 
gender 
54.2% 5.6% 40.2% 
female % within 
gender 
46.9% 13.6% 39.5% 
Total % within 
gender 
51.1% 9.0% 39.9% 
Question 3 by gender in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
it's always personal privacy between 
husband and wife only, which needs 
no external interference 
settle within family 
before senior members 
but not in court 
go to the court 
if necessary 
male % within 
gender 
51.5% 6.1% 42.4% 
female % within 
gender 
46.0% 18.0% 36.0% 
Total % within 48.2% 13.3% 38.6% 
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gender 
Question 3 by gender in Qingdao 
it's always personal privacy between 
husband and wife only, which needs 
no external interference 
settle within family 
before senior members 
but not in court 
go to the court 
if necessary 
male % within 
gender 
33.9% 8.9% 57.1% 
female % within 
gender 
25.0% 7.7% 67.3% 
Total % within 
gender 
29.6% 8.3% 62.0% 
Education * nature of the action in Yongxing and Dachan 
it is the crime of 
rape, without her 
consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not 
good 
























23.8% 19.0% 57.1% 
Education * nature of the action in Shenxian and Pengzhuan 
it is the crime of 
rape, without her 
consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not 
good 
common domestic violence, 
circumstances decides 






















18.8% 50.0% 31.3% 
Education * nature of the action in Qingdao 
it is the crime of 
rape, without her 
consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not 
good 





















13.3% 6.7% 80.0% 
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Marital status * nature of the action in Yongxing and Dachang 
it is the crime of 
rape, without her 
consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not 
good 







6.2% 48.6% 45.2% 
unmarried % within 
marital 
status 
16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 
Marital status * nature of the action in Shenxian and Pengzhuang 
it is the crime of 
rape, without her 
consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not 
good 







7.4% 58.0% 34.6% 




Marital status * nature of the action in Qingdao 
it is the crime of 
rape, without her 
consent 
it is not illegal 
though it is not 
good 







13.8% 17.2% 69.0% 
unmarried % within 
marital 
status 
11.9% 1.7% 86.4% 
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